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Can genetic tests determine race? Americans are fascinated with
DNA ancestry testing services like 23andMe and AncestryDNA. Indeed,
in recent years, some people have changed their racial identity based upon
DNA ancestry tests and have sought to use test results in lawsuits and
for other strategic purposes. Courts may be similarly tempted to use
genetic ancestry in determining race. In this Essay, we examine the ways
in which DNA ancestry tests may affect contemporary understandings of
racial identity. We argue that these tests are poor proxies for race because
they fail to reﬂect the social, cultural, relational, and experiential norms
that shape identity. We consider three separate legal contexts in which
these issues arise: (1) employment discrimination, (2) race-conscious
initiatives, and (3) immigration. Based on this analysis, we strongly
caution against deﬁning race in predominantly genetic terms.
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INTRODUCTION
Advertisements for DNA ancestry tests are ubiquitous. Any U.S.
consumer with a television has undoubtedly seen a commercial like the
one featuring “Kyle.” In his AncestryDNA testimonial, Kyle states:
Growing up, we were German. We danced in a German dance
group. I wore lederhosen. When I ﬁrst got on Ancestry, I was
really surprised that I wasn’t ﬁnding all of these Germans in my
tree. I decided to have my DNA tested through AncestryDNA.
The big surprise was, we are not German at all. Fifty-two percent
of my DNA comes from Scotland and Ireland. So, I traded in my
lederhosen for a kilt.1
1. Ancestry, Kyle | Ancestry Stories | Ancestry, YouTube (June 13, 2016),
https://youtu.be/84LnTrQ2us8 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). Kyle’s “discovery”
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There are many people like Kyle. Almost thirty million individuals
worldwide have taken DNA ancestry tests,2 and analysts predict that by
2021 this number could exceed 100 million.3 This growing popularity
shows that human beings are very interested in our genetic makeups and
in our genealogies. We are seeking a richer understanding of ourselves
and of our identities, and perhaps a stronger sense of connectedness to
our ancestors.
While some observers view DNA ancestry tests as purely
“recreational,”4 these tests can have a powerful effect on both the
individuals who take them and on society as a whole. For some individuals,
test results may affirm a sense of personal identity or open up new avenues
for racial and ethnic exploration.5 DNA ancestry testing is largely a positive
experience for this group. For others, however, the tests may create an
inner sense of conﬂict if the results deviate from how the individual
views herself or how others perceive her identity. Whether positively or
negatively received, the results of these tests could unfortunately reinforce
the belief that race is biological.
In particular, challenges arise when one considers that DNA ancestry
tests are touted as revealing a person’s “real” or “true” racial or ethnic
identity. This conﬂation of race and genetics was apparent in the back-andthat his genetic ancestry did not align with his lived ethnic identity has been repeated in
numerous other testimonials. See, e.g., Ancestry, AncestryDNA TV Commercial, ‘Katherine
and Eric’, iSpot.tv (2015), https://www.ispot.tv/ad/AZbh/ancestrydna-katherine-and-eric
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Ancestry, AncestryDNA TV Commercial,
Testimonial: ‘Kim’, iSpot.tv (2015), https://www.ispot.tv/ad/wKqV/ancestrydna-kim (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Ancestry, AncestryDNA TV Commercial, ‘Testimonial:
Livie’, iSpot.tv (2016), https://www.ispot.tv/ad/wDMp/ancestrydna-testimonial-livie (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
2. In a blog post, the president and CEO of Ancestry.com writes that “[a]bout 30
million people worldwide have already started a DNA journey, including over 16 million
with Ancestry.” Margo Georgiadis, Our Path Forward, Ancestry (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2020/02/05/our-path-forward [https://perma.cc/65PNZP9W]; see also Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home
Ancestry Test, MIT Tech. Rev. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/612880/more-than-26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review).
3. See Regalado, supra note 2.
4. Deborah A. Bolnick, Duana Fullwiley, Troy Duster, Richard S. Cooper, Joan H.
Fujimura, Jonathan Kahn, Jay S. Kaufman, Jonathan Marks, Ann Morning, Alondra Nelson,
Pilar Ossorio, Jenny Reardon, Susan M. Reverby & Kimberly TallBear, The Science and
Business of Genetic Ancestry Testing, 318 Science 399, 399 (2007); see also Alondra Nelson,
The Social Life of DNA: Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation After the Genome 27 (2016).
5. See, e.g., Ancestry, Blana & Identity | DNA Discussion Project | Ancestry, YouTube
(Nov. 2, 2017), https://youtu.be/bYAKjOgbPuU (on ﬁle with Columbia Law Review)
(discussing the importance of receiving conﬁrmation of her identity through DNA testing).
Following a DNA ancestry test, “[t]est-takers may reshape their personal identities, and they
may suffer emotional distress if the test results are unexpected or undesired.” Bolnick et al.,
supra note 4, at 399; see also Wendy D. Roth & Biorn Ivemark, Genetic Options: The Impact
of Genetic Ancestry Testing on Consumers’ Racial and Ethnic Identities, 124 Am. J. Soc.
150, 165 (2018).
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forth between President Donald Trump and Senator Elizabeth Warren
over Warren’s claimed Native American ancestry.6 In a July 2018 campaign
rally, Trump threatened to expose Warren’s alleged racial fraud by
demanding that she take a DNA test.7 Trump’s argument, at least initially,
was that the DNA ancestry test would reveal who Warren “really is.”8
Similarly, Kyle’s testimonial reduces race or ethnicity to his genetic
code. Kyle said that he grew up German. His family danced in a German
dance group. He wore lederhosen. His family likely ate German-inspired
food. Yet, Kyle seems to have largely abandoned his German cultural
heritage for a new ethnicity based solely on biology—that is, based on his
DNA ancestry test results.
While Kyle’s case seems to involve only a question of personal identity
and Trump’s challenge to Warren was largely political gamesmanship,
DNA ancestry tests raise other social and legal concerns. Consider the
following: For most of his life, Ralph Taylor identiﬁed as white. In 2010,
however, Taylor began identifying as Black9 after a DNA ancestry test
6. For an overview of the exchanges between Trump and Warren and how they reﬂect
reductionist, biological views of race, see Masha Gessen, Elizabeth Warren Falls for Trump’s
Trap—And Promotes Insidious Ideas About Race and DNA, New Yorker (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/elizabeth-warren-falls-for-trumps-trapand-promotes-insidious-ideas-about-race-and-dna (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
7. In the campaign rally, Trump stated that in a future presidential debate:
We will very gently take that kit, and we will slowly toss it, hoping it doesn’t
hit her and injure her arm, even though it only weighs probably 2
ounces, . . . [a]nd we will say, “I will give you a million dollars to your
favorite charity, paid for by Trump, if you take the test and it shows you’re
an Indian.”
Tucker Higgins, Trump Said He Would Give $1 Million to Charity If Elizabeth Warren Took
a DNA Test. Now She Wants Him to Pay Up, CNBC (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/15/elizabeth-warren-dna-test-she-urges-trump-to-fulﬁll-1million-charity-pledge.html [https://perma.cc/LH52-58AQ] (internal quotation marks
omitted); Washington Free Beacon, Trump: I Would Give $1 Million to Warren If She Takes
DNA Test to Prove Native American Heritage, YouTube, https://youtu.be/CgMF7ngs5Ac
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). Trump later denied making the promise. Amy B.
Wang & Deanna Paul, Trump Promised $1 Million to Charity If Warren Proved Her Native
American
DNA.
Now
He’s
Waffling.,
Wash.
Post
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/15/trump-dared-elizabeth-warren-takedna-test-prove-her-native-american-ancestry-now-what (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
8. In 2018, Warren took the test and asserted that the results conﬁrmed her Native
American ancestry. Higgins, supra note 7.
9. We use the term Black throughout this Essay. We recognize that this terminology
does not capture the myriad ways in which individuals racialized as Black today may have
identiﬁed and been identiﬁed by others historically. While the analysis herein uses a
Black/white frame in examining the uses and effects of genetic race, we do not mean to
suggest that race in the United States is limited to Black and white experiences. We
recognize, however, that anti-Blackness has played a critical role in structuring racial
hierarchy in the United States to the detriment—as this analysis shows—not only of Black
Americans but also of other groups racialized as nonwhite. See Devon W. Carbado, Race to
the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1283, 1307–09 (2002) (offering examples of “ways in which
all people of color, and not just Blacks, have been racially subject to Black/White-structured
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indicated that he was ninety percent Caucasian, six percent indigenous
American, and four percent sub-Saharan African.10 Based on these results,
Taylor—who owns an insurance company—sought government
certiﬁcation as a minority-owned business to augment his chances of
securing government contracts.11 When the government refused the
requested certiﬁcation, Taylor sued alleging race discrimination.12
Consider also Cleon Brown, a police officer in Hastings, Michigan.
Like Taylor, Brown identiﬁed as white for most of his life.13 When a DNA
ancestry test indicated that eighteen percent of his DNA traced to subSaharan Africa, Brown shared this information with his colleagues.14
Brown alleged that his fellow officers subsequently subjected him to a

legal and political regimes”). We hope that future investigations of genetic race will build
upon this insight while simultaneously exploring the particularized ways in which racial
groups are dissimilarly situated.
We capitalize the “b” in “Black” and “Blackness” for the same reasons that Kimberlé
Crenshaw articulates in her work. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Retrenchment] (“When using ‘Black,’ I
shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reﬂect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
‘minorities,’ constitute a speciﬁc cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper
noun.” (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 516 (1982))); see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan.
L. Rev. 1241, 1244 n.6 (1991) (“By the same token, I do not capitalize ‘white,’ which is not
a proper noun, since whites do not constitute a speciﬁc cultural group.”). The use of
capitalized terms to refer to Black people also has historical origins. See Crenshaw,
Retrenchment, supra, at 1332 n.2 (“[T]he ‘N’ in Negro was always capitalized until, in
defense of slavery, the use of the lower case ‘n’ became the custom in ‘recognition’ of Blacks’
status as property . . . and . . . the capitalization of other ethnic and national origin
designations made the failure to capitalize ‘Negro’ an insult.” (citing W.E.B. Du Bois, That
Capital “N” (1916), reprinted in 2 The Seventh Son: The Thoughts and Writings of W.E.B.
Du Bois 12, 12–13 (Julius Lester ed., 1971))).
10. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Office of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., No. 165582 RJB, 2017 WL 3387344, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2017).
11. Id.
12. Id. at *4. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal
of Taylor’s lawsuit. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash.’s Office of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters.,
754 F. App’x 556, 558–59 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2755 (2019) (“OMWBE
did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it determined it had a ‘well founded
reason’ to question Taylor’s membership claims and, after requesting additional
documentation from Taylor, determined that Taylor did not qualify as a ‘socially and
economically disadvantaged individual.’”).
13. See Plaintiff’s Complaint & Jury Demand at 5, Brown v. City of Hastings, No.
1:17CV00331 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2017); see also John Eligon, A Sergeant Who Learned
He’s Part Black Says He Faced Racist Taunts at Work, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/us/cleon-brown-black-lawsuit.html (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review). We examine the Cleon Brown case at greater length, infra section
IV.A.2.
14. Plaintiff’s Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 13, at 5.
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racially hostile environment.15 Brown made several allegations. The police
chief called him “Kunta,” after the main character, an enslaved African, in
Alex Haley’s 1976 novel Roots.16 Colleagues whispered “Black Lives Matter”
when Brown passed them in the department’s corridors.17 Someone put a
Black Santa with eighteen percent written on it in Brown’s office Christmas
stocking.18 Hastings’s mayor, upon learning of Brown’s DNA ancestry test
results, told Brown a racist joke repeatedly using the word “Negroid.”19
Brown sued the City of Hastings for race discrimination under federal and
state laws.20
In the foregoing examples, DNA ancestry test results contributed to a
change in identity. We call this construction of identity, based largely on
DNA ancestry test results, “genetic ethnicity” or “genetic race.” While
much of the analysis herein is readily applicable to ethnicity, this Essay
focuses primarily on genetic race.
The above examples also illustrate some of the complex questions
raised by genetic race and demonstrate the potential for genetic racism.
First, what is race? And what happens when a person’s genetic ancestry
conﬂicts with their previously self-identiﬁed race or the way in which
others view their racial identity? For example, before receiving their
ancestry test results, Ralph Taylor and Cleon Brown self-identiﬁed as white.
Moreover, based upon their physical appearances, many—if not most—
Americans would have classiﬁed Brown and Taylor as white. Yet, in their
complaints, both men claimed to be Black or African American because
their DNA ancestry tests revealed some percentage of sub-Saharan African
ancestry. Are Taylor and Brown Black? Should courts allow their
discrimination lawsuits to proceed?
Second, how should genetic notions of race affect assessments of
racial composition and diversity in organizations? Should employers,
colleges, and demographers rely on DNA ancestry test results when
measuring diversity? Should Ralph Taylor, and others like him, now
qualify for race-conscious affirmative action based on their ancestry test
results?
This Essay explores the ways in which DNA ancestry tests both reﬂect
and shape understandings of race in the United States and how these tests
may complicate various social policies and legal doctrines. We
acknowledge that people may incorporate their DNA ancestry test results
into their own racial and ethnic identities and that these tests may shape

15. Id. at 10 (“Defendants, and their supporters in the department, have created an
openly hostile, discriminatory, stressful working environment for Plaintiff.”).
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 11.
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individual conceptions of identity.21 We caution, however, against
conﬂating genetics with lived identities and sociopolitical categories, and
ultimately reject the concept of genetic race for legal or other policy
purposes.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of the
DNA ancestry testing industry, explains how ancestry tests work, and
considers their inherent limitations as proxies for racial and ethnic
identity. Part I also explores the various ways in which people respond to
test results and explains how some responses reinforce biological
understandings of race. Part II analyzes the historical development of
biological race and explains how this concept has been used in the United
States to create, justify, and sustain racial hierarchy. This Part also explains
how biological race, and its recent equivalent—genetic race—conﬂict with
modern understandings of race as a social construction. Part III shows how
genetic race may lead to accusations of racial fraud or cultural
appropriation. It also examines how the rule of hypodescent—also known
as the “one-drop rule”—creates a racial asymmetry with regard to who may
claim a new identity based upon DNA ancestry test results. Part IV
considers three areas in which litigants and other actors may be tempted
to rely on genetic race: (1) employment discrimination, (2) race-conscious
initiatives, and (3) immigration. We conclude that relying on genetic race
is problematic, given the shortcomings of DNA ancestry tests and the social
repercussions of treating the results of these tests as proxies for racial and
ethnic identity.
I. DNA ANCESTRY TESTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON IDENTITY
Genetic ancestry and race are not the same. To fully appreciate why,
one must ﬁrst understand the science behind DNA ancestry tests.
Although our focus is on these tests and the construction of race, this
project is part of a larger—and necessary—interrogation of the interplay
between technological innovation and personal information.22 Science
21. Some scholars have argued that individuals have a dignity or liberty interest in
being able to freely choose or elect their race. See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race:
Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identiﬁcation, 102 Geo. L.J. 1501,
1506–07 (2014) (arguing for a right to self-deﬁnition). While these concerns are not
insigniﬁcant, for purposes of this analysis, we align ourselves with scholars, like Professor
Tanya Katerí Hernández, who adopt a more sociopolitical understanding of race and who
tend to focus less on recognition of personal individual identity and more on group-based
material inequalities. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights: MixedRace Stories of Discrimination 111–26 (2018) [hereinafter Hernández, Multiracials and
Civil Rights] (adopting a “socio-political . . . concept of race” that “jettisons the emphasis
on personal identity in favor of a focus on the societal and political factors that structure
opportunity by privileging and penalizing particular phenotypes and familial connections
viewed as raced across groups”).
22. See generally Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 757 (2015) (arguing for more careful legal scrutiny of genetic evidence);
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law Issues, 75 Ohio
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appeals to many people because it is presumed to be neutral and governed
by objective techniques and veriﬁable facts. Thus, scientiﬁc analyses of
biological information are often tremendously persuasive. Yet science is
constantly evolving and methodological constraints exist. Moreover,
because scientiﬁc inquiry is subject to sociopolitical forces, science can be
manipulated and misunderstood. It is therefore critical to point out the
limitations of science in this and other areas. This Part begins by
examining the evolution of the DNA ancestry testing industry and the
marketing strategies that companies use to promote their products. It then
turns to the science underlying genetic ancestry, including its limitations.
The Part ends by considering the potential impact of ancestry tests on
racial or ethnic identity.
A.

The Origins and Marketing of DNA Ancestry Tests

DNA ancestry tests are a form of direct-to-consumer genetic test.
Customers purchase a testing kit, collect a sample (usually in the form of
a vial of spit or a cheek swab), and mail that sample away for analysis.23
While the consumer genetics market has grown exponentially,24 the DNA
ancestry testing industry is relatively new, with a handful of companies
dominating the market. AncestryDNA—a subsidiary of Ancestry.com—is
by far the biggest player.25 23andMe and FamilyTreeDNA follow
AncestryDNA in market share and popularity.26
Industry giant AncestryDNA began selling its DNA ancestry tests in
2012.27 Ancestry.com had already been operating as a genealogy company
helping customers to create family trees, locate relatives, and search
archives.28 AncestryDNA began as an effort to help users ﬁll in the missing
branches of their family trees.29
State L.J. 1225 (2014) (examining risks associated with the negligent disclosure of genetic
information); Margaret Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 955
(examining the potential discriminatory effects of biometric ID cyber surveillance
technologies in immigration law); Osagie K. Obasogie, The Return of Biological Race?
Regulating Innovations in Race and Genetics Through Administrative Agency Race Impact
Assessments, 22 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (proposing racial impact assessments to
help regulators determine “how to balance the risks and beneﬁts of new technologies that
have the potential to give undue legitimacy to biological race”).
23. Barbara Mantel, Consumer Genetic Testing, CQ Researcher (June 14, 2019),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre2019061400 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See Regalado, supra note 2.
27. Announcing
the
New
AncestryDNA!,
Ancestry
(May
3,
2012),
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2012/05/03/announcing-the-new-ancestrydna
[https://perma.cc/77SE-E399].
28. Our Story, Ancestry, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/ourstory [https://perma.cc/KN4X-4MKR] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020).
29. Id.
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23andMe had a slightly different start. It began in 2008 as a small
Silicon Valley start-up, co-founded by entrepreneur Anne Wojcicki, the exspouse of Sergey Brin of Google fame.30 In fact, Google was among
23andMe’s major initial funders.31 At its founding, the company offered
several kinds of services that included genetic testing for ancestry, certain
traits, and medical conditions.32 The FDA temporarily shut down
23andMe’s health-related testing in 2013.33 However, in 2015, the
company again began offering customers health-related tests, this time
with the FDA’s approval.34 In addition to offering direct-to-consumer
genetic tests for carrier status and disease risk,35 23andMe is the only DNA
ancestry company to gain the FDA’s authorization to offer direct-toconsumer reports on how well users metabolize certain pharmaceuticals.36
FamilyTreeDNA, although less well known, was actually the ﬁrst
company to offer commercial DNA ancestry tests.37 It began as an effort to
use genetic technology to conﬁrm genealogical relationships between
possible relatives.38 A few years later, FamilyTreeDNA partnered with the
National Geographic Society to administer the tests in a worldwide genetic
survey called the Genographic Project.39 Company executives then
expanded FamilyTreeDNA’s testing services to include clinical genetic
testing and exome sequencing under the umbrella of its parent company
GenebyGene.40

30. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, American DNA: The Politics of Potentiality in a Genomic Age,
54 Current Anthropology (Supplement 7) S77, S79 (2013).
31. Id.
32. Id. at S77.
33. The FDA sent a warning letter ordering the company to stop selling health-related,
direct-to-consumer genetic tests, which the agency considered to be medical devices within
its regulatory purview. 23andMe had not obtained the necessary approval for marketing
those tests. Matthew Herper, 23andMe Stops Offering Genetic Tests Related to Health, Forbes
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/12/05/23andme-stopsoffering-genetic-tests-related-to-health/#373f6a454ef7 [https://perma.cc/6FGE-2HGU].
34. Andrew Pollack, 23andMe Will Resume Giving Users Health Data, N.Y. Times (Oct.
21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/business/23andme-will-resume-givingusers-health-data.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
35. Our Health + Ancestry DNA Service, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/dnahealth-ancestry [https://perma.cc/2P7F-JLWE] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020).
36. 23andMe Granted the First and Only FDA Authorization for Direct-to-Consumer
Pharmacogenetic Reports, 23andMe (Oct. 31, 2018), https://mediacenter.23andme.com/
press-releases/23andme-granted-the-first-and-only-fda-authorization-for-direct-to-consumerpharmacogenetic-reports [https://perma.cc/B8K9-NUW6] (last updated Nov. 1, 2018).
37. Brianne E. Kirkpatrick & Misha D. Rashkin, Ancestry Testing and the Practice of
Genetic Counseling, 26 J. Genetic Counseling 6, 7 (2017); see also Andelka M. Phillips, Only
a Click Away—DTC Genetics of Ancestry, Health, Love . . . and More: A View of the Business
and Regulatory Landscape, 8 Applied & Translational Genomics 16, 18 (2016).
38. Kirkpatrick & Rashkin, supra note 37, at 7.
39. See Phillips, supra note 37, at 18.
40. See id.
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Ostensibly, these companies make money from selling test kits to
customers. AncestryDNA sells a single testing kit for a regular price of
$99.41 23andMe offers ancestry and traits tests for $99, and a combined
health, ancestry, and traits test for $199.42 FamilyTreeDNA offers three
separate DNA ancestry tests: (1) ethnic percentages and origins for $79,43
(2) paternal family line for $119,44 and (3) maternal family line for $159.45
However, when 23andMe sold access to its customer database in 2015,
some wondered if the true proﬁt model for consumer genetics was not
selling tests to users but rather selling users’ data to third parties.46
Direct-to-consumer DNA ancestry testing companies each use a
distinct marketing spin to appeal to their customers. AncestyDNA’s
marketing strategy references familial ties but focuses on geographical
origins. The company promises that “[y]our AncestryDNA results include
information about your geographic origins across 1000+ regions and
identif[y] potential relatives through DNA matching to others who have
taken the AncestryDNA test.”47 AncestryDNA claims that it “doesn’t just
tell you which countries you’re from, but also can pinpoint the speciﬁc
regions within them, giving you insightful geographic detail about your
history.”48 It also offers the ability to “[t]race your ancestors’ journeys over
41. DNA, Ancestry, https://www.ancestry.com/dna [https://perma.cc/R2U6-APF4]
(last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
42. 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com [https://perma.cc/D92P-YJAJ] (last visited
Aug. 26, 2020). Consumers can often purchase these products on sale at considerably
reduced prices. See, e.g., 23andMe DNA Kits Are 50% Off Ahead of Black Friday, Today
(Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.today.com/health/23andme-kits-are-50-percent-amazonblack-friday-2018-t143624 [https://perma.cc/K3NW-HT3U] (last updated Nov. 25, 2019);
Courtney Campbell, This Popular DNA Kit Is at Its Lowest Price of the Year Right Now, USA
Today (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/reviewedcom/2018/04/23/
this-popular-dna-kit-is-at-its-lowest-price-of-the-year-right-now/34171495 [https://perma.cc/
962E-J9Z6] (last updated Apr. 24, 2018).
43. Discover Ethnic Percentages and Ancestry with Family Finder, FamilyTreeDNA,
https://www.familytreedna.com/products/family-ﬁnder [https://perma.cc/D6T4-9J28]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2020).
44. Trace
Your
Paternal
Ancestry
with
Y-DNA,
FamilyTreeDNA,
https://www.familytreedna.com/products/y-dna [https://perma.cc/22RH-NQA7] (last
visited Sept. 17, 2020).
45. Trace
Your
Maternal
Ancestry
with
mtDNA,
FamilyTreeDNA,
https://www.familytreedna.com/products/mt-dna [https://perma.cc/2QKH-VWUE] (last
visited Sept. 17, 2020).
46. See Sarah Zhang, Of Course 23andMe’s Plan Has Been to Sell Your Genetic Data
All Along, Gizmodo (Jan. 6, 2015), http://gizmodo.com/of-course-23andmes-businessplan-has-beento-sell-your-1677810999 [https://perma.cc/UK2X-6C7H] (“If you’re paying a
cut rate to have 23andMe sequence your DNA, you are 23andMe’s product.”). Genetic
privacy and individuals’ ownership and control over their genetic data are serious concerns
but are outside the scope of this Essay. For a discussion of genetic ownership controversies,
see Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1105, 1121–
28 (2018).
47. Ancestry, supra note 41.
48. Id.
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time,” “[c]onnect with your people,” and “[b]uild a [family] tree—and
magnify your DNA results.”49
23andMe’s marketing employs the language of self-discovery and
exploration. The company’s website includes the following tagline:
“Three paths. One destination. You.”50 It invites consumers to “[k]now
what makes you, you.”51 It explains that “genetic insights . . . can help
make it easier for you to take action on your health” and that their
products allow you to discover “your personal story, in a whole new way.”52
Not surprisingly, given its origin, FamilyTreeDNA focuses on familial
connections. The company promises its tests will help consumers “[l]earn
about [their] personal history and follow the path[s] of [their]
ancestors.”53 FamilyTreeDNA’s marketing also emphasizes the company’s
ability to provide “industry-leading tests.”54 It boasts of having “the world’s
most comprehensive DNA matching database for autosomal DNA, Y-DNA,
and mtDNA.”55 The company continues to pair with National Geographic
to give its customers “more insight into where [their] ancestors came
from.”56 Speciﬁcally, FamilyTreeDNA allows individuals who have
participated in the National Geographic Genographic Project to transfer
those results to FamilyTreeDNA in order to use its tools and services.57
Albeit in somewhat different ways, all three companies attempt to
capitalize on the idea that DNA is tied to identity, either familial,
geographical, or personal. As Professor Timothy Caulﬁeld argues, DNA
ancestry testing companies market to consumers “a history that is rooted
in biological variation, not culture or emotional connection. The clear
message is that your genes are closely tied, at some intrinsic level, to who
you are as a person.”58 Because DNA ancestry tests are grounded in
genetics, they naturally reinforce the idea—which is already deeply
ingrained in the United States—that race is biologically determined.
Indeed, Professor Dorothy Roberts warns that “the explosion in genetic
ancestry testing is perpetuating a false understanding of individual and
collective racial identities that can have widespread repercussions for our
49. Id.
50. 23andMe, supra note 42.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Begin Your DNA Journey, FamilyTreeDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com
[https://perma.cc/W3WY-VEMV] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. National Geographic Genographic Project Transfers, FamilyTreeDNA, https://
www.familytreedna.com/nat-geo-transfer [https://perma.cc/XU35-3D75] (last visited Aug.
31, 2020).
57. Id.
58. Timothy Caulﬁeld, Is Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Reifying Race?, Pol’y
Options (Mar. 23, 2018), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/march-2018/directconsumer-genetic-testing-reifying-race [https://perma.cc/NR6G-JDAJ].
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society.”59 In short, DNA ancestry tests are creating the conditions for
genetic race.
B.

The Science and Limitations of DNA Ancestry Tests

DNA ancestry tests represent a marriage of at least two separate areas
of scientiﬁc inquiry: (1) genetic similarity and (2) human migratory
patterns.60 Importantly, the Human Genome Project revealed that human
beings are 99.9% genetically similar.61 The variation in that remaining
fraction of a percent is what enables DNA ancestry testing companies to
predict people’s geographic origins.62 Yet how do these genetic differences
arise and what allows these companies to correlate them with particular
parts of the globe? In this section, we explain the science behind DNA
ancestry tests and its limitations with respect to accurately predicting
genetic ancestry.
1. Background Science. — Fully understanding DNA ancestry tests
requires some knowledge of the underlying science. Here we offer a brief
introduction to the nature of genetic variation and how scientists use those
differences to predict an individual’s genetic ancestry.
First, DNA sequences change over time. Because organisms pass their
genes from parent to offspring, children may inherit their parents’ genetic
idiosyncrasies, including random genetic changes known as “mutations.”63
DNA also changes as a result of sexual reproduction. Each person’s
genome is a blend of her genetic parents’ DNA.64 New traits enter
populations as members of those populations mate and generate new
genetic combinations. In short, mutations and sexual reproduction create

59. Dorothy Roberts, Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business ReCreate Race in the Twenty-First Century 249 (2011) [hereinafter Roberts, Fatal Invention].
Roberts notes:
Genetic genealogy has tremendous power to inﬂuence the way we deﬁne
race, determine who belongs to various racial groupings, and understand
racial connections. Test results are being used not only as a means to
explore personal identity, but also as a basis for claiming membership in
racial groups in order to qualify for government beneﬁts and
entitlements.
Id. at 249–50.
60. See id. at 57–65.
61. Remarks on the Completion of the First Survey of the Human Genome Project, 1
Pub. Papers 1267, 1268 (June 26, 2000); Genetics vs. Genomics Fact Sheet, Nat’l Hum.
Genome Rsch. Inst., https://www.genome.gov/19016904/faq-about-genetic-and-genomicscience [https://perma.cc/T8ZL-E7NQ] (last updated Sept. 7, 2018).
62. See Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 59–62.
63. What Is a Gene Mutation and How Do Mutations Occur?, U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med.,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/mutationsanddisorders/genemutation [https://perma.cc/
9V9K-FFYD] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
64. What Is a Gene?, U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med., https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
primer/basics/gene [https://perma.cc/AC49-6LMT] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
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genetic variation. Evolution may then tip in favor of the transmission of
one genetic trait or another through reproduction.65
Not all populations, however, are equally genetically diverse. In
isolated populations, genetic similarity tends to increase over time. People
in those populations have access to fewer mates. As a result, they breed
with genetically similar individuals, thereby locking in the population-wide
genetic traits. We know this phenomenon as “inbreeding.” Greater levels
of genetic similarity within isolated populations make them more
susceptible to certain genetic conditions.66
Using the degree of genetic similarity between species, evolutionary
biologists can measure “evolutionary distance.” Evolutionary distance
roughly correlates to the number of years since two species that share a
common genetic ancestor diverged. For example, human beings are
ninety-six percent similar to chimpanzees with an evolutionary distance of
about ﬁve to seven million years.67
Although humans are members of the same species, evolutionary
biologists can still speculate as to when one human population diverged
from another. To draw these conclusions, scientists must work from widely
held assumptions about where humans as a species originated. Most
evolutionary biologists agree that modern humans began in East Africa.68
Populations then migrated, probably in waves, to other regions of the
world.69 At varying points during these migrations, environmental
65. How Are Gene Mutations Involved in Evolution?, U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med.,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/mutationsanddisorders/evolution
[https://perma.cc/9TY8-T2LW] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
66. PM Galetti, Jr., Conservation Genetics, in 2 Brenner’s Encyc. of Genetics 165, 165–
66 (Stanley Maloy & Kelly Hughes eds., 2d ed. 2013).
67. Ajit Varki & Tasha K. Altheide, Comparing the Human and Chimpanzee Genomes:
Searching for Needles in a Haystack, 15 Genome Rsch. 1746, 1746 (2005); Stefan Lovgren,
Chimps, Humans 96 Percent the Same, Gene Study Finds, Nat’l Geographic (Aug. 31,
2005), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/8/chimps-humans-96-percentthe-same-gene-study-ﬁnds [https://perma.cc/J3YN-786V]. Estimates of the evolutionary
distance vary somewhat. Compare Galina V. Glazko & Masatoshi Nei, Estimation of
Divergence Times for Major Lineages of Primate Species, 20 Molecular Biology & Evolution
424, 432 (2003) (“Therefore, we can probably say that the divergence between humans and
chimpanzees occurred about 6 MYA with a rough range of 5–7 MYA.”), and Naoyuki
Takahata, Yoko Satta & Jan Klein, Divergence Time and Population Size in the Lineage
Leading to Modern Humans, 48 Theoretical Population Biology 198, 216 (1995) (listing
that chimps and humans diverged 4.6 million years ago), with Oliver Venn, Isaac Turner,
Iain Mathieson, Natasja de Groot, Ronald Bontrop & Gil McVean, Strong Male Bias Drives
Germline Mutation in Chimpanzees, 344 Science 1272, 1274 (2014) (calculating that the
average time when human and chimp genomes can be aligned is around thirteen million
years ago).
68. See Chris Stringer, Out of Ethiopia, 423 Nature 692, 692 (2003); see also Andrea
Manica, William Amos, François Balloux & Tsunehiko Hanihara, The Effect of Ancient
Population Bottlenecks on Human Phenotypic Variation, 448 Nature 346, 346 (2007).
69. See Manica et al., supra note 68, at 349 (ﬁnding that that there were likely land
bridges that facilitated waves of emigration, including “a single connection between Africa
and Eurasia via a route through the Sinai to the Levant, the Bering Strait between Eurasia
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constraints—such as a mountain range or a rough winter—isolated
populations, leading to inbreeding and the resulting locking in of certain
genetic attributes.70 As the populations continued to move, they carried
with them the unique genetic traits associated with their geographic
origin, thus making it possible to genetically group those populations. The
more genetic data a researcher has, the ﬁner the distinctions she can
make. For example, DNA ancestry tests are quite reliable for individuals of
predominantly European descent because those populations make up the
bulk of the current databases.71
DNA ancestry tests use the assumptions described above to predict an
individual’s ancestral geographic origin. These predictions are then
reported as the individual’s “genetic ancestry.” The DNA ancestry
companies arrive at their results by comparing the individual consumer’s
genetic data to the populations in the companies’ unique databases.72
Consequently, each DNA ancestry company could yield different results
for the same consumer because the companies are using different
reference databases.73 Furthermore, as more consumers take DNA
ancestry tests, the size and diversity of the companies’ databases increase,
which may lead companies to ﬁne-tune their results and to reclassify their
customers. For example, in spring 2019, AncestryDNA updated its
database, leading the company to change the reported ethnicity for some

and the Americas, and connections between the Malaysian Peninsula to Melanesia and
Oceania”).
70. See Val C. Sheffield, Edwin M. Stone & Rivka Carmi, Use of Isolated Inbred Human
Populations for Identiﬁcation of Disease Genes, 14 Trends Genetics 391, 391–92 (1998).
71. See Ancestry Composition: 23andMe’s State-of-the-Art Geographic Ancestry Analysis,
23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/ancestry-composition-guide [https://perma.cc/K3P2FCH6] (last updated Sept. 2019) (“Historically, biomedical research has disproportionately
focused on participants of European descent. Due to this bias, and . . . [because most]
23andMe customers have unmixed European ancestry, we have the most reference data from
European populations, and we are able to distinguish as many sub-populations from Europe
as across all of Asia.”); Isabelle Mencia, Why DNA Ancestry Tests Are Struggling to Avoid
White Bias, Study Break (Mar. 5, 2018), https://studybreaks.com/news-politics/dnaancestry-tests [https://perma.cc/9CUT-P98A].
72. Charmaine D. Royal, John Novembre, Stephanie M. Fullerton, David B. Goldstein,
Jeffrey C. Long, Michael J. Bamshad & Andrew G. Clark, Inferring Genetic Ancestry:
Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications, 86 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 661, 665 (2010)
(“[E]pidemiological inferences of genetic ancestry are typically applied to individuals and are
nearly always based on the analysis of large collections of single nucleotide polymorphisms . . .
or ancestry informative markers. . . . Each individual’s genome is then mapped as a mosaic of
segments inferred to be derived from . . . [the] ancestral population . . . .”).
73. Kirkpatrick & Rashkin, supra note 37, at 9; see also Royal et al., supra note 72, at
668 (highlighting the limitations to the publicly available databases that research geneticists
use).

2020]

GENETIC RACE?

1943

of its users.74 One customer, whose son had taken a test, called the change
in results “quite upsetting . . . because that’s his identity.”75
Companies offering DNA ancestry tests may report an individual’s
genetic ancestry in a number of ways. They may return results as
continental origin such as European, East Asian, African, and Indigenous
American.76 Alternatively, companies may present results as biogeographical ancestry. Biogeographic ancestry compares a person’s DNA
to modern populations.77 Scientists can use biogeographic ancestry to
predict an individual’s (or her ancestor’s) originating country.78 Industry
leaders like AncestryDNA and FamilyTreeDNA often combine the two
with their ethnicity tests. Both companies return their results in terms of
continental origin (e.g., Europe South/European) and in terms of
countries (e.g., Italy). We provide examples of how those companies
present their results in Figures 1 and 2 below.

FIGURE 1: ANCESTRYDNA79

74. Liam Mannix & Alexandra Gauci, Time to Get that Viking Tattoo Removed?
Ancestry Updates DNA Results, Sydney Morning Herald (Apr. 28, 2019),
https://www.smh.com.au/national/time-to-get-that-viking-tattoo-removed-ancestryupdates-dna-results-20190426-p51hmh.html [https://perma.cc/2DB3-XQK3].
75. Id (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Simone).
76. Jennifer K. Wagner, Interpreting the Implications of DNA Ancestry Tests, 53
Persps. Biology & Med. 231, 236 (2010). Continental ancestry “assumes the existence of four
or ﬁve major ‘parental’ populations that gave rise within the last 100,000 years to existing
populations.” Royal et al., supra note 72, at 661. However, “there is little evidence that four
biologically discrete groups of humans ever existed.” Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 400.
77. Royal et al., supra note 72, at 661.
78. See Kirkpatrick & Rashkin, supra note 37, at 8–9.
79. This image comes from the results of an AncestryDNA test. AncestryDNA,
DNAOrigins: DNA Results Summary 1 (2020) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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FIGURE 2: FAMILYTREEDNA80

DNA ancestry tests can also report an individual’s relationships to
their genetic family members.81 For example, AncestryDNA users not only
gain access to information about their genetic ancestry (expressed in
geographical terms) but also the ability to match with other users to whom
they may be genetically related.82 Using this technology, one of the authors
of this Essay located her genetic cousins. She had never met some of her
matches because her father was adopted. The website compared her
genetic data to that of its database and found enough genetic similarity to
hypothesize that she and two other users were long-lost genetic relatives.
Law enforcement has used these kinds of familial matches as a crimesolving tool. For example, in April 2018, police arrested Joseph James
DeAngelo for a string of decades-old assaults and murders after the DNA
from his third and fourth cousins partially matched crime-scene DNA.83
Investigators used the partial match to look for a suspect within the

80. This image comes from the results of a FamilyTreeDNA test. myFTDNA, Origins 1
(2020) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
81. See Royal et al., supra note 72, at 661–63 (detailing the types of ancestry tests and
genetic testing services that various companies offer); see also Kirkpatrick & Rashkin, supra
note 37, at 10 (outlining the methodologies companies use to perform DNA relative
matching).
82. See Kirkpatrick & Rashkin, supra note 37, at 10.
83. Natalie Ram, Christi J. Guerrini & Amy L. McGuire, Genealogy Databases and the
Future of Criminal Investigation, 360 Science 1078, 1078 (2018); Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will
Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State Killer Can Home in on About 60% of
White Americans, Science (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/
we-will-ﬁnd-you-dna-search-used-nab-golden-state-killer-can-home-about-60-white
[https://perma.cc/J3LC-2JUA].
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cousins’ family tree.84 After zeroing in on DeAngelo, they then collected
his discarded DNA for forensic testing and identiﬁed him as the alleged
killer. As this case demonstrates, DNA can be a powerful tool for
establishing genetic relatedness.85 However, as we discuss in further detail
below, DNA ancestry tests are far less reliable when it comes to predicting
genetic ancestry.86
2. The Limitations of DNA Ancestry Tests. — Having explained the
science of DNA ancestry tests, we now turn to how these tests may fail to
accurately predict a person’s genetic ancestry. A variety of factors affect
the ability to predict genetic ancestry: (1) the distribution of human
genetic variation, (2) the genetic markers used as reference points, (3) the
selection of reference populations, and (4) the statistical measures used
for analysis.87 As a result, there are certain things DNA ancestry tests
cannot do.88
First, DNA ancestry tests cannot perfectly calculate a person’s
continental origin or biogeographic ancestry. Even within populations,
genetics vary and are inevitably matters of probability. There is no single
genetic trait shared by all members of an ancestral population or that only
occurs within a given population.89 Consider this hypothetical. Genetic
Marker 1 occurs in eighty-ﬁve percent of people with ancestors from
Population A, whereas ﬁfteen percent of people with ancestors from
Population A have Genetic Marker 2. Genetic Marker 1 also occurs with
much less frequency in people with ancestors from Populations B, C, and
D, say in less than one percent of those individuals.
While DNA ancestry tests look at thousands of genetic markers and
individuals have ancestors from multiple populations, we can nonetheless
use our simpliﬁed hypothetical to illustrate how a person might receive an
inaccurate result. Because a person with Genetic Marker 1 is most likely to
have ancestors from Population A, DNA ancestry companies would likely
link Genetic Marker 1 to Population A ancestry. A person who is
descended from the ﬁfteen percent without Genetic Marker 1 would be
told they do not have Population A ancestry, whereas the rare person with
Population B ancestry who has Genetic Marker 1 would be told they are
84. See Abigail Abrams, How Did They Catch the Golden State Killer? An Online DNA
Service and His Genetic Relatives Revealed the Suspect, Time (Apr. 26, 2018),
http://time.com/5256835/how-did-golden-state-killer-genealogy-websites-online-dnapolice [https://perma.cc/5N3U-HQCW].
85. See id.
86. See infra section I.B.2.
87. Royal et al., supra note 72, at 667. For an in-depth discussion of the limitations of
DNA ancestry testing as the result of these four factors, see id. at 667–69.
88. See id. at 661 (explaining that “[t]he very concept of ‘ancestry’ is subject to
misunderstanding in both the general and scientiﬁc communities”).
89. See David Serre & Svante Pääbo, Evidence for Gradients of Human Genetic
Diversity Within and Among Continents, 14 Genome Rsch. 1679, 1682–84 (2004)
(discussing genetic diversity within and between continents).
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descended from Population A. Therefore, a person who is in the genetic
minority of an ancestral population will get an incorrect result. Moreover,
even if a test can pinpoint some geographic locations where a particular
genetic variant occurs frequently, it is unlikely to reveal every place that
the genetic variation is found,90 such as the rare—and perhaps unknown—
occurrence of Genetic Marker 1 in Populations B, C, and D. Thus, even if
a DNA genetic ancestry test indicates that an individual has zero percent
of a particular background, it cannot completely rule out the possibility
that the individual is actually a member of that ancestral group.91 As we
discuss below, a different company with a more comprehensive database
and more detailed set of match criteria could yield a more accurate result.
This hypothetical also explains why certain health conditions are
more common in particular populations. Imagine that having Genetic
Marker 1 makes a person a carrier for a particular genetic condition.
People with Population A ancestry will be at greater risk. However, not all
people with Population A ancestry will be carriers, and there will be
carriers with other kinds of ancestry as well. For example, it is common
knowledge that people with Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry are more likely to
be carriers for Tay-Sachs.92 However, not all Tay-Sachs carriers are of
Ashkenazi Jewish descent, and the vast majority of people who have
Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry do not carry the genetic variant associated with
Tay-Sachs.93 Similarly, it is commonly known that people with African
ancestry are more likely to be carriers for sickle cell.94 However, not all
sickle cell carriers are of African descent, and most people with African
ancestry do not have that particular genetic variant.95
Interestingly, individuals with Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, or
South Asian ancestry may sometimes be misclassiﬁed as “Native
American.” Why? Because some genetic markers coded as “Native

90. See Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 399 (observing that while “genetic ancestry
testing can identify some of the groups and locations around the world where a test-taker’s
haplotype or autosomal markers are found, . . . it is unlikely to identify all of them”).
91. See Wagner, supra note 76, at 241–42 (noting that genomic ancestry tests
frequently cannot prove a person is not of a particular ancestry “because the test alleles are
found in multiple different populations, so that group-fraction assignments are
probabilistic, not discretely different”); see also Royal et al., supra note 72, at 667 (“Accuracy
is limited by the fact that every person has hundreds of ancestors going back even a few
centuries and thousands of ancestors in just a millennium. . . . Genetic ancestry tests can
access only a fraction of these ancestral contributions.”).
92. Troy Duster, Buried Alive: The Concept of Race in Science, Chron. Higher Educ.
(Sept. 14, 2001), https://www.chronicle.com/article/buried-alive-the-concept-of-race-inscience (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
93. See id.; Tay Sachs Disease, Nat’l Org. for Rare Disorders,
https://rarediseases.org/rare-diseases/tay-sachs-disease [https://perma.cc/6Q2K-GC56]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (“Approximately one in 30 Ashkenazi Jewish people carries the
altered gene for Tay-Sachs disease.”).
94. See Duster, supra note 92.
95. See id.
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American” are present within other ancestral populations.96 In a
particularly colorful variation on this theme, a man received a result
indicating that he was a descendant of Genghis Khan, only to discover that
he was not actually one of Khan’s genetic relatives.97 Like in our
hypothetical of Genetic Markers 1 and 2, these results occur when a DNA
ancestry company categorizes a variant as “Native American” or “related
to Genghis Khan” while ignoring the fact that the variant also occurs—
albeit with less frequency—in other ancestral populations.98
These examples demonstrate that, although a database may contain
tens of thousands of samples, it may still fail to capture the full extent of
genetic diversity within a particular group or in a particular area.99 For
instance, one common criticism of DNA ancestry testing is that the
individuals who get the most reliable results tend to be of predominantly
European descent because of their overrepresentation in the reference
databases.100
Individuals taking DNA ancestry tests may be unaware of the extent
of the tests’ limitations. As Section I.A discusses, the DNA ancestry testing
industry may actually reinforce misconceptions about the tests’ meaning
and accuracy in its efforts to attract new clients.101 However, it is worth
emphasizing that even if DNA ancestry tests could predict ancestral origins
with perfect accuracy, it would still be a mistake to conﬂate those results
with race.102 As Part II explains, the results of these tests fail to reﬂect the

96. See Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 400 (“Because no archaeological, genetic, or
historical evidence supports [the suggestion that people with Middle Eastern, Mediterranean,
or South Asian ancestry also have Native American ancestry], the test probably considers some
markers to be diagnostic of Native American ancestry when, in fact, they are not.”).
97. Nicholas Wade, Falling from Genghis’s Family Tree, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/21/science/21genghis.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
98. See id.
99. Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 399.
100. See Royal et al., supra note 72, at 665 (“[T]here are limitations to the accuracy of
ancestry inference within and among regions. Several studies that sampled populations
deeply across Europe have shown that population structure can be inferred even at ﬁne
spatial scales (i.e., the scale of several hundreds of kilometers) within Europe.”). At the
population level, genetic tests tend to be less accurate than their genomic counterparts. See
Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 399 (noting that genomic DNA ancestry tests attempt to
provide a better measure of overall ancestry by analyzing more genetic markers).
101. Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 399 (“[B]oth scientists and consumers should
approach genetic ancestry testing with caution because . . . commercialization has led to
misleading practices that reinforce misconceptions.”).
102. See Royal et al., supra note 72, at 661 (“This conception of ancestry is frequently
equated with that of ‘race,’ and the terms are often used interchangeably; however, this is
problematic because in the history of science there have been many ‘racial’ taxonomic
schemes.”). Moreover, “these [ancestry informative markers] are not found in all peoples
who would be classed together as a given ‘parental’ population.” Bolnick et al., supra note
4, at 400.
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social, cultural, relational, and experiential norms that deﬁne racial
classiﬁcation schemes.103
C.

Effects of DNA Ancestry Tests on Racial and Ethnic Identity

At ﬁrst blush, DNA ancestry tests may appear to be harmless tools for
self-exploration. They are frequently described as “recreational,”104 and
commercials for DNA ancestry tests, such as the one featuring Kyle
described in the Introduction, are fun and lighthearted in tone. Yet by
stating that their services will give people a greater understanding of who
they are, DNA ancestry testing companies reinforce beliefs in genetic race.
Test takers can, and do, misconstrue these products as tests for biological
race. This section considers how individuals react to their results.
Some people have happily received their DNA ancestry test results.
For example, one satisﬁed customer—after lauding a DNA ancestry
company’s professionalism—wrote: “Most importantly, I trust their
scientiﬁc methodology so I have no trouble accepting the ﬁndings.
Actually, it turns out that I am exactly who I thought I was because my
more recent ancestors were to be found not so far away from the newlydiscovered mitochondrial cousins!”105
Another DNA ancestry test taker was delighted with his results
because he believed they proved his family’s “true” origin: “After one
simple test, I have proof that family tradition was wrong; that my family are
really [Swiss]. Because of this test, we’ve solved a major genealogical
dilemma, with dramatic evidence of the continuity of family lines.”106
Lyn, an AncestryDNA customer, was similarly pleased with her results.
In her testimonial, Lyn states:
I didn’t know where I was from ethnically. So, we sent that sample
off to Ancestry. My AncestryDNA results are that I’m twenty-six
percent Nigerian. I’m just trying to learn as much as I can about
my culture. I put the Gele on my head and I looked into the
mirror and I was trying not to cry. Cause it’s a hat. But it’s like the
most important hat I’ve ever owned.107
103. See Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 400 (“Current understandings of race and
ethnicity reﬂect more than genetic relatedness, though, having been deﬁned in particular
sociohistorical contexts (i.e., European and American colonialism). In addition, social
relationships and life experiences have been as important as biological ancestry in shaping
individual identity and group membership.”).
104. See supra note 4.
105. Testimonials, Roots for Real, http://www.rootsforreal.com/testimonials_en.php
[https://perma.cc/NNW7-8ADT] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020) (testimonial of V.L. Young).
106. Our
Customers’
Comments
&
Testimonials,
FamilyTreeDNA,
http://www.familytreedna.com/testimonials.aspx [https://perma.cc/JZG5-TJF8] (last
visited Aug. 26, 2020) (emphasis added) (testimonial of Justin Howery).
107. Ancestry, AncestryDNA | Lyn Discovers Her Ethnicity Discoveries | Ancestry,
YouTube (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0l0_ttMidII (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
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Reactions to genetic ancestry results, however, are not always positive.
This is particularly true when the results conﬂict with an individual’s selfidentiﬁed race or their expressed race and observed race.108 Self-identiﬁed
race is the race that you consider yourself to be. Expressed race is the race
you say you are to others.109 Observed race is the race others actually
assume you to be.110 When DNA ancestry test results contradict any of these
perceptions of race, the test taker may experience psychological stress and
may fear a loss of status, personal and professional relationships, and
material beneﬁts.111 In these situations, test takers are more likely to reject
their test results.
A recent study by Professor Aaron Panofsky and Dr. Joan Donovan
illustrates the latter point, as well as the malleability of racial categories.112
Using a white nationalist online forum as their focus group, Panofsky and
Donovan recorded and evaluated how self-identiﬁed white nationalists
responded to DNA ancestry tests indicating mixed-race ancestry. The study
not only evaluated how members of this community perceived their own
surprising results, but also examined how members perceived and
responded to the results of other members. Panofsky and Donovan found
that despite the forum’s professed commitment to racial purity, most
responses tended to reframe the results in a manner that allowed members
to maintain their white identities.113 Of the members who responded to
another poster’s ancestry results, more were supportive than
denunciatory.
Panofsky and Donovan found that the supportive responses fell into
two broad categories. Responses in the ﬁrst category expressed support by
rejecting the validity of the ancestry tests themselves. These responses
included allegations that the testing companies had distributed erroneous
results to fulﬁll an anti-white agenda,114 as well as recommendations that
people use their family’s personal accounts rather than ancestry tests to
trace their genealogy.115 Other users in this category claimed that race and
ethnicity were as simple as what a person sees in the mirror.116 Responses
in the second category expressed support by reinterpreting the test results.
108. See Ellis P. Monk, Jr., The Costs of Color: Skin Color, Discrimination, and Health
Among African-Americans, 121 Am. J. Socio. 396, 410 (2015) (discussing the multiple
dimensions of racial identiﬁcation in the United States).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 399; Wagner, supra note 76, at 238.
112. See Aaron Panofsky & Joan Donovan, Genetic Ancestry Testing Among White
Nationalists: From Identity Repair to Citizen Science, 49 Soc. Stud. Sci. 653, 657–58 (2019).
113. See id. at 661–62 (explaining that “many [genetic ancestry test] users are willing
to appeal to fellow Stormfront posters for interpretive help or moral support in the face of
problematic news despite the ostensibly absolute membership criterion” and showing that
there were more supportive responses than denunciatory ones).
114. Id. at 666.
115. Id. at 665.
116. Id. at 665–66.
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These responses took many forms but often included leeway for statistical
error or a focus on the ancestry tests’ lack of precision.117
From these ﬁndings, Panofsky and Donovan concluded that the white
nationalist movement possesses the ﬂexibility to reframe and respond to
DNA ancestry test results in ways that allow people to retain their white
nationalist identity. Indeed, the group may tolerate—or even intentionally
claim—diversity within whiteness.118
Panofsky and Donovan’s ﬁndings are unsurprising given that a
person’s embrace or rejection of ancestry test results often depends upon
a variety of factors, including the person’s evaluation of their pre-test
identity. Professor Wendy Roth and Biorn Ivemark argue that test takers
ﬁlter genetic information through two social mechanisms, “their identity
aspirations, or preferences for the ethnic or racial identities they seek to
claim, and their social appraisals, their assessment of how others will accept
their identity claims.”119
Roth and Ivemark’s “genetic options theory” was conﬁrmed by
participants in their study.120 For example, Amy, who was adopted and had
been told that her mother was German, reported that she was
“embarrassed to be German because of what happened with the
Holocaust.”121 When Amy read her test results as indicating both German
and Basque ancestry, she embraced her Basque ancestry and began
exploring and emphasizing it more than her German ancestry.122
By contrast, Shannon responded differently to her test results.
Shannon’s adoptive father told her that she had Native American ancestry,
an identity with which Shannon strongly identiﬁed (along with being
white).123 When Shannon’s test results indicated no Native American
ancestry, she reported that “I about fell over . . . . I mean I was literally
hysterical, that’s how much it means to me to be Indian.”124 Shannon
ultimately decided that the tests must be wrong, and she continued to
identify as Native American and white.125
The above examples demonstrate that, for better or worse, some
people take the results of DNA ancestry tests seriously. When test results
117. Id. at 667 (explaining “[t]he most common tactic is to dismiss low levels of
anomalous ancestry as ‘statistical error’”).
118. Id. at 674. Panofsky and Donovan warn that this ﬂexibility may pose considerable
challenges to those “hoping to promulgate anti-racist understandings of human genetic
variation and identity.” Id. at 677.
119. Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 152.
120. Id. Roth and Ivemark followed one hundred Americans and assessed the extent to
which these individuals changed their racial identities in the eighteen months following
their ancestry tests. Id. at 151–52.
121. Id. at 165–66.
122. Id. at 166.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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conﬂict with an individual’s desired or preferred identity, the test taker
may reject them. When test results align with an individual’s desired or
preferred identity, they are more positively received and can trigger a
reaffirmation of an existing racial or ethnic identity or a redeﬁnition of
the individual’s self-identiﬁed race.
To be sure, most people do not change their racial identities based
on the results of DNA ancestry tests.126 For example, in the Roth and
Ivemark study mentioned above, ﬁfty-nine percent of the test takers did
not change their racial or ethnic identities after their DNA ancestry test.127
However, thirty-six percent of test takers did.128 This ﬁnding underscores
the belief that race is biologically determined and scientiﬁcally veriﬁable.
It also highlights the heavy inﬂuence that DNA ancestry tests can have on
personal identity.
In Part II, we address how biological accounts of race ignore the
social, economic, political, and cultural aspects of racial identity,129 and in
so doing, threaten to entrench racial hierarchies.
II. DEFINING RACE: FROM BIOLOGICAL TO SOCIAL
Genetic race is unfortunately nothing new. The idea of race as
biological—and therefore scientiﬁcally veriﬁable—dates back almost four
centuries. This Part contextualizes genetic race within the long history of
biological understandings of race. Section II.A describes the historical
origins of biological race and how various entities, including legal actors,
have used the concept to justify and bolster social, political, and economic
hierarchies. Section II.B explains the modern view of race as a social
construction. We argue that genetic race, if left unchecked, could become
the latest installment in the harmful and misguided legacy of biological
race in the United States.
A.

Historical Foundations of Biological Race

Professor Dorothy Roberts has observed that “[t]he way we think
about race today is the product of historical coincidence.”130 Historically,
126. See id. at 163 (stating that only about a third of respondents incorporated
geneticized identities based on test results).
127. Id. at 163.
128. Id. (reporting that “[o]f those whose identities changed, most did not give up their
previous ethnic or racial identities, but rather incorporated an additional identity”).
129. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 75–76 (describing the assumption of some genetic
testing companies that racial groups are self-contained); Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra
note 59, at 74, 255 (“[S]cientists seem oblivious to their reliance on social assumptions about
race in their genetic research.”); Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 400 (“Because race has such
profound social, political, and economic consequences, we should be wary of allowing the
concept to be redeﬁned in a way that obscures its historical roots and disconnects it from its
cultural and socioeconomic context.”); Duster, supra note 92.
130. Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 28.
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Europeans employed a variety of metrics, including religious, cultural, and
morphological differences, to create group hierarchies. Over time, these
factors were supplemented—if not supplanted—by scientiﬁc
arguments.131
In the late 1600s, François Bernier, a French physician, was among
the ﬁrst Europeans to sort humans into discrete categories based on
geographic location and phenotype.132 Soon thereafter, white Europeans
developed a hierarchy of physically distinct groups, not surprisingly,
placing themselves at the top and Black people at the bottom.133 By 1800,
the idea of biologically distinct racial groups, marked by inherited,
immutable characteristics and attributes, was in place.134 Thus, as Professor
Joe Feagin notes, “[R]ace was, from its inception, a folk classiﬁcation, a
product of popular beliefs about human differences that evolved from the
sixteenth century through the nineteenth centur[y].”135 As we show below,
understandings of race continue to evolve today. This section traces these
developing conceptions and demonstrates how biological race has been
used to defend colonialism, racial slavery, and the continued systematic
subordination of people whom Europeans viewed as inferior.
1. Biological Race and Slavery. — Race science, which began in the
1600s with people like Bernier, became particularly important as white
Europeans were increasingly tasked with defending colonialism and the
American institution of chattel slavery. Justiﬁcations for slavery rested on
a belief in the innate inferiority of Black people.136 Many inﬂuential
leaders argued that these individuals were destined to be enslaved—and
indeed that enslavement was to their beneﬁt—due to their “natural

131. Roberts notes that “the concept of race as a natural category arose from the
convergence . . . in eighteenth-century Europe . . . of the scientiﬁc revolution and . . .
colonialism.” Id. She argues that the expanding slave trade “necessitated a racial system of
governance” while the scientiﬁc revolution led to a “shift among European intellectuals
from theological to biological thinking, giving the institution of science ultimate authority
over truth and knowledge.” Id.
132. Joe R. Feagin & Clairece Booher Feagin, Racial and Ethnic Relations 5 (6th ed.
1999); Ibram X. Kendi, Stamped from the Beginning: The Deﬁnitive History of Racist Ideas
in America 55–56 (2016). In 1684, Bernier remarked that “there are in all four or ﬁve Types
of Race among men whose distinctive traits are so obvious that they can justiﬁably serve as
the basis of a new division of the Earth.” François Bernier, A New Division of the Earth, 51
Hist. Workshop J. 247, 247 (2001) (reprinting Bernier’s April 1684 essay).
133. Feagin & Feagin, supra note 132, at 5; Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at
28–36.
134. See Feagin & Feagin, supra note 132, at 5 (“It was only in the late eighteenth
century that the term race came to mean a category of human beings with distinctive
physical characteristics transmitted by descent.”).
135. Id. (quoting Audrey Smedley, Race in North America 25 (1993)).
136. See Albert Deutsch, The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840) and Its Use as ProSlavery Propaganda, 15 Bull. Hist. Med. 469, 469 (1944) (discussing published studies that
asserted Black people were a subhuman species more closely related to apes than to whites).
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intellectual limitations,” like having a “brain . . . so fragile an organ as
never to be able to withstand the pressure of civilized responsibility.”137
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers and scientists like
Johann Blumenbach and Samuel George Morton led the push for
empirical evidence to prove racial hierarchies.138 This pseudoscience,139
which today is known as scientiﬁc racism, was speciﬁcally intended to
reverse engineer “scientiﬁc” proof that race and racial hierarchies were
predetermined by nature, and thus justiﬁed.140
Blumenbach, a German anatomist, was perhaps the most inﬂuential
proponent of scientiﬁc racism. Based upon studies of skulls and human
anatomy, Blumenbach sorted humans into ﬁve racial groups, in the
following rank order: Caucasians (Europeans), Mongolians (Asians),
Ethiopians (Africans), Americans (Native Americans), and Malays
(Polynesians).141 Morton, an American physician and anatomy professor,
grounded his theories in craniometry, which is the measurement of skulls
to estimate mental capacity.142 Based on brain size, Morton claimed to
discern a descending order of intelligence with “Caucasians” at the
pinnacle of the racial order and Blacks at its nadir.143 Other physicians like
Samuel Cartwright, who practiced in Mississippi and Louisiana, also
sought to use their medical training to explain Black inferiority.144
Cartwright argued that biological differences caused enslaved Black

137. Id. at 470.
138. For an excellent overview of the development of racial science, see Roberts, Fatal
Invention, supra note 59, at 28–43.
139. Professor Roberts cautions against use of the label “pseudoscience” as it suggests
that using science to support racist ideas was somehow an exceptional, extreme abuse of
science by bad actors. She notes that “what we call racial pseudoscience today was
considered the vanguard of scientiﬁc progress at the time it was practiced, and those who
practiced it were admired by the scientiﬁc community and the public as pioneering
geniuses.” Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 27–28.
140. George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History 56–58 (2015); see also Roberts,
Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 27–36.
141. Feagin & Feagin, supra note 132, at 6; Kate MacCord, Johann Friedrich
Blumenbach
(1752–1840),
Embryo
Project
Encyc.
(Jan.
22,
2014),
https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/johann-friedrich-blumenbach-1752-1840 [https://perma.cc/
4UXN-PYXG]. Blumenbach used the term “Caucasian” because he believed Europeans in
the Caucasus mountains of Russia were “the most beautiful race of men.” Feagin & Feagin,
supra note 132, at 5. He also thought the earliest humans originated in this area. Id. In part,
due to its origins in scientiﬁc racism and its descriptive inaccuracy, the term Caucasian is
viewed by some as a racial epithet. See Yolanda Moses, Why Do We Keep Using the Word
“Caucasian”?, Sapiens (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.sapiens.org/column/race/caucasianterminology-origin [https://perma.cc/T3ZW-4T3B].
142. Robert A. Smith, Types of Mankind: Polygenism and Scientiﬁc Racism in the
Nineteenth Century United States Scientiﬁc Community 30 (May 2014) (M.A. thesis,
Pittsburg State University) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
143. See id. at 31 (discussing Morton’s theories).
144. See id. (citing Samuel A. Cartwright, Report on the Diseases and Physical
Peculiarities of the Negro Race, 7 New Orleans Med. Surgical J. 691 (1851)).
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persons to experience mental inﬁrmities and other diseases that rendered
them incapable of self-determination. He noted:
[T]he brain being ten per cent less in volume and in weight, he
is, from necessity, more under the inﬂuence of his instincts . . .
and animality, than other races of men and less under the
inﬂuence of his reﬂective faculties . . . . His mind being thus
depressed by the excessive development of the nerves of organic
life, nothing but arbitrary power, prescribing and enforcing
temperance in all things, can restrain the excesses of his mental
nature and restore reason to her throne.145
Although Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, propounded in the
mid-nineteenth century, could have served as a check on the idea of clearly
delineated and immutable racial groups, scientists used Darwin’s theories
to support their existing views of race rather than to undermine them.146
For example, Clémence Royer, an evolutionary scientist, produced a
popular French translation of Darwin’s works. This translation included a
preface147 in which Royer argued that “[s]uperior races are destined to
supplant inferior ones . . . . One needs to think carefully before claiming
political and civic equality among people composed of an Indo-European
minority and a Mongolian or Negro majority.”148 In short, Royer
attempted to combine racial science and evolutionary theory to “prove”
that nonwhites were biologically inferior and were therefore undeserving
of equal rights.
Inﬂuential U.S. politicians and lawmakers were not immune to the
appeal of scientiﬁc racism. In Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson
spends several pages discussing the inferiority of Black people, observing:
“The ﬁrst difference [between white and Black people] which strikes us is
that of colour. . . . [T]he difference is ﬁxed in nature, and is as real as if its

145. Samuel A. Cartwright, Essays, Being Inductions Drawn from the Baconian
Philosophy Proving the Truth of the Bible and the Justice and Benevolence of the Decree
Dooming Canaan to be Servant of Servants 12 (1843).
146. In On the Origin of Species, Darwin argues that biological organisms evolve over the
course of generations through a process of natural selection. Charles Darwin, On the Origin
of Species (1859). Professor Roberts observes that “Darwin’s radical view that the human
species comprises varieties that are changeable and impossible to demarcate might have
undermined the typological understanding of race . . . . Instead, most scientists adapted
Darwin’s theories to preexisting views of racial types.” Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note
59, at 34.
147. See Annalee Newitz, The 9 Most Inﬂuential Works of Scientiﬁc Racism, Ranked,
Gizmodo (May 13, 2014), https://io9.gizmodo.com/the-9-most-inﬂuential-works-ofscientiﬁc-racism-rank-1575543279 [https://perma.cc/RXC4-FVLN] (citing Joseph-Antenor
Firmin, The Equality of the Human Races 271 (Asselin Charles trans., Univ. of Ill. Press
2002) (1885) (commenting on Clemence Royer’s preface to On the Origin of Species by
Charles Darwin)).
148. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Joseph-Antenor Firmin, The Equality of the Human Races 271 (Asselin Charles trans., Univ.
of Ill. Press 2002) (1885)).
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seat and cause were better known to us.”149 Jefferson proceeds to make
numerous observations about the relative physical attributes and
psychological and intellectual capacities of Blacks and whites, stating in
part: “[I]t appears to me, that in memory they are equal to the whites; in
reason much inferior.”150
The decennial census of 1840, which reported that rates of mental
disease and defect among free Black people were eleven times higher than
among enslaved Black people, fueled the ﬂames of scientiﬁc racism.151 Proslavery advocates used this supposedly objective government-approved
data to proclaim the necessity of slavery. For example, John C. Calhoun152
cited the census on the ﬂoor of Congress to bolster his conclusion that
“[t]he African is incapable of self-care and sinks into lunacy under the
burden of freedom. It is a mercy to him to give him the guardianship and
protection from mental death.”153
Beliefs in biological race also found expression in nineteenth-century
case law. For example, in Hudgins v. Wrights, the Virginia Supreme Court
was tasked with determining whether three plaintiffs were enslaved or
free.154 When it was unable to determine the plaintiffs’ ancestry with
accuracy, the court relied upon physical features to ascertain their race.155
The court noted: “Nature has stampt upon the African and his
descendants two characteristic marks, besides the difference of
149. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 138 (William Peden ed., 1955).
Some argue that Jefferson was torn over whether Black people’s supposed inferiority to
whites was innate or whether it was the result of decades of enslavement. See, e.g.,
Enlightenment Inﬂuence: Racism in Notes on the State of Virginia, Monticello,
Thomas Jefferson Found., https://www.monticello.org/slavery-at-monticello/liberty-slavery/
enlightenment-influence-racism-notes-state-virginia-1781 [https://perma.cc/Z4A4-LNJS]
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019). Jefferson states that “[i]t will be right to make great allowances
for the difference of condition, of education, of conversation, of sphere in which they
move.” Jefferson, supra, at 139. Further, he concludes his discussion of slavery stating:
I advance it therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether
originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are
inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind. It is not
against experience to suppose that different species of the same genus, or
varieties of the same species, may possess different qualiﬁcations.
Id. at 143. Yet, other scholars have concluded that Jefferson was a proponent of biological
race. See e.g., Interview by PBS with Paul Finkelman, Professor, Mitchell Hamline Sch. of
L., https://www.pbs.org/jefferson/archives/interviews/Finkelman.htm [https://perma.cc/
3DA4-BVVD] (“[Jefferson] knew in his heart that slavery was wrong, and yet at the same
time was so hooked into the system and could never give it up, [and] felt the necessity of
creating a scientiﬁc rationale for racism.”).
150. Jefferson, supra note 149, at 149.
151. Deutsch, supra note 136, at 471–72.
152. Calhoun was a former U.S. Vice President and a leader of the secession movement.
Id. at 473.
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robert W. Wood, Memorial of
Edward Jarvis, M.D. 11 (1885)).
154. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 136 (1806).
155. Id. at 137, 139–40.
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complexion, which often remain visible long after the characteristic
distinction of colour either disappears or becomes doubtful; a ﬂat nose
and a woolly head of hair.”156 Because the plaintiffs appeared white, and
one had long, straight, black hair, the court ruled that they enjoyed a
presumption of freedom.157
In 1857, drawing upon prevalent beliefs in the biological inferiority
of Black people, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Dred Scott v. Sandford that
neither enslaved Africans nor their descendants—whether free or
enslaved—were United States citizens.158 The Court observed:
[Black people] had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unﬁt to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations;
and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully
be reduced to slavery for his beneﬁt.159
Political leaders and jurists thus used biological race, undergirded by racial
science, to justify slavery and to try and reconcile it with the nation’s
expressed commitment to liberty and equality. Pervasive acceptance of
scientiﬁc arguments regarding Black racial inferiority (and white
superiority) allowed chattel slavery to be characterized as a benevolent
enterprise designed to save Black people from themselves,160 and one that
was not at odds with the nation’s founding principles.161 Chattel slavery
thus became the moral solution to a biological problem, and whites were
absolved of any guilt or blame for this heinous institution.162

156. Id. at 139.
157. Id. at 141–42.
158. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
Const. amend. XIV.
159. Id. at 407.
160. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 136, at 473–74 (noting that the 1840 census’s
conclusions were widely accepted in newspapers, political speeches, and scientiﬁc tracts and
were used to argue against the emancipation of enslaved persons).
161. Professor Roberts explains:
Biological difference was essential to justifying the enslavement of
Africans in a nation founded on a radical commitment to liberty, equality,
and natural rights. White Americans had to explain black subjugation as
a natural condition, not one they imposed by brute force for the nation’s
economic proﬁt. Treating race as biology constituted the only suitable
“moral apology” . . . for slavey in a society that claimed equality as its most
cherished ideal.
Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 24.
162. Scientiﬁc explanations of Black biological inferiority were often buttressed by
religious explanations rooted in the Old Testament story of Ham. See Stephen R. Haynes,
Race, National Destiny, and the Sons of Noah in the Thought of Benjamin M. Palmer, 78 J.
Presbyterian Hist. 125, 125 (2000); Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientiﬁc Racism and
the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 559, 571–72 (2000);
Joseph Smith, Jr., Letter to Oliver Cowdery, Latter Day Saints’ Messenger & Advoc., Apr. 9,
1836, at 289.
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2. Racial Terrorism and Jim Crow. — The need to differentiate between
white and nonwhite intensiﬁed as the United States, under the guise of
Manifest Destiny, expanded its borders to include territories with large
nonwhite populations.163 As Professor Laura Gómez explains, at the end
of the Mexican–American War in 1848, the United States sought to secure
the maximum amount of land and the least number of Brown and
Indigenous bodies (which at the time greatly outnumbered whites in what
subsequently became the U.S. Southwest).164 As a result of competing
interests, what emerged was a more nuanced “racial hierarchy with four
tiers . . . : Euro-Americans at the top; followed by Mexicans, as a ‘native’
group with a formal claim to white status; followed by Pueblo Indians as a
buffer group among the three native groupings (Mexican, Pueblo, other
Indian); with nomadic and semi-nomadic Indian tribes at the bottom.”165
Importantly, white supremacist ideology, founded on biological
conceptions of race, drove this hierarchy.166
In addition to complexities wrought by western expansion, following
the Civil War and ratiﬁcation of the Fourteenth Amendment, millions of
Black people became U.S. citizens.167 Although many Black Americans
thrived during the period of radical Reconstruction,168 as Professor Osagie
163. See Laura E. Gómez, Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American
Race 138, 157 (2d ed. 2018) (claiming that “Manifest Destiny was central to the larger
nineteenth-century processes that restructured the American racial order” and “Mexican
Americans, as a group, have continued to be off-white, neither deﬁnitively white or
deﬁnitively non-white”).
164. Laura E. Gómez, Off-White in an Age of White Supremacy: Mexican Elites and the
New Rights of Indians and Blacks in Nineteenth-Century New Mexico, 25 Chicano-Latino
L. Rev. 9, 18–21 (2005).
165. Id. at 26–27.
166. Id. at 17–18.
167. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
168. Radical Reconstruction (1865–1877) was a period of unprecedented achievement
and optimism for Black Americans. In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, the country
ratiﬁed the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which
abolished slavery and eliminated racial restrictions on the right to vote, respectively. Id.
amend. XIII, § 1; amend. XV, § 1. Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen,
and Abandoned Lands (The Freedmen’s Bureau) to supply food, hospitals, land, and
education to formerly enslaved persons. Freedmen’s Bureau Act, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865)
(repealed 1872). Congress also passed numerous statutes to extend basic civil rights and
civil liberties to formerly enslaved persons, including the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and
1875. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (prohibiting racial discrimination
in public accommodations, including transportation); Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16
Stat. 140 (seeking to limit intrusions on the right to vote and to end terrorization of Black
Americans by organizations like the Ku Klux Klan); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27 (establishing birthright citizenship and equal protection rights).
The tangible effects of these changes were extraordinary. During Reconstruction,
Black Americans built and enrolled in schools, launched corporate enterprises, developed
social clubs, and were elected to public office, among other things. See John Hope Franklin
& Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans 227–46 (7th
ed. 1994). As Black men exercised the right to vote, integrated, progressive state and local
governments formed across the South. Id. at 239–46. For example, between 1868 and 1896,
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Obasogie observes, “there were equally powerful opposing forces
determined to maintain racial subordination, [and] [t]he increasingly
sophisticated notion of race-as-biology [provided these forces with]
rational and objectively veriﬁable” evidence of Black inferiority.169
Obasogie notes that biological race thus “not only justiﬁed the status quo,
[i]t gave moral impetus to the belief that to try to change these status
relationships would be contrary to evolutionary progress and, thus, society
itself.”170
Unsurprisingly, radical Reconstruction and the period thereafter
were marked by backlash and racial terrorism as whites sought to reinforce
the racial order and to impose a state of de facto servitude on Blacks.
Whites formed “White Leagues” and other white supremacist
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).171 Dedicated to protecting
white racial purity and buttressing white social, economic, and political
hegemony, these groups used various means to terrorize Black
communities, including property destruction and physical violence (up to
and including murder).172
Racial terrorism was not, however, limited to members of white
supremacist organizations. Average white citizens—committed to asserting
their superior status to Blacks—were also participants. Following
Reconstruction, public lynchings became relatively commonplace.173
Louisiana alone had 133 Black legislators, of whom thirty-eight were senators and ninetyﬁve were representatives. Id. at 239–40. During that time, three Black Americans served as
lieutenant governor of the state, and one Black American served brieﬂy as acting governor.
Id.
169. Obasogie, supra note 22, at 12–13.
170. Id. at 13.
171. The KKK was founded in 1865. Klanwatch Project, S. Poverty L. Ctr., Ku Klux Klan:
A
History
of
Racism
and
Violence
9
(6th
ed.
2011),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Ku-Klux-Klan-A-History-of-Racism.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LQ4R-Y4JS]. Within months, its members began to ride through Black
neighborhoods nightly, threatening residents with violence. Id. Soon, thousands of
Klansmen began to make good on these threats of violence with whippings, cross burnings,
and lynchings. Id. at 12. By 1868, the Klan had drafted its ﬁrst set of organizational
principles, establishing itself as a white supremacist organization committed to upholding
the racial hierarchy. Id. at 14.
172. See, e.g., id. at 9. A substantial body of evidence indicates that racial terror was
effective in chilling or otherwise altering the behavior of Black Americans. In particular,
racial terror seems to have caused Black Americans to ﬂee their neighborhoods. Equal Just.
Initiative, Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror 55 (3d ed. 2017),
https://lynchinginamerica.eji.org/report [https://perma.cc/BL68-PEWH] [hereinafter
Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in America]. For example, after a 1912 lynching in
Georgia, “white vigilantes distributed leaﬂets demanding that all black people leave the
county or suffer deadly consequences.” Id. at 38. The threat appears to have worked, as just
eight years later, “the county’s black population had plunged from 1100 to just thirty.” Id.
173. For instance, between 1877 and 1950, more than 4,000 racial terror lynchings were
documented in twelve southern states. During the same time period, there were more than
300 racial terror lynchings documented in other states. Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in
America, supra note 172, at 5–6. These numbers exclude “hangings and mob violence that
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Lynchings were not necessarily about punishing speciﬁc individuals but
were rather attempts to degrade and dehumanize Black Americans
generally.174 They were often community events with “large crowds of
whites watch[ing] and participat[ing] in the [B]lack victims’ prolonged
torture.”175 Some lynchings were carnival-like, attended by thousands,176
with “vendors selling food, printers producing postcards featuring
photographs of the lynching and corpse, and [attendees collecting] the
victim’s body parts . . . as souvenirs.”177 Because lynchings were organized
to garner maximum visibility and to incite maximum terror in Black
Americans, they were frequently held in prominent places within a town’s
Black community.178
Lynchings were used to reinforce social norms that accompanied a
racial hierarchy built on white supremacy. Hundreds of Black Americans
were lynched for social transgressions like “speaking disrespectfully [to a
white person], refusing to step off the sidewalk, . . . [or] using an improper
title for a white person.”179 Another commonly offered justiﬁcation was the
alleged expression of sexual interest in a white woman.180 Countless Black
men were killed for the most insigniﬁcant infractions, while others were
killed for no infraction at all.181 Importantly, racial terror was backed by
the full force of the law. Prominent white community members frequently
attended lynchings. Moreover, prosecutions for property destruction and
physical violence were few and far between, and convictions were nearly
nonexistent.182

followed some criminal trial process or that were committed against non-minorities without
the threat of terror.” Id.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 28.
176. Id. at 33. The attendees included children. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 38.
179. Id. at 31–32 (citing numerous stories of Black Americans lynched for minor social
transgressions, including “referring to a white police officer by his name without the title of
‘mister,’” “accidentally bumping into a white girl . . . to catch a train,” and “annoying white
girls”).
180. A common thread underlying racial terror was the overwhelming fear of race
mixing, or interracial sex. See id. at 30 (identifying six of the most common reasons for
lynchings, beginning with “a wildly distorted fear of interracial sex”). Klansmen, for
example, justiﬁed their actions by declaring them “necessary to defend the purity of [w]hite
women.” Kendi, supra note 132, at 249. The fear of race mixing was considerable,
“extend[ing] to any action by a [B]lack man that could be interpreted as seeking or desiring
contact with a white woman.” Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in America, supra note 172,
at 30.
181. See, e.g., Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in America, supra note 172, at 31.
Nearly twenty-ﬁve percent of the lynchings in the South stemmed from accusations of sexual
assault. Id. Importantly, these lynchings often occurred in cases where the survivor had not
identiﬁed the perpetrator. Id.
182. Id. at 35.
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During Reconstruction, Southern legislatures also began to reenact
“Black Codes.” These laws speciﬁcally targeted Black Americans and were
designed to restrict their mobility and to reaffirm their substandard
position in the sociopolitical and economic hierarchy.183 Frequently, Black
Codes deprived Black Americans of the right to vote and to serve on
juries.184 Some Codes restricted their earning capacity, thereby ensuring
their perpetual placement in the working class. Importantly, Black Codes
often created new criminal charges, which spawned mass arrests of Black
Americans and proliferation of the brutal system of convict leasing.185
In addition to Black Codes, Southern states enacted antimiscegenation statutes and other laws designed to segregate the races.
Anti-miscegenation laws, which date back to the 1600s, criminalized
interracial relationships and were premised on a belief that interracial sex
would dilute or contaminate white blood lines.186 For example, the State
of Alabama passed a law that imposed greater penalties for adultery or
fornication between whites and Blacks than for the same conduct between
persons of the same race.187 In upholding the statute in Pace v. State, the
Alabama Supreme Court noted that mixed-race cohabitation, unlike samerace cohabitation, threatened “the amalgamation of the two races,
producing a mongrel population and a degraded civilization.”188 Because
anti-miscegenation laws were designed to maintain white racial purity and
white supremacy, they expressly targeted relationships between whites and
nonwhites,189 but not relationships among subordinate racial groups.
Thus, as the nineteenth century came to a close, Americans had
developed rigid color lines enforced by law, social norms, and the threat
of racial terror. Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly condoned
the legal subclass that Black Americans occupied. In a series of cases, the
183. Id. at 22–24.
184. Some states, like Mississippi for example, went as far as to amend their constitutions
to disenfranchise Black Americans. Id. at 22–23.
185. Id. In convict leasing, states leased inmates as a source of cheap labor to private
parties, like plantation owners. These private parties were responsible for providing laborers
with food and shelter, but often conditions were as bad as, or worse than, under slavery. Id.
186. Kendi, supra note 132, at 41 (“In 1664, Maryland legislators declared it a ‘disgrace
to our nation’ when ‘English women . . . intermarry with Negro slaves.’ By the end of the
century, Maryland and Virginia legislators had enacted severe penalties for White women in
relationships with non-White men.”); Kathy Russell-Cole, Midge Wilson & Ronald E. Hall,
The Color Complex: The Politics of Skin Color in a New Millennium 15 (rev. ed. 2013)
(noting that “[a]s early as 1622, a little more than two years after the ﬁrst Africans had
stepped ashore, Virginia legislators were passing antimiscegenation statutes”).
187. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 232 (1881) (“[A] different punishment is
affixed to the offense of adultery when committed between a negro and a white person, and
when committed between two white persons or two negroes . . . .”).
188. Id.
189. An exception was between whites and Native Americans. See Act to Preserve Racial
Integrity, Va. Code § 20-54 (1960) (making it unlawful in the state of Virginia for any white
person to marry any nonwhite person except for someone with mixed white and Native
American ancestry).

2020]

GENETIC RACE?

1961

Court eviscerated the Reconstruction Amendments by limiting Congress’s
power to promote racial equity. For example, in the Civil Rights Cases, the
Court invalidated parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment proscribes discriminatory action only by the state,
and not that engaged in by private individuals.190 Consequently, it was not
a denial of equal protection for private entities to refuse to grant Black
Americans access to “inns, public conveyances, theatres, and other places
of public amusement.”191 In Pace v. Alabama, the Court also upheld
Alabama’s anti-miscegenation law, concluding that the statute treated
Black and white offenders exactly the same.192 And, in the now infamous
case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute requiring
separate railway cars for members of the white and “colored” races.193
Plessy merits close analysis not only because of the Court’s
disingenuous embrace of the “separate but equal” doctrine, but also
because of the Court’s unquestioned adoption of biological race.
190. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); see also United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214, 217–18 (1875) (holding a federal law regulating voting discrimination
inapplicable because states retained the right to regulate their elections); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75 (1873) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment’s
“privileges and immunities” clause applied only to rights set forth in the U.S. Constitution,
and not to rights supplied by state law).
191. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10. Similarly, in United States v. Cruikshank, a case
arising out of the state of Louisiana, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process and equal protection provisions did not apply to individual actions, but only to those
of state actors. 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (“The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds
nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”). The Court also restricted the First
and Second Amendments, holding that constitutional limitations on the rights of assembly
and to bear arms only applied to the federal government, and not to the states. Id. at 552–
53. The Cruikshank case arose from the 1873 Colfax Massacre, one of the worst known
incidents of racial violence after the Civil War. Following a disputed gubernatorial election,
pro-Confederacy white Democrats attacked a group of Black individuals, including Black
Republicans, who had assembled at a local courthouse. After the Black individuals had
surrendered, the white mob shot and hanged many of them, resulting in the deaths of 60–
150 Black Americans. Only three whites were killed.
192. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584–85 (1883) (observing that “the punishment . . .
is directed against the offense designated and not against the person of any particular color
or race” and that “[t]he punishment of each offending person, whether white or black is
the same”).
193. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In rejecting Plessy’s Thirteenth Amendment argument, the
Court stated:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and
colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and
which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race
by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or
reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.
Id. at 543 (emphasis added). In rejecting Plessy’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Court
similarly noted that “legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.” Id. at 551.
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Critically, in its factual summary, the Court noted “that the mixture of
colored blood was not discernible” in the plaintiff, Homer Plessy.194 In
other words, Plessy appeared white. Yet, based on knowledge of his mixedracial heritage, the railway conductor treated Plessy as if he were colored,
and the state subsequently arrested him for occupying a white railway
car.195 Thus, Plessy’s race was apparently in his blood. Indeed, after
upholding the Separate Car Act, the Supreme Court stated that an
important question likely remained concerning Plessy’s race under
Louisiana law, observing:
[T]he question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to
constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white
person, is one upon which there is a difference of opinion in the
different states; some holding that any visible admixture of black
blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race; others
that it depends upon the preponderance of blood; and still
others that the predominance of white blood must only be in the
proportion of three-fourths.196
3. Eugenics and the Rule of Hypodescent. — As this brief historical
overview shows, a widespread belief in the biological inferiority of Black
people led to a harrowing system of racial terrorism during and
immediately after Reconstruction. This system was sanctioned and
advanced by law. Indeed, in Plessy’s wake, states increasingly adopted “Jim
Crow”197 laws which mandated racial segregation in just about all areas of
American life, including public accommodations, public schools, and
intimate relations.198 In a society that was increasingly racially diverse,
interracial associations threatened efforts to maintain racial caste. Jim
Crow laws thus were a form of social control, in effect telling Black
Americans that they were so inferior that they could not occupy the same
space as whites and that they were not entitled to the same beneﬁts and
opportunities as whites. The laws also sent a message of superiority to
whites, furthering a sense among them that their privileged status was
innate and God-given, rather than unfairly bestowed by law and tradition.
Yet Jim Crow and racial terror were not the only mechanisms used to
entrench racial hierarchies in the United States. The eugenics movement,
founded by Sir Francis Galton, an English scientist, also used dubious
science to make claims about racial difference. Eugenicists believed that
“intelligence and other personality traits are genetically determined and
therefore inherited.”199 However, instead of relying upon natural selection
to eliminate inferior groups, eugenicists sought governmental inter194. Id. at 538.
195. Id. at 538–39.
196. Id. at 552.
197. Jim Crow laws were named after a famous nineteenth-century minstrel character.
Lerone Bennett, Jr., Before the Mayﬂower: A History of Black America 255–56 (1993).
198. Id. at 256.
199. Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 36.
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ventions to prevent the deterioration of the white race.200 These policies
included the forced sterilization of Blacks and other “inferior” races, the
implementation of immigration restrictions to limit the inﬂux of
undesirable groups, and increased attention to anti-miscegenation laws.201
Importantly, enforcement of Jim Crow laws, anti-miscegenation
prohibitions, and a regime of “separate but equal” required that states
determine who was Black (and conversely, who was white). And in the early
decades of the twentieth century, states increasingly adopted the principle
of hypodescent, or the “one drop rule,” to police the color line.202 This
rule classiﬁed any individual with one drop of African blood, or one
African ancestor, as Black. This simplistic construction of genetically
traceable racial identity was frequently transmitted into law. Notably, in
1924, Virginia became the ﬁrst state to codify the one-drop rule in its “Act
to Preserve Racial Integrity,” which stated in pertinent part:
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to
marry any save a white person, or a person with no other
admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the
purpose of this chapter, the term ‘white person’ shall apply only
to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than
Caucasian.203
In Naim v. Naim,204 which upheld the state’s anti-miscegenation law,
the Virginia Supreme Court found that “the State’s legitimate purposes
were ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens’ and to prevent ‘the
corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration
of racial pride.’”205

200. Id.
201. Id. at 36–42.
202. Although states formally codiﬁed the rule in the Jim Crow era, scholars locate its
origin at earlier points in U.S. history. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color
Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600–1860, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 592 (2007)
(examining the historical origins of the one-drop rule from the colonial period through the
Jim Crow era); Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: “Passing” Revisited and
Demystiﬁcation as a Critical Practice, 18 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 297, 313–14 (2000) (centering
the one-drop rule in nineteenth-century laws of maternal descent).
203. Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, Va. Code § 20-54, invalidated by Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
204. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
205. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (quoting Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756). The trial court in Loving was
equally forthright in its views, noting:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix.
Id. at 3. In discussing the lower court’s decision and its reliance on Naim, the Supreme Court
in Loving noted that these statements were “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of
White Supremacy.” Id. at 7.
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While notions of biological race predominate throughout U.S.
history, it is important to note that decision makers used racial science,
along with other conceptions of race, to limit access to whiteness and white
privilege. The famous Thind and Ozawa cases demonstrate this complexity.
In Ozawa v. United States, Takao Ozawa, a Japanese immigrant, applied for
naturalization as a U.S. citizen.206 At the time, U.S. law only permitted “free
white persons” and persons of “African nativity” or “African descent” to
be naturalized.207 Ozawa argued that naturalization was not restricted to
these groups and that his extended residence in the United States, his
education, and his character qualiﬁed him for citizenship.208 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled against Ozawa, ﬁnding that naturalization was
limited to the aforementioned groups and that “white person” only
referred to “what is popularly known as the Caucasian race.”209 The Court
noted that prior cases holding that Japanese individuals were not
Caucasian were “sustained by numerous scientiﬁc authorities.”210
Interestingly, a year later in United States v. Thind, Bhagat Singh
Thind, a South Asian immigrant, argued that he was eligible for
naturalization because race scientists at the time considered Indians to be
Caucasian.211 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected Thind’s
arguments, in effect saying that science alone was not sufficient to ground
a claim to whiteness. The Court observed that “during the last half century
especially, the word [Caucasian] by common usage has acquired a popular
meaning, not clearly deﬁned to be sure, but sufficiently so to enable us to
say that its popular as distinguished from its scientiﬁc application is of
appreciably narrower scope.”212 Thus, in Ozawa and Thind, the Court
206. 260 U.S. 178, 189 (1922).
207. Id. at 189–90 (noting that the District Court of Hawaii had deemed that the
appellant was not eligible for naturalization under § 2169 of the Revised Statutes).
208. Id. at 189.
209. The Court determined that skin color was an unreliable indicator of race, noting:
[T]he test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual is
impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even
among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair
blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the
lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races. Hence to adopt the
color test alone would result in a confused overlapping of races and a
gradual merging of one into the other, without any practical line of
separation.
Id. at 197.
210. Id. at 198.
211. See 261 U.S. 204, 210 (1923).
212. Id. at 209. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thind, many South Asians
were denaturalized and lost their property. One such person, Vaishno das Bagai, committed
suicide. Bagai’s suicide note attests to the psychological, economic, and social signiﬁcance
of racial classiﬁcations. The note read, in part:
I came to America thinking, dreaming and hoping to make this land my
home. Sold my properties and brought more than twenty-ﬁve thousand
dollars (gold) to this country, established myself and tried to give my
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cycled back and forth between scientiﬁc and popular understandings of
race in determining who was white.213
Although multiple interwoven factors have been used to police racial
boundaries, the above history shows that biological race has played a
dominant role in racial classiﬁcation in the United States. Indeed, the view
that nature created race—that is, that race is innate, inheritable, and
unchangeable and that racial groups are genetically identiﬁable and
separable—has ossiﬁed within mainstream U.S. culture. Yet, as we explain
below, the concept of biological race is antithetical to most contemporary
scholarly understandings of race.
B.

Race as a Social Construction

The genocide committed during World War II, as well as the overt
racial terrorism and rhetoric that accompanied it, led to an important shift
in international views of race. Following the war, the United Nations
founded the Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) and convened leading scholars to develop a formal statement
on race.214 UNESCO’s initial statement seemingly rejected biological race
in favor of a social deﬁnition, declaring: “[T]here is no proof that the
groups of mankind differ in their innate mental characteristics, whether
in respect of intelligence or temperament.”215 It explained that “genetic
children the best American education . . . But now they come to me and
say, I am no longer an American citizen. They will not permit me to buy
my home and, lo, they even shall not issue me a passport to go back to
India. Now what am I? What have I made of myself and my children?
Kritika Agarwal, Living in a Gilded Cage: Vaishno Das Bagai’s Disillusionment with America,
S. Asian Am. Digit. Archive (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.saada.org/tides/article/living-in-agilded-cage [https://perma.cc/4LZL-7482] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bagai). For an engaging analysis of the Ozawa and Thind cases, see California Newsreel,
Race: The Power of an Illusion (The House We Live In), Facing Hist. & Ourselves (Apr. 29,
2003), https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/video/race-power-illusion-housewe-live?token=37864112 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
213. Some scholars maintain that the opinions, in this respect, are inconsistent. See Ian
Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race 56–77 (2006). Others,
however, disagree and assert that science and common knowledge are interwoven. For
example, in his examination of the cases, Professor Devon Carbado notes:
[S]cience and common knowledge are codependent: commonknowledge understandings of race often have their foundation in science.
For example, during much of the Jim Crow era in the South, it was
commonly understood—that is, a part of Southern society’s common
knowledge—that blood quantum determined one’s racial identity. The
social intelligibility of this idea is directly linked to nineteenth-century
scientiﬁc notions of race and racial categorization. The one-drop rule is
both a scientiﬁc idea and a product of common understanding.
Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 633, 637 (2009).
214. See UNESCO, Fallacies of Racism Exposed, UNESCO Courier, July–Aug. 1950, at
1. For an overview of early statements on race produced by UNESCO, see Jean Hiernaux &
Michael Banton, Four Statements on the Race Question 7 (1969).
215. Hiernaux & Banton, supra note 214, at 34.
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differences are not of importance in determining the social and cultural
differences between different groups of homo sapiens, and . . . social and
cultural changes in different groups have, in the main, been independent
of changes in inborn constitution.”216 Thus, UNESCO called for a shift to
understanding race and racial inequality as social in meaning and origin,
rather than biological.217
Since that time, academic, legal, and scientiﬁc communities have
consistently debunked biological notions of race and, conversely, have
espoused that race is a social construct.218 Indeed, experts have shown that
no single genetic characteristic is exclusive to any socially constructed
racial group.219 Moreover, intraracial genetic variation (genetic variation
within racial groups) is greater than interracial genetic variation (genetic
variation between racial groups).220
Certainly, morphological and other physical differences (e.g., in skin
tone, facial features, and hair texture) between racial groups exist and
have a genetic basis.221 Scientiﬁc inquiry, however, has not demonstrated
216. Id.
217. UNESCO issued another statement on race in 1951. As Professor Roberts points out:
Both UNESCO statements disclaimed the practice of ranking races. But
neither document abandoned the concept of biological race altogether.
Instead, both statements took issue with race as an ideological doctrine of
inferiority that was responsible for deadly social conﬂicts. They
distinguished the Nazis’ ideological use of race for repressive purposes
from the scientiﬁc use of race for legitimate research.
Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 44–45.
218. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (citing sources
supporting the theory that racial classiﬁcations are “sociopolitical, rather than biological, in
nature”); R. C. Lewontin, The Apportionment of Human Diversity, in 6 Evolutionary
Biology 381, 397 (Theodosius Dobzhansky, Max K. Hecht & William C. Steere eds., 1972)
(concluding that because racial classiﬁcations do not reﬂect fundamental genetic
differences, biologists should abandon talk of biological races). But see Masatoshi Nei &
Arun K. Roychoudhury, Genetic Relationship and Evolution of Human Races, 14
Evolutionary Biology 1, 11, 41 (1982) (noting that “while the interracial genetic variation is
small . . . the genetic differentiation is real and generally statistically highly signiﬁcant” and
that “the racial differences in many morphological characters have a genetic basis”). For
insightful analyses and critiques of the scientiﬁc evidence, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, In
My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture 35–39 (1992); Roberts, Fatal
Invention, supra note 59, at 55–80.
219. See Appiah, supra note 218, at 35 (discussing the lack of genetic exclusivity among
races).
220. See Nei & Roychoudhury, supra note 218, at 11, 40–41 (ﬁnding that “the
interracial genic variation . . . relative to the intraracial genic variation . . . is quite small”).
221. See Nicholas G. Crawford, Derek E. Kelly, Matthew E. B. Hansen, Marcia H.
Beltrame, Shaohua Fan, Shanna L. Bowman, Ethan Jewett, Alessia Ranciaro, Simon
Thompson, Yancy Lo, Susanne P. Pfeifer, Jeffrey D. Jensen, Michael C. Campbell, William
Beggs, Farhad Hormozdiari, Sununguko Wata Mpoloka, Gaonyadiwe George Mokone,
Thomas Nyambo, Dawit Wolde Meskel, Gurja Belay, Jake Haut, NISC Compar. Sequencing
Program, Harriet Rothschild, Leonard Zon, Yi Zhou, Michael A. Kovacs, Mai Xu, Tongwu
Zhang, Kevin Bishop, Jason Sinclair, Cecilia Rivas, Eugene Elliot, Jiyeon Choi, Shengchao
A. Li, Belynda Hicks, Shawn Burgess, Christian Abnet, Dawn E. Watkins-Chow, Elena
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that the genes responsible for these characteristics also account for
attributes that society frequently assigns to racial groups (e.g., differences
in language, morality, physicality, sexuality, intellectual capacity,
propensity for criminal behavior, or political ideology).222 In short, there
is no gene for race.
The key is not to confuse the indicator with the thing that it is
indicating. Physical characteristics and ancestry, among other things,223
are used to place individuals within a socially constructed racial category.
For example, society frequently uses skin color to assign race. The lighter
or darker one’s skin tone, the more likely one is to be characterized
respectively as white or as nonwhite. In this example, skin color is an
indicator of race but is not in and of itself race.224 This distinction is
essential to understanding race as a social construct.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that there are multiple
indicators of race. For example, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the
Court recognized that phenotype is not dispositive in determining “race,”
stating that “a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981
protection” against race discrimination.225 Rather, the Court determined
Oceana, Yun S. Song, Eleazar Eskin, Kevin M. Brown, Michael S. Marks, Stacie K. Loftus,
William J. Pavan, Meredith Yeager, Stephen Chanock & Sarah A. Tishkoff, Loci Associated
with Skin Pigmentation Identiﬁed in African Populations, 358 Science 887, 887 (2017)
(discussing genes associated with skin color); NIH, Is Hair Texture Determined by
Genetics?, Genetics Home Reference, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/traits/hairtexture
[https://perma.cc/689U-PAGJ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020) (discussing genetic factors
associated with hair texture); see also Nicholas Wade, East Asian Physical Traits Linked to
35,000-Year-Old Mutation, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/02/15/science/studying-recent-human-evolution-at-the-genetic-level.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
222. Appiah, supra note 218, at 35; see also Nei & Roychoudhury, supra note 218, at 41–
42 (“[T]he genetic distance between populations is not always correlated with the
morphological distance. . . . Evidently, the evolutions at the structural gene level and at the
morphological level do not obey the same rule.”).
223. In addition to physical characteristics (e.g., skin color, hair texture, the shape of
the eyes and nose) and ancestry, other factors might also be employed singly, or in
combination, to assign race. Some of these factors include geographical affiliation, dress,
name, language or accent, demeanor, place of residence, religion, and marital and social
connections.
224. See Sheldon Krimsky, Introduction to Race and the Genetic Revolution: Science,
Myth, and Culture 3–4 (Sheldon Krimsky & Kathleen Sloan eds., 2011) (noting that
although race is a social construct, “[i]t is not unusual for people to sort one another into
group categories by external characteristics including ethnicity, language, skin color, and
morphological features”).
225. 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). The case involved a § 1981 claim by a U.S. citizen of Iraqi
descent against a college. Id. at 606. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment contracts. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2018). The defendant sought to challenge the plaintiff’s inference of
discriminatory conduct by asserting that both the plaintiff and the relevant college
administrators were white and that the statute did not encompass claims of discrimination
by “one Caucasian against another.” Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 609–10. The defendant
maintained that under modern racial classiﬁcations, Arabs, and thus the plaintiff, are white.
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that ancestry can also be used to assign race.226 The Court thus concluded
that Al-Khazraji, whom the defendants maintained was Caucasian, could
set forth a claim of intentional race discrimination if he could prove that
he was of Arabic ancestry.227
While skin color and ancestry are indicators or proxies for race and
may be used in racial classiﬁcation and to further racial discrimination,228
these indicators have no self-evident or innate meaning; rather, they have
social meaning.229 Race then is the social meaning ascribed to indicators
like skin color and ancestry.230 It is a “constantly evolving product[] of the
Id. Although the Court appears to reject—or, at minimum, to question seriously—the
concept of biological race in cases like Saint Francis and Thind, see supra notes 206–213 and
accompanying text, some scholars argue that it has continued to acknowledge the existence
of biological race outside of the law. For example, Professor Khiara Bridges argues:
[The] Court has created two conceptual entities: a legal race that denotes
socially constructed groups, and a scientiﬁc race that denotes biologically
similar groups[,] . . . [and] this rhetorical move functions to make the
Court complicit in the resuscitation of racial biology, as it implicitly
reaffirms the idea that there exist races that are not products of social
construction, but rather are products of genetic homogeneity.
Khiara M. Bridges, The Dangerous Law of Biological Race, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 21, 26 (2013)
(emphasis added to “race” and “races”).
226. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613.
227. In attempting to distinguish between race, religion, and national origin, the Court
stated that Al-Khazraji must demonstrate that “he was born an Arab” and that he was not
basing his claim “solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion.” Id.
228. Proxy discrimination occurs when society treats individuals differently based upon
a seemingly neutral criterion that is closely related to a racial group. See, e.g., McWright v.
Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that discriminating against individuals
with gray hair is a proxy for age discrimination because the ﬁt between age and gray hair is
sufficiently close (citing Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th
Cir. 1992))). See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White? Rethinking
Race in “Post-Racial” America 1 (2013) (examining identity performance discrimination
and the social signiﬁcance of, among other things, hair and dress); Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 Geo. L.J. 1079,
1086 (2010) (examining race discrimination on the basis of hair); Angela Onwuachi-Willig
& Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII
Should Apply Even if Lakisha And Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1283 (explaining how
names may serve as proxies for race); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic
Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1134, 1142
(2004) (arguing that the deﬁnitions of race and ethnicity under Title VII should be
expanded to include “performed features associated with racial and ethnic identity”). Like
these commentators, we believe that discrimination based upon a proxy that is closely
associated with race is race discrimination and ought to be legally cognizable. For a
contrasting view, see Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1803,
1812–13 (2000) (arguing against legal recognition of proxy discrimination).
229. See Feagin & Feagin, supra note 132, at 7 (noting that races are “simply groups
with visible differences that Europeans and European Americans have decided to emphasize
as important in . . . social, economic, and political relations”); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown:
The Law of Skin Color, 49 Duke L.J. 1487, 1493–98 (2000) [hereinafter Jones, Shades of
Brown] (discussing the social signiﬁcance of skin color, ancestry, and other indicators of
race).
230. Jones, Shades of Brown, supra note 229, at 1497.
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ways in which a society construes . . . [and] attaches meaning” to these and
other differences.231 As Professor Ian F. Haney López notes, race is
a vast group of people loosely bound together by historically
contingent, socially signiﬁcant elements of their morphology
and/or ancestry. . . . [It] is neither an essence nor an illusion, but
rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject
to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro
effects of daily decisions.232
Importantly, race affects—and sometimes dictates—people’s lived, day-today realities. Individuals of the same race often share common
experiences. Although not monolithic,233 these shared experiences are all
connected to, and inﬂuenced by, the sociopolitical salience of race.
While many people have embraced the idea of race as a social
construction, biological understandings of race continue to abound.
Recent events, like mass shootings targeted at Black,234 Jewish,235 and
Latinx communities,236 demonstrate that racism, fueled by white
supremacist views erroneously grounded in biology, persists.237 In addition
231. Id. at 1493 n.15.
232. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1994); see also Davis v.
Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 835 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that “as a legal concept, a racial category
is generally understood as a group, designated by itself or others, as socially distinct based
on perceived common physical, ethnic, or cultural characteristics”).
233. Racial experiences are also shaped by gender, class, and sexuality, among other
things. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal Forum 139 (examining the intersection of race and
gender); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev.
581 (1990) (same).
234. See, e.g., Jon Schuppe & Jamie Morrison, Dylann Roof Sentenced to Death for
Charleston Church Massacre, NBC News (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/charleston-church-shooting/dylann-roof-sentenced-death-charleston-churchmassacre-n705376 [https://perma.cc/TX2C-36JF] (last updated Jan. 11, 2017).
235. See, e.g., Dakin Andone, Jason Hanna, Joe Sterling & Paul P. Murphy, Hate Crime
Charges Filed in Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting that Left 11 Dead, CNN (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/us/pittsburgh-synagogue-active-shooter/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Y6JK-NK5C].
236. See, e.g., Cedar Attanasio, Jake Bleiberg & Paul J. Weber, Police: El Paso Shooting
Suspect
Said
He
Targeted
Mexicans,
AP
News
(Aug.
9,
2019),
https://www.apnews.com/456c0154218a4d378e2fb36cd40b709d
[https://perma.cc/GRM2-EM36].
237. See, e.g., Hannah Allam, El Paso Mass Shooting Meant to Galvanize Other White
Nationalists, NPR (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/10/750172227/el-pasomass-shooting-meant-to-galvanize-other-white-nationalists [https://perma.cc/KHG2-9RKU];
Lois Beckett, More than 175 Killed Worldwide in Last Eight Years in White NationalistLinked Attacks, Guardian (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/aug/04/mass-shootings-white-nationalism-linked-attacks-worldwide [https://
perma.cc/A4N7-SWC6]; Editorial, We Have a White Nationalist Terrorist Problem, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/opinion/mass-shootingsdomestic-terrorism.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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to individual acts of racialized violence, biological race can be employed
on a macro level to justify gross racial inequities in housing, education,
employment, income, wealth, and health care, among other areas. The
argument is that if nature created racial hierarchy and resulting inequities,
then policy interventions cannot—and presumably should not attempt
to—disrupt them.238 In short, American society has not yet jettisoned a
biological understanding of race or a reliance on science to justify
separation, exclusion, violence, subordination, and other denials of
human rights.
*

*

*

Modern accounts recognize that race is inherently and inseparably
tied to social context. The problem with genetic race is that it conﬂates
genetic ancestry with socially constructed racial categories and attendant
experiences. Yet, contemporary understandings of race reﬂect more than
some distant, centuries-old connection to a geographical place.239 Indeed,
as we discuss above,240 race has a particular history in the United States.
Courts and other lawmakers have strategically deployed race to justify,
among other things, the capture and enslavement of African people and
the system of Jim Crow segregation that continued well into the twentieth
century. This history informs contemporary understandings of race in the
United States. Genetic race leaps right over this layered, contextualized
history and attempts to replace it with another simplistic, biological
conception of race, this time based not on skull circumference but on the
results of DNA ancestry tests. We discuss the social implications of genetic
race below.
III. RACIAL ASYMMETRY, RACIAL FRAUD, AND CULTURAL APPROPRIATION
In addition to fueling harmful and antiquated notions of biological
race, DNA ancestry tests reinforce white racial privilege and racial
hierarchies in other, more subtle ways. This Part begins by exposing a
curious asymmetry in terms of who has access to DNA-based racial ﬂuidity.
It then considers how genetic race may lead to accusations of “racial fraud”
or “cultural appropriation.” Finally, this Part responds to the argument
that multiracialism, as demonstrated by DNA ancestry tests, will end, or at
least ameliorate, racism.

238. For discussion of historical uses of this argument, see Roberts, Fatal Invention,
supra note 59, at 24, 42.
239. Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 400 (“Current understandings of race and ethnicity
reﬂect more than genetic relatedness, though, having been deﬁned in particular
sociohistorical contexts (i.e., European and American colonialism). In addition, social
relationships and life experiences have been as important as biological ancestry in shaping
individual identity and group membership.”).
240. See supra section II.A.
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Racial Asymmetry

A one-sidedness to the process of genetic self-discovery exists. Whites
are much more likely than nonwhites to change their racial identity based
upon DNA ancestry test results—and they do so based upon a small
percentage of sub-Saharan ancestry.241 Moreover, whites who change their
identities do not act randomly. In their examination of test takers, Roth
and Ivemark found that white test takers were more likely to embrace a
new racial identity when they perceived that identity as beneﬁcial.242 Thus,
some whites adopted a nonwhite identity when it offered economic
opportunities.243 Others acted when they believed their new identity might
facilitate cross-racial interactions.244 Still others embraced a new racial
identity as a means of adding more interest to what they perceived as an
otherwise “bland” racial identity.245
People of color, by contrast, are much less likely to change their racial
identity based on DNA ancestry test results.246 As Roth and Ivemark note,
“[b]ecause African-American and Latino identities historically
incorporated racial mixture, they contain a subsumed multiraciality—an
241. See, e.g., Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 164 (ﬁnding among survey participants
that “[t]hose who identiﬁed as only white before testing were the most likely to incorporate
geneticized identities (52%), while those who identiﬁed as only black before testing were
the least likely (17%)”). Gender may also affect the way in which test takers perceive results.
One study found that forty-three percent of female test takers surveyed were excited when
test results revealed African ancestry whereas only ten percent of male test takers surveyed
viewed this information positively. Sharon Kirkey, Are Genetic Ancestry Tests Reinforcing
Wrongheaded Ideas of Race?, Nat’l Post (Apr. 2, 2018), https://nationalpost.com/news/
world/are-genetic-ancestry-tests-reinforcing-wrongheaded-ideas-of-race [https://perma.cc/
5CFD-CGYF] (last updated Apr. 3, 2018).
242. See Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 172.
243. See Antonia Noori Farzan, A DNA Test Said a Man Was 4% Black. Now He Wants
to Qualify as a Minority Business Owner., Wash. Post (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/09/25/a-dna-test-saidhe-was-4-black-now-he-wants-to-qualify-as-a-minority-business-owner (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing Ralph Taylor’s case).
244. See Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 179 (“Adopting new geneticized identities
may shape social networks and racial interactions.”). This may explain a recent interaction
between one of the authors of this Essay and a DNA ancestry test taker. While standing in
line to enter an entertainment venue, the test taker initiated a conversation with the author
by proclaiming—without solicitation—“I am Black!” Though he had always identiﬁed as
white, his 23andMe test results triggered this spontaneous announcement to a stranger. He
showed the author the 23andMe analysis, which reported he possessed 1% West African
ancestry. Interview with S. Davis, in Wilmington, N.C. (July 21, 2018) (recording on ﬁle with
authors).
245. Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 172.
246. Id. at 164. Professor Roberts points out that when Black Americans incorporate
genetic data into their conceptions of self, this process is generally not reductionist. Roberts
notes that Black Americans “embed test results in the family history they have already begun
to construct, interpret them to ﬁt their political and spiritual viewpoints, and integrate them
into their collective customs,” instead of equating genetic data with race and basing their
identity solely on this data. Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 252–53.
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understanding that the identity already comprises multiple racial
ancestries.”247 Thus, affirmation of this general knowledge may be of no
real moment for these individuals. What may be of interest to Black
Americans, however, is greater genealogical speciﬁcity. Because much
ancestral information was lost or destroyed during the transatlantic slave
trade and the period of chattel slavery, some Black Americans may have a
keen interest in reconstructing this lost history and these severed
connections.248 They may, thus, turn to DNA ancestry tests to ﬁll in these
important gaps.
While DNA ancestry tests may provide information about continental
origin or biogeographic ancestry, we maintain that for Black as well as for
white people, these tests are not synonymous with race. Indeed, as Part I
demonstrates, the tests are less likely to accurately predict genetic ancestry
for people with non-European ancestry due to a lack of diversity in
company databases.249 However, even if the tests were 100% accurate, DNA

247. Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 152. Roth and Ivemark continue by noting that
“[a]s a result, African-American and Hispanic/Latino respondents typically believe that new
ancestries do not challenge their previous identities. Many nonwhite respondents also
express cultural and political motivations for maintaining their pretest identiﬁcations.” Id.
See also Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 230 (“Most African Americans are not
interested in ﬁnding out what race they are—they are pretty sure they are black and that
there is racial mixing somewhere in their heritage.”); Caroline Randall Williams, You Want
a Confederate Monument? My Body Is a Confederate Monument, N.Y. Times (June 26,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/opinion/confederate-monuments-racism.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (powerfully examining the history of miscegenation
and rape within the author’s family and within the Confederacy more generally).
248. See Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 232 (“The chance to regain their
lost ancestry has struck a deep chord with many black Americans in particular.”); Bolnick
et al., supra note 4, at 399 (explaining that some individuals who undergo DNA ancestry
testing “are searching for a connection to speciﬁc groups or places in Eurasia or Africa” and
that “[t]his search for a ‘homeland’ is particularly poignant for many African-Americans,
who hope to recapture a history stolen by slavery”). Professor Roberts notes that Black
Americans have difficulty tracing their lineage to periods prior to the 1870 U.S. census using
conventional genealogical tools because “[b]irth certiﬁcates, marriage documents, and
other evidence of [their ancestors’ lives] in America are scarce.” Roberts, Fatal Invention,
supra note 59, at 230. In addition, she points out that tracing their lineage back to Africa is
“virtually impossible” because “[r]ecords were rarely kept of the names, much less the
origins, of Africans who were captured by slave sellers and forcibly shipped to the Americas.”
Id. For an excellent examination of the ways in which Black Americans are utilizing genetic
genealogy tests, see generally Nelson, supra note 4, at 157–66. Dr. Alondra Nelson
documents the ways in which “[g]enetic analysis is . . . increasingly being used as a catalyst
for reconciliation—to restore lineages, families, and knowledge of the past and to make
political claims in the present,” but cautions that “the issues, controversies, and questions
we pose to science about race and the unsettled past can never ﬁnd resolution in the science
itself.” Id. at 6, 164.
249. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text; see also Roberts, Fatal Invention,
supra note 59, at 245–49 (describing how database limitations affect the accuracy of test
results).
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ancestry test results should not be conﬂated with race because, as section
II.B explains, race is socio-political, not biological.250
The comparative use of DNA ancestry tests by whites and Blacks
reveals another interesting difference. DNA ancestry tests can also reveal
or affirm genealogical ties to Western Europe. Yet, as we mention above,
it is unlikely that Black people would identify as white if tests indicated that
a small percentage of their DNA traced back to Western Europe. Indeed,
even if they desired to do so, their claims to whiteness would likely be
treated as farcical, especially if their previously self-identiﬁed race or
observed race conﬂicts with their newly adopted genetic race. For
example, if Stacey Abrams were to proclaim that she was white based upon
a DNA ancestry test that revealed eighteen percent of her ancestry traced
back to Western Europe, many people would summarily dismiss her claim.
This skepticism likely reﬂects the heavy inﬂuence of the one-drop rule
and/or the salience of physical characteristics like skin color, hair texture,
and facial features in assigning race.251
In sum, in the context of genetic race, the continued use of the rule
of hypodescent produces an asymmetry and instantiates the existing racial
hierarchy. As seen with Ralph Taylor and Cleon Brown, “one drop” of
African ancestry supports whites’ claims to Blackness.252 However, one
drop of European ancestry, per DNA ancestry test results, does not render
white a person whose previously self-identiﬁed or observed race was Black.
As has long been the case in the United States, it remains easier to be
assigned a subordinate rather than a privileged status. In other words, one
can more easily move down—rather than up—the U.S. racial hierarchy.253
250. See also Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 252–57 (arguing that Black
racial identity and Black solidarity should not rest upon “genetic kinship” but rather on
“black people’s distinctive collective experience of creatively resisting racial oppression in
the United States”).
251. See generally Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial
Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1161 (1997)
(discussing the origins of the U.S. system of racial classiﬁcation). During the period of
chattel slavery, the rule served not only to bolster the Southern economy by increasing the
number of enslaved persons but also to maintain a system of white racial purity and
superiority in the United States. See id. at 1174–79.
252. See supra notes 9–20 and accompanying text. Indeed, Taylor and others have
expressly endorsed the rule of hypodescent and have sought to apply it to support their
newly acquired nonwhite racial identities. While Taylor relied upon his DNA ancestry test
results, some individuals have simply invoked a vague reference to an unknown ancestor. See
Katie Shepherd, ‘I’m a Black Male’: Miami Police Captain Admits Changing Race Designation
from White to Black, Wash. Post (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2020/01/21/ortiz-cop-black (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“‘I learned
there are people in my family that are mixed and that are black,’ Ortiz said. ‘And if you
know anything about the “one-drop rule” . . . you would know if you have one drop of black
in you, you are considered black. You’re probably black, too.’” (quoting Miami Police
Captain Javier Ortiz)).
253. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993)
[hereinafter Harris, Whiteness as Property] (arguing that whiteness has both material and
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Access to whiteness remains elusive, and white identity continues to be
more difficult to assume than nonwhite racial identities.
A recent Portlandia episode used the reality of the one-drop rule for
comedic effect.254 In the episode, Portland’s eccentric mayor bemoans a
headline dubbing his fair city the least diverse in America.255 In an attempt
to comfort the mayor, his colleague Fred mentions DNA ancestry tests,
explaining: “They’re great. They tell you where you’re from like down to
a percentage. . . . Hardly anyone is 100% European.”256 The mayor then
proceeds to test the entire city of Portland to prove that, contrary to the
headline, Portland is in fact diverse.257 In a ceremony following the mass
testing, the mayor proudly declares, “You know, before DNA testing, we
were 75% white. And now there is scarcely a white person in the entire city
of Portland. We are more diverse than New York City or even Detroit.”258
Fred reads aloud the results of one citizen who appears to be a white male:
“Judd’s genetic breakdown is 98% Northern European, 1% broadly
European, 0.5% Ashkenazi Jew . . . 0.25% African, and 0.25% other.”259
“0.25% African. I’m Black!” gasps Judd.260 The audience applauds
approvingly.261 A beatiﬁc smile passes across the mayor’s face and he
declares, “Well, we lost another white person. But the melting pot
continues to grow.”262
B.

Racial Fraud and Cultural Appropriation

When someone assumes a new racial identity solely based upon DNA
ancestry test results, allegations of cultural appropriation or racial fraud
may arise.263 For example, in the same Portlandia episode, Carrie, a
psychological value to many whites, and that some whites will vigilantly guard against
extending its privileges to others).
254. See Portlandia: Most Pro City (IFC television broadcast Mar. 21, 2018). Portlandia
is a sketch comedy television series, starring Fred Armisen and Carrie Brownstein, which
parodies life in Portland, Oregon. See id.
255. See id.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Social scientists have worked for decades to develop a deﬁnition of cultural
appropriation. One frequently cited deﬁnition is “the taking—from a culture that is not
one’s own—of intellectual property, cultural expressions or artifacts, history and ways of
knowledge.” Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao, Introduction to Cultural Appropriation: A
Framework for Analysis, in Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation 1, 1 (Bruce
Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Writers’
Union of Canada, Resolution (1992)); see also Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter,
Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural) Appropriation, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 859, 863 (2016)
(adopting Ziff and Rao’s deﬁnition of cultural appropriation); Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual
Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J. Gender Race & Just. 69, 73 (2000)
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character who also appears white, attends a reception wearing a kimono
paired with a sombrero. Carrie explains, “I wouldn’t have worn this a week
ago. That would have been offensive, but, you know, I just wanted to
acknowledge my heritage.”264
The issue, of course, extends beyond art or ﬁction. Accusations of
racial fraud and cultural appropriation have attended white individuals
who, in recent years, have claimed a Black racial identity.265 For example,
in September 2020, Jessica Krug, a historian at George Washington
University, admitted to having lied about her race for her entire
professional career.266 Krug, who is white and Jewish, claimed several Black
identities, including “North African Blackness, then US rooted Blackness,
then Caribbean rooted Bronx Blackness.”267 She also characterized her
background as poor, donned a fake accent, and claimed to be an expert
in diasporic dance.268 Similarly, in June 2015, Rachel Dolezal, who
changed her racial identiﬁcation from white to Black, was outed as
white.269 Dolezal, who was an adjunct lecturer and the president of a local
(“Cultural appropriation is a term used to describe the phenomenon of culture traveling in
the opposite direction . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cultural appropriation is
deﬁned by power and use; thus, questions regarding appropriation must always focus on
who is doing the appropriation, and to what end. See Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of
Cultural Property, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 2004, 2044 (2007). A focus on power and use helps
to distinguish cultural appropriation from cultural appreciation. Common deﬁnitions of
fraud include unjustiﬁably or falsely claiming, or being credited with, accomplishments or
qualities.
See
Fraud,
Lexico,
https://www.lexico.com/en/deﬁnition/fraud
[https://perma.cc/37FG-6CNW] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020). By racial fraud, we mean the
adoption of a racial identity that is not your own.
264. Portlandia, supra note 254.
265. Professors Khaled Beydoun and Erika Wilson term this phenomenon reverse
passing. Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 282, 288
(2017) (“Reverse passing . . . is the process by which whites shed their white racial identity
in exchange for a nonwhite racial identity.”).
266. Michael Levenson & Jennifer Schuessler, University Investigates Claim that White
Professor Pretended to Be Black, N.Y. Times (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/09/03/us/jessica-krug-gwu-race.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last
updated Sept. 9, 2020); Lauren Lumpkin & Susan Svrluga, White GWU Professor
Admits She Falsely Claimed Black Identity, Wash. Post (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/09/03/white-gwu-professor-admitsshe-falsely-claimed-black-identity (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). Since Krug’s
disclosure, a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin at Madison has also been
exposed for passing for Black. Colleen Flaherty, More White Lies, Inside Higher Ed (Sept.
10, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/09/10/more-allegations-racialfraud-academe [https://perma.cc/XBM6-5U5V].
267. Jessica A. Krug, The Truth, and the Anti-Black Violence of My Lies, Medium (Sept.
3, 2020), https://medium.com/@jessakrug/the-truth-and-the-anti-black-violence-of-mylies-9a9621401f85 [https://perma.cc/9R8F-2B43].
268. See supra note 266.
269. Rachel Dolezal is a civil rights activist who was raised white, but later secretly passed
for years as Black. See Dana Ford & Greg Botelho, Who is Rachel Dolezal?, CNN (June 17,
2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/us/rachel-dolezal/index.html [https://perma.cc/
747P-UTZZ]; Richard Pérez-Peña, Black or White? Woman’s Story Stirs Up a Furor, N.Y.
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chapter of the NAACP, had tanned her skin, donned hairstyles
traditionally associated with Black women, and fabricated a personal
narrative rooted in poverty and abuse.270 Both Krug and Dolezal are said
to have beneﬁtted from their racial passing through the establishment of
personal and professional networks and the garnering of other
professional opportunities.271
Although Krug and Dolezal did not ground their claims to Blackness
in a DNA ancestry test, in many ways their cases raise issues similar to those
raised by Cleon Brown, Ralph Taylor, and Senator Elizabeth Warren.272
Are these individuals engaging in racial fraud? Moreover, if they alter their
identity performance when they change their identity, are they donning
something akin to blackface (i.e., performing a caricatured version of what
they think it means to be a member of one of these groups)?273
In the case of Senator Warren, the Cherokee Nation certainly
objected to Warren’s assertion of Native American ancestry. In a heartfelt
op-ed, Chuck Hoskin Jr., the Secretary of State for the Cherokee Nation,274
explained:
While we appreciate the affinity many Americans have for the
family lore of native ancestry, stating, “My grandmother was
Cherokee” or citing vague results of a consumer DNA test do us
harm and in no way confers the full rights and responsibilities of
Times (June 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/us/rachel-dolezal-naacppresident-accused-of-lying-about-her-race.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review);
Lisa Respers France, Rachel Dolezal on Being Black: ‘I Didn’t Deceive Anybody’,
CNN (July 20, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/20/us/rachel-dolezal-vanity-fair-feat
[https://perma.cc/9SNT-2CDN].
270. Beydoun & Wilson, supra note 265, at 286–87.
271. Osamudia James, What Rachel Dolezal Doesn’t Understand: Being Black Is
About More than Just How You Look, Wash. Post (June 12, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/12/what-rachel-dolezal-doesntunderstand-being-black-is-about-more-than-just-how-you-look (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review); Levenson & Schuessler, supra note 266.
272. Importantly, although Warren claimed Native American ancestry, she did not
make a tribal membership claim. See Joe Perticone, Elizabeth Warren Addresses DNA Test
and Native American Heritage During Iowa Trip: ‘Tribal Citizenship Is Very Different from
Ancestry’, Bus. Insider (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/elizabeth-warrenaddresses-native-american-dna-test-in-iowa-tribal-citizenship-is-very-different-from-ancestry2019-1 [https://perma.cc/W2VC-QLW4].
273. Blackface, of course, is more than caricature. See Jamelle Bouie, Opinion,
Blackface Is the Tip of the Iceberg, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/northam-blackface-racism.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the role of blackface in bolstering racial
subordination).
274. The Cherokee Nation has since elected Hoskin Jr. to principal chief. Lenzy
Krehbiel-Burton, Chuck Hoskin Jr. Elected New Cherokee Chief, Vows to ‘Unify Cherokee
People’ Following ‘Contentious’ Election Moments, Tulsa World (June 3, 2019),
https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/state-and-regional/chuck-hoskin-jr-elected-newcherokee-chief-vows-to-unify/article_eaa47bbc-82b1-50f3-a586-7494739ef913.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
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tribal citizenship. . . . When someone boasts they are Native
American due to the results of a DNA test, it perpetuates the
general public’s misunderstanding about what it means to be a
tribal citizen . . . . We are citizens through historical
documentation, adopted laws and a shared language and culture
that make us unique.275
Professor Osamudia James seems to agree. When critiquing Rachel
Dolezal’s racial performance, James notes:
[T]he experience of blackness . . . often includes subtle, but
more indelible, phenomena: the learning, as a child, of racial
narratives of inferiority; the frustration of navigating a society
where education about white supremacy (and how it intersects
with gender, class and other constructs) is withheld; the labor of
black caregivers who cultivate resiliency and pride in their little
ones despite the experience of racial struggle . . . . [Black
people’s] resilience is borne out of childhood that yes, presents
challenges and exposes us to stigma, but also results in a lived,
day-to-day racial experience that enriches our lives and informs
the world; an experience to which Dolezal may not fraudulently
lay claim, whether or not people believed her farce.276
James and Hoskin are both asserting that race involves more than a
questionable connection to a geographical space or a tenuous link to some
unknown, distant ancestor. Race is shaped by historical and sociopolitical
context as well as cultural forces. These combined forces result in a lived,
racial experience that cannot be put on and taken off at whim.
This reasoning extends to Ralph Taylor’s case. The reader will recall
that after receiving DNA ancestry test results estimating that he was ninety
percent Caucasian, six percent indigenous American, and four percent
sub-Saharan African, Taylor applied for certiﬁcation as a disadvantaged
business enterprise (DBE) under a federal affirmative action program277
that was developed to increase access to government-funded contracts by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.278 Taylor submitted
275. Chuck Hoskin Jr., Opinion, Chuck Hoskin Jr.: Elizabeth Warren Can Be a Friend,
but She Isn’t a Cherokee Citizen, Tulsa World (Jan. 31, 2019), https://
www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/columnists/chuck-hoskin-jr-elizabeth-warren-can-be-a-friendbut/article_8c4b4d62-15be-536d-bb96-f33368a4488b.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review). Hoskin also presumably took issue with Trump’s mockery of Warren, noting:
“Likewise, when someone disparages someone else’s family lore by dismissively calling them
names or using negative stereotypes about Native Americans, that robs us all of an
opportunity to have a meaningful discussion.” Id.
276. James, supra note 271.
277. Taylor sought certiﬁcation under both the State of Washington and the federal
government’s DBE program. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Off. of Minority & Women’s
Bus. Enters., No. 16-5582 RJB, 2017 WL 3387344, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2017), aff’d,
754 F. App’x 556 (9th Cir. 2018). His state certiﬁcation was initially denied, but was
voluntarily reversed after Taylor appealed the decision. Id. at *2.
278. Id. at *1–3. The federal government deﬁnes socially disadvantaged individuals as
“those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within
American society because of their identities as members of groups and without regard to
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the following materials in support of his application: (1) an affidavit in
which he identiﬁed himself as Black American and Native American;279
(2) his DNA ancestry test results; (3) a copy of his Washington State
driver’s license, which included his picture; (4) his birth certiﬁcate, which
did not state his race (although his parents are listed as “Caucasian”);
(5) a letter from Taylor’s father to an unknown entity, dated approximately three years before his application, requesting that Taylor’s birth
certiﬁcate be changed to reﬂect that he is “Caucasian, African,
and American Indian”; (6) the results of Taylor’s father’s DNA ancestry
tests, which estimated that his father was forty-four percent European,
forty-four percent sub-Saharan African, and twelve percent East Asian; and
(7) a 1916 death certiﬁcate for a woman from Virginia, Eliza Ray, identiﬁed as “Negro,” but with no supporting documentation to indicate she
was one of Taylor’s ancestors.280
The State of Washington challenged Taylor’s racial identiﬁcation as
Black, asking that he submit additional documentation supporting his
claimed identity.281 In response, Taylor submitted a letter in which, among
other things, he asserted that his new racial identity was based on his DNA
ancestry test results, his membership in the NAACP, his subscription to
Ebony magazine, and his “great interest in Black social causes.”282 Taylor
also stated that based on family names and a timeline that he had
constructed, an “inference [could] be made” that he and Eliza Ray were
maternally related.283 Finally, while acknowledging that he did not know
how he was perceived in the relevant communities, Taylor submitted
letters from two individuals who stated that they viewed him as a person of
mixed race or mixed heritage.284 Neither of these individuals indicated
with which racial group they or Taylor identiﬁed.285 The State

their individual qualities. Social disadvantage must stem from circumstances beyond their
control.” 49 C.F.R. pt. 26, app. E (2019). Under the DBE, women and racial minorities are
presumed to be “socially and economically disadvantaged.” Id. § 26.67(a)(1). This
presumption is rebuttable. Id. §§ 26.63, 26.67(b).
279. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2. Interestingly, in his request for
certiﬁcation under the Washington state program, Taylor identiﬁed himself as Black, but
not Native American. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at *3. Under the federal DBE program, recipients of federal funds (in this case
the State of Washington) may certify a ﬁrm’s eligibility for the federal program. Id. at *2.
Thus, although Taylor’s certiﬁcation was for the federal DBE program, the State of
Washington was initially charged with rendering a decision on his application. Id.
282. Id. at *3. Taylor conceded that he had no documentation to support his claimed
Native American identity. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.

2020]

GENETIC RACE?

1979

subsequently denied Taylor’s requested certiﬁcation.286 A federal district
court upheld this determination, which was affirmed on appeal.287
The problem with Taylor’s claim to a Black racial identity is that he
seemingly pulled it out of thin air. Although there are many markers of
racial identity,288 Taylor could not produce persuasive evidence that would
ground his claim to Blackness in any of them. He had no immediate
ancestors who were Black; he had no lived experience as a Black person;
and indeed he had held himself out for most of his life as white.289 Taylor
also could not show that he was regarded as Black by the community, and
he had none of the physical indicators that are frequently associated with
Blackness (e.g., a brown skin tone, or kinky hair). In short, his claim to
Blackness seemed cut from whole cloth, manufactured—one might
presume—to allow Taylor to participate in the DBE program, a program
designed to redress historic discrimination experienced by people of
color, women, and economically disadvantaged individuals.290
In addition to a lack of persuasive support for his claimed racial
identity, Taylor’s racial switch is problematic for several other reasons.
First, it trivializes or downplays the racialized experiences of Black
people.291 As James notes, being Black is ﬁlled with meaning, including
beneﬁts and challenges.292 And in the United States, where racism is
endemic, the challenges are considerable.
Second, to use a DNA ancestry test to assert a nonwhite identity, either
on a whim or for strategic purposes, smacks of white privilege.293 As noted
286. Id.
287. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Off. of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., 754 F.
App’x 556, 558–59 (9th Cir. 2018) (ﬁnding that “OMWBE did not act in an arbitrary and
capricious manner when it determined it had a ‘well founded reason’ to question Taylor’s
membership claims”).
288. See supra notes 228–230 and accompanying text.
289. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2.
290. See id. at *1 (noting that in establishing and reauthorizing the DBE program,
Congress considered and documented the discriminatory hurdles that women and racial
minorities face in securing transportation contracts).
291. See James, supra note 271.
292. See id. (describing the day-to-day challenges of navigating the experience of
Blackness in a society where racial narratives of inferiority and a lack of awareness about
white supremacy are commonplace).
293. Broadly speaking, “white privilege” refers to the myriad advantages that white
people possess based on their race in a society characterized by racial inequality and racial
injustice. See generally Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,
Peace & Freedom, July–Aug. 1989, at 10, 10–12 (detailing speciﬁc examples of privileges the
author experienced as a result of being white). White privilege is often said to include the
ability not to see oneself as having a race or to not have to think about race. See Barbara J.
Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 969–70, 973–74 (1993) (describing the
“transparency phenomenon” or the “tendency for whiteness to vanish from whites’ selfperception”). In the context of this Essay, white privilege might also include the privilege
of not having to think about other people’s race and what it means to be a person of color.
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earlier, in a social context where whiteness and Blackness are not
equivalent, this sort of racial ﬂuidity is generally only available to those
who phenotypically appear and identify as white.294 Like a one-way street,
whites can claim Blackness, but Blacks cannot readily claim whiteness
based upon DNA ancestry test results alone.295 Concerns about white
privilege are aggravated by a sense that changes in racial identiﬁcation by
whites based on DNA ancestry test results are strategic, situational, and
largely without negative consequence. Professor Wendy Roth notes that
when white people discover a new racial identity through DNA testing,
“[t]hey can try it on, mention it when it’s to their advantage and ignore it
otherwise.”296 And they rarely completely abandon their white identity.297
Thus, choosing to identify as Black does not carry the same consequences
for whites as it does for nonwhite people. Roth observes that this “can
really lead whites in particular to think that race is like that for
everyone.”298 This assumption can be frustrating for individuals who lack
the same racial ﬂuidity. As one of the author’s students recently observed,
whites who strategically change their race based on DNA ancestry tests “get
the beneﬁts of Blackness, but none of the harms.”299
It is important to note what we are not arguing here. We are not trying
to police racial boundaries or to assert that henceforth all individuals must
prove their race. We have no wish to return to the days of race trials.300 We
also are not asserting that all claims to Blackness must be grounded in a
Only by overlooking the pernicious history of racism in the United States and what this has
meant and continues to mean for people of color can one wake up and decide, on thin
evidence, “I am going to be Black.” Indeed, to claim an identity that is not your own—to
steal another’s identity—is arguably the ultimate manifestation of white privilege.
294. See discussion supra section III.A.
295. Some Blacks have historically been able to pass as white. See Harris, Whiteness as
Property, supra note 253, at 1710–13 (describing her grandmother’s experience with
passing). But this ability was generally limited to those whose physical appearance was
indistinguishable from whites and those who were not known to have Black ancestors or
connections. Id. at 1710–11 (“[I]n the burgeoning landscape of urban America, anonymity
was possible for a black person with ‘white’ features. . . . No longer immediately identiﬁable
as [someone’s child,] she could thus enter the white world . . . .”).
296. Ashifa Kassam, Users of Home DNA Tests ‘Cherry Pick’ Results Based on Race
Biases, Study Says, Guardian (July 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/science/
2018/jul/01/home-dna-test-kits-race-ethnicity-dna-ancestry [https://perma.cc/73GR-RG6E]
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wendy Roth).
297. See Anita Foeman, DNA Tests, and Sometimes Surprising Results, N.Y. Times (Apr.
23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/us/dna-ancestry-race-identity.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text
(discussing the strategic use of transracialism).
298. Kassam, supra note 296.
299. Comment from Jebril Reeves, Third-Year Law Student, Duke L. Sch., in Durham,
N.C. (Feb. 19, 2019).
300. Cf. Mary Ziegler, What is Race?: The New Constitutional Politics of Affirmative
Action, 50 Conn. L. Rev. 279, 285 (2018) (“[R]elevant decision makers rely not only on skin
color, but also on a variety of proxies—including class, education, place of residence, dress,
voice, and name—in judging an individual’s racial identity.”).
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particular lived experience, a particular phenotype, or an immediate Black
ancestor. In the United States, race has not been constructed based solely
on one variable.301 In addition, we are not saying that society should not
enjoy and beneﬁt from cross-racial exchanges and collaboration. Such
exchanges have inspired much artistic, scientiﬁc, and cultural innovation
and creativity in this country.302 What we are saying is that, in certain
instances, the government must have the ability to screen for racial fraud
and racial groups must be able to call out instances of racial fraud and
cultural appropriation.
To be sure, difficult cases will arise. For example, is it fraudulent for a
person whose mother is white and whose father is Black, and who has
always identiﬁed as white, to change their racial identiﬁcation to Black
while in college? Is the wearing of a sombrero, a kimono, or a kente cloth
by a white person the same as the wearing of braids and locs, the
acquisition of lip and hip injections and suntans, or the situational
donning of a Black accent? To a large extent, the answers to these
questions will vary depending upon degree and context, and we leave it to
others to develop context-speciﬁc analytical frameworks for determining
when certain identity claims and actions are, or are not, problematic.
Here, we maintain only that claims to racial identity should not be
grounded solely in DNA ancestry test results.
C.

Counterarguments

Might genetic race produce positive social effects? Some will contend
that our rejection of genetic race is short-sighted, asserting DNA ancestry
tests can disrupt the idea of innately distinct races by showing that most
Americans are racially mixed.303 Per this argument, knowledge of racial
301. See supra section II.B.
302. See, e.g., Jiali Luo & David Jamieson-Drake, A Retrospective Assessment of the
Educational Beneﬁts of Interaction Across Racial Boundaries, 50 J. Coll. Student Dev. 67,
75, 78 (2009).
303. For example, Professors Jennifer Hochschild, Vesla Weaver, and Traci Burch argue
that genomic science and multiraciality, among other factors, are revealing the
heterogeneity within racial groups and that this knowledge will decrease the distance
separating groups. Jennifer L. Hochschild, Vesla M. Weaver & Traci R. Burch, Creating a
New Racial Order: How Immigration, Multiracialism, Genomics, and the Young Can
Remake Race in America 7–9 (2012). Similarly, Professor Jennifer Wagner notes:
[T]he use of DNA ancestry testing may help us visualize just how
antiquated our civil rights framework is today and challenge that
framework enough to force individuals to be treated as such. Questioning
how to categorize children of recent admixture, questioning the
continued existences of social norms like the one-drop rule
(hypodescent) and blood-quantum rules (hyperdescent), and
questioning how to deﬁne individuals with complex proportional ancestry
. . . might help us blur, both socially and genetically, these arbitrary
categories.
Wagner, supra note 76, at 240–41. But see Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra
note 21, at 1–15 (examining and rejecting the argument that mutiracialism will end racism
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admixture will transform social discourse, break down barriers between
racial groups, and lead to a wide-scale embrace of multiraciality in both
public and private contexts. As is explained below, history belies the idea
that racial mixture and racial ﬂuidity will destroy racism and racial
hierarchy.
Monoracialism—the idea that individuals descend from only one
racial group—has never been the reality in the United States. Race mixing,
both voluntary and involuntary, has occurred between whites, Blacks,
Native Americans, and other racialized peoples since the colonial era.304
Thus, mixed-race people have always been among us. Interracial unions
and any resulting offspring, however, threatened to undermine “white
racial purity” and white hegemony in a society built upon white
supremacy.305 Indeed, the presence of race mixing led colonial lawmakers
to disapprove of miscegenation (at least between whites and Blacks)306 as
early as 1622, only a few years after the ﬁrst Africans arrived on North
American shores.307 Despite these laws, whites and nonwhites continued to
engage in interracial sex, which raised a question regarding the resulting
status (enslaved or free) of the mixed-race offspring of free white men and
enslaved women. Departing from traditional English rules of patrilineal
descent, in which the status of the child always followed that of the father,
colonists determined that, by law, the status of mixed-race children would
follow that of the mother.308 In addition, legislatures passed statutes
providing for the banishment of white women who married Black men and
for the enslavement of their children.309 Anti-miscegenation laws and rules
concerning biological descent ﬂourished throughout the nineteenth

and that new legal frameworks are necessary to redress discrimination against multiracial
persons).
304. See generally Kathy Russell, Midge Wilson & Ronald Hall, The Color Complex:
The Politics of Skin Color Among African Americans 9–23 (1992) (chronicling the history
of race mixing in the United States up to the Civil War); Joel Williamson, New People:
Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States 6–14 (1995) (exploring Black–white
unions in the United States from the colonial era to the end of the twentieth century).
305. See Russell et al., supra note 304, at 12 (“For slavery to gain moral acceptance, it
was essential to keep the races apart.”).
306. Id. at 13. At this time, while colonial whites were not particularly concerned with
the race mixing of Indians and Africans, “the rapid proliferation of White-Black race mixing
. . . caus[ed] them great alarm.” Id. at 12.
307. See Russell et al., supra note 304, at 13 (“Most of these laws implied that Africans
were a lower life form than Europeans; they proclaimed that sexual union between Whites
and Blacks was twice as evil as fornication between two Whites, and that sex with Negroes
was equivalent to bestiality.”); Hickman, supra note 251, at 1172–73 (discussing early efforts
to prohibit interracial unions).
308. Russell et al., supra note 304, at 14 (noting that these laws “allowed, even
encouraged, owners to increase slaveholdings through sexual misconduct”).
309. Hickman, supra note 251, at 1176.
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century and continued to exist until at least the late 1960s in the United
States.310
The presence of mixed-race persons and attempts to erase their
existence (by deﬁning them as Black) are evidenced in other ways and at
other points in U.S. history. For example, Professor Christine Hickman
notes that in the mid-seventeenth century, “laws dealing with Negro slaves
added the phrase ‘and mulattoes’ to ensure that mulattoes were subject to
the same restrictions as Negroes.”311 In addition, she notes that in 1850,
the U.S. Census began to count mulattoes separately from Blacks.312
However, by 1920, the Census Bureau “stopped counting ‘mulattoes’ and
formally adopted the one drop rule.”313 Critically, anti-miscegenation laws
and a rule of hypodescent—the notion that one drop of Black blood
makes you Black—would only be required in a social context where racial
mixing was prevalent and deemed threatening.
As noted earlier, we posit that most Black Americans already
recognize that racial groups in the United States are racially mixed.314
Knowledge of the history of miscegenation and a rainbow of skin tones
within communities of color support this conclusion. DNA ancestry test
results affirming this general knowledge may be less consequential in
changing Black Americans’ views of race than white Americans’ views.315
In contrast, white Americans might tend to perceive their genealogies
as exclusively European or white.316 To the extent that whites in the United
States are less aware of historical race mixing and its presence in their own
families, ancestry test results may be revelatory.317 However, a question
remains as to whether this information will lead to increased
understandings of institutional racism and a stronger commitment to
310. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) (noting that at the time of the decision,
Virginia was one of sixteen states that prohibited and punished marriage based on racial
classiﬁcations).
311. Hickman, supra note 251, at 1178–79.
312. Id. at 1182. Hickman notes that although some believed that mulattoes were
superior to Blacks, the differentiation between Black and mulatto was not necessarily
designed to elevate the stature of mixed-race individuals. Id. at 1184–86.
313. Id. at 1187 (citing 3 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep’t of Com., Fourteenth Census
of the United States Taken in the Year 1920: Population, at 10 (1922)).
314. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
315. Cf. Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 229 (“It is not clear, however, why
genetic technologies would have any greater impact on racial inequality than the knowledge
of racial intermixture we had without them.”).
316. See, e.g., Tara Bahrampour, They Considered Themselves White, but DNA Tests
Told a More Complex Story, Wash. Post (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/social-issues/they-considered-themselves-white-but-dna-tests-told-a-more-complexstory/2018/02/06/16215d1a-e181-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
317. Of course, many whites are aware of this history. See Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra
note 59, at 229 (“Surely, Southern slave owners were well aware that the children they
fathered with enslaved women were racially mixed and intimately related to them. Yet their
response was to pass laws guaranteeing that their offspring would have the status of slaves.”).
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eradicating systemic racial inequities. That is to say, will test results and
greater knowledge of society’s multiraciality cause white test takers, and
society more generally, to fundamentally rethink, among other things,
their views on (1) racial proﬁling and other forms of racially biased
policing; (2) systemic racial disparities in wealth, income, and access to
education, health care, and housing; and (3) the need for remedial
interventions like affirmative action and reparations?
We are skeptical. While racial affiliation (e.g., having a family member
or a friend of a different race—or indeed, claiming to be a member of that
race) may change some people’s views of marginalized groups or
subordinating structures, in others it may have no signiﬁcant effect.318
Indeed, some data suggest that advocates of multiracialism tend to make
identity claims that are disconnected from demands to change the
material conditions of those ravaged by racism.319
We are also skeptical about whether DNA-driven changes in identity
will eradicate or signiﬁcantly reduce racism for another reason. Some will
argue that our present moment has the potential to differ signiﬁcantly
from the past because instead of suppressing multiraciality, we have an
opportunity to embrace it. This embrace, they will argue, will breakdown
racial barriers. This contention, however, is undermined by historical and
contemporary evidence in countries where racial mixing was widely
practiced, publicly recognized, and explicitly encouraged.
For example, because of its racially mixed population, Brazil often
touts itself as a racial democracy.320 However, during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, Brazil, and several Latin American countries, adopted
policies of “blanqueamiento,” in which the state deliberately sought to
“whiten” its population by incentivizing European immigration and

318. Mary R. Jackman & Marie Crane, “Some of My Best Friends Are Black . . .”:
Interracial Friendship and Whites’ Racial Attitudes, 50 Pub. Op. Q. 459, 470–71 (1986)
(determining that “black friends and acquaintances have almost no effect on whites’ policy
orientations towards blacks” according to survey data). But see Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the Multiracial Family
250–57 (2013) [hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our Hearts] (discussing
potential positive effects of interracial marriages on other family members).
319. See Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 91–95. Professor
Hernández explains that for multiracial activists, “the primary locus of multiracial
discrimination is in any societal resistance to the assertion of multiracial identity.” Id. at 91.
She notes that the problem is not that this approach “centers itself on identity,” but rather
that these “claims are isolated from material inequality concerns with social hierarchy and
group-based disparities.” Id. at 95.
320. Brazil frequently employs national identity to cloak racial differences (e.g.,
encouraging citizens’ use of national descriptors such as “I am Brazilian” instead of racial
descriptors to identify themselves). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & David R. Dietrich, The Latin
Americanization of U.S. Race Relations: A New Pigmentocracy, in Shades of Difference: Why
Skin Color Matters 40, 43–46 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009) (noting that in Brazil and
elsewhere “racial stratiﬁcation systems operate . . . without races being officially
acknowledged”).
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encouraging race mixing between whites and people of color.321 Despite
the success of these policies in terms of achieving a whiter and more
mixed-race society,322 Brazil has an entrenched racial hierarchy,323 with
whites on top and Blacks on the bottom. Indeed, today, Brazil experiences
many of the same racial dynamics that we see in the United States:
widespread discrimination against its Black population in law
enforcement, employment, and access to health care and education,
among other things.324
Rather than breaking down racial hierarchy, Professors Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva and David R. Dietrich suggest that a growing mixed-race
population may entrench it. In The Latin Americanization of U.S. Race
Relations, the authors posit that the United States may be developing a
three-tiered racial hierarchy similar to that which exists in Latin
America:325 whites on top, a category of “honorary whites” in the middle,
321. Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of
Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 11, 63–64 (2001) (“Called
‘blanqu[e]amiento’ in the Spanish-speaking nations and ‘branqu[e]amiento’ in Brazil, the
idea was to encourage the progressive whitening of national populations.” (citing Winthrop
R. Wright, Café Con Leche: Race, Class and National Image in Venezuela 52–54 (1990)));
see also john a. powell, Transformative Action: A Strategy for Ending Racial Hierarchy and
Achieving True Democracy, in Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa,
and the United States 371, 378 (Charles V. Hamilton, Lynn Huntley, Neville Alexander,
Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães & Wilmot James eds., 2001) (“[T]he Brazilian
government encouraged racial intermixing to whiten the population and eliminate
[B]lacks.”); Edward E. Telles, Race in Another America: The Signiﬁcance of Skin Color in
Brazil 28–29 (2004) [hereinafter Telles, Race in Another America] (describing whitening
policies devised and implemented by Brazilian eugenicists). Unlike in the United States,
racial mixing was encouraged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Brazil “because
it was believed that white genetics were a ‘purifying’ agent that could cleanse the ‘corrupt’
or ‘tainted’ gene[s] of . . . [B]lack and Native population[s].” Sammy Lorena,
“Blanqueamiento”: The Forced Racial Whitening of Brasil, Kolor Komplex (Jan. 21, 2017),
https://www.kolorkomplex.com/kolorkomplex-history/2017/1/3/the-blanqueamientothe-forced-whitening-of-brasil [https://perma.cc/4JPJ-76QF]. Yet, as Robert Cottrol points
out, “[b]y the 1920s, a number of Latin American intellectuals began seeing the AfroAmerican and Indian elements of their national populations less as embarrassments to be
explained away, and more as distinctive parts of their national identities.” Cottrol, supra, at
66; see also Telles, Race in Another America, supra, at 33 (noting that the 1933 publication
of Gilberto Freyre’s Casa Grande e Senzales [The Masters and the Slaves] “transformed the
concept of miscegenation from its former pejorative connotation into a positive national
characteristic and the most important symbol of Brazilian culture”).
322. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Colorism and the Law in Latin America—Global
Perspectives on Colorism Conference Remarks, 14 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 683, 691
(2015).
323. See Edward Telles, The Social Consequences of Skin Color in Brazil, in Shades of
Difference: Why Skin Color Matters 9, 10 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009) (explaining that
while some refer to Brazil’s hierarchy as a color hierarchy because skin color performs the
work of racial categories, the effects parallel the racial hierarchy of the United States).
324. Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, supra note 320, at 40.
325. Id. at 42–44. Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich point out that
[b]ecause most colonial outposts were scarcely populated by Europeans, all these
societies developed an intermediate group of browns, pardos, or mestizos that
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and a nonwhite group or the “collective Black” on the bottom. BonillaSilva and Dietrich observe that most multiracial individuals will fall within
the “honorary white category,” having some but not all the privileges of
whites but escaping some of the disadvantages of the collective Black.326
Thus, rather than eliminating white supremacy, Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich
argue that this triracial hierarchy will effectively maintain it. They
conclude that “[w]hites will still be at the top of the social structure, but
they will face fewer race-based challenges. . . . [H]onorary whites . . . will
remain secondary, will still face discrimination, and will not receive equal
treatment in society.”327 And “those at the bottom of the racial hierarchy
will discover that behind the statement ‘We are all Americans’ hides a
deeper, hegemonic way of maintaining white supremacy.”328 We fear that
the phrase “We are all multiracial” could produce the same effects.
The work of Professor Tanya Katerí Hernández supports many of
Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich’s conclusions. In Multiracials and Civil Rights:
Mixed-Race Stories of Discrimination, Hernández examines historical and
contemporary discrimination against mixed-race persons in the United
States.329 Importantly, she shows that multiracial persons are primarily
buffered sociopolitical conﬂicts. Even though this group did not achieve the status
of white anywhere, it nonetheless had a better status than the Indian or black
masses and, therefore, developed its own distinct interest.
Id. at 44.
326. Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich observe that with the browning of America, whites may
be incentivized to create this intermediate group of honorary whites to buffer racial conﬂict.
See id. at 46–47. As honorary whites increase in number and social importance and become
more vested in maintaining their distinction from the collective Black, Bonilla-Silva and
Dietrich maintain that honorary whites are likely to embrace the rhetoric of colorblind
racism and distance themselves from the opposition to or resentment of members of the
collective Black. Id. at 59.
327. Id. at 60.
328. Id.
329. See Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 6, 111 (“Although
the claimants may personally identify as multiracial persons, they present allegations of
public discrimination rooted in a bias against nonwhiteness that is not novel or particular
to mixed-race persons . . . . Particularly noteworthy is the fact that it is multiracials of African
ancestry who overwhelmingly ﬁle multiracial-identiﬁed racial-discrimination legal
claims . . . .”); see also Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial
Classiﬁcation in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 Md. L. Rev. 97, 121–26 (1998)
[hereinafter Hernández, Multiracial Discourse] (noting that a “middle tier” of racial
classiﬁcation can lead multiracial individuals to embrace a sense of white superiority,
“notwithstanding their own consistent experiences of discrimination and prejudice”);
Jones, Shades of Brown, supra note 229, at 1521–27 (casting doubt on whether
multiracialism will end racial discrimination). Notably, mixed racial identity has not spared
mixed-race persons from scornful and, at times, brutal treatment in contexts outside the
United States. For example, being of mixed-racial identity did not spare Jews under the
Nuremberg Laws, nor did it spare many Blacks in South Africa’s system of racial apartheid.
See, e.g., Alan Cowell, South Africa’s ‘Coloreds’: A Group Torn Between Black and White
Worlds, N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/11/world/southafrica-s-coloreds-a-group-torn-between-black-and-white-worlds.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing how mixed-race people in South Africa were labeled “colored” and
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targeted for discrimination because of their nonwhiteness or Blackness.330
Indeed, she notes that some data suggest
that phenotype and known black ancestry are stronger drivers of
multiracial discrimination than actual mixed-race status,
inasmuch as multiracials of black and Asian ancestry encounter
more racism than multiracials of white and Asian ancestry. This
also parallels the greater rejection of black-white multiracial
online date seekers as compared to Asian-white multiracials, and
the greater resistance the public has to accepting multiracial
identity when expressed by black-white multiracials as opposed to
multiracials of other ancestries.331
In short, multiracial identity does not obliterate racial distinctions and
bias against nonwhites. Racism thrives amidst multiracialism. If being
multiracial has not spared multiracials of discrimination, then proclaiming
that we are all multiracial is unlikely to accomplish that end. Eliminating
racism requires sustained attention to group-based hierarchies and a
frontal attack on white supremacy.
*

*

*

Biological race has been used historically to suppress racial mixture
in furtherance of white racial supremacy. Ironically, biological race in the
form of genetic race is being used today to assert that Americans are so
racially mixed that we are all one race and, therefore, recognition of racial
classiﬁcations is itself problematic. Indeed, we should be colorblind.332 We
reject this move. As our analysis shows, whether biological race is used to
suppress racial heterogeneity or to celebrate it, the end result is the
same—the fortiﬁcation, rather than the dismantling, of racial hierarchy.
IV. GENETIC RACE IN LAW AND POLICY
Despite the shameful historical uses of biological race Part II
describes, courts and other policymakers may still be tempted to rely on
DNA ancestry test results as proxies for race. This Part considers
three contexts in which this may occur: (1) employment discrimination,
afforded different rights and privileges than white or Black citizens); U.S. Holocaust Mem’l
Museum, Nuremberg Race Laws, Holocaust Encyc., https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/
content/en/article/nuremberg-laws [https://perma.cc/G6BS-FZ6R] (last updated Sept. 11,
2019) (“[Mixed-race individuals] enjoyed the same rights as ‘racial’ Germans, but these
rights were continuously curtailed through subsequent legislation.”).
330. See Hernández, Multiracial Discourse, supra note 329, at 119 n.110 (“[T]he racism
mixed-race persons experience ﬂows from their connection to blackness, as opposed to
their mixed-race status.”).
331. See Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 94.
332. See id. at 101–10 (explaining how multiracial discourse has been used to challenge
policies of inclusion in affirmative action litigation); see also Hernández, Multiracial
Discourse, supra note 329, at 139–61 (describing the jurisprudential shift toward colorblindness and its disavowal of the social signiﬁcance of race).
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(2) race-conscious initiatives, and (3) immigration. While we acknowledge
that discrimination on the basis of DNA ancestry test results may
sometimes be legally actionable, we conclude that courts should not rely
on genetic race exclusively—or even primarily—in any of these areas.
Because DNA ancestry testing remains relatively new, some of our analysis
is preliminary. It is, however, important to think about how various actors
might use and respond to genetic race before any widespread practices or
doctrinal developments take hold.
A.

Employment Discrimination

An employer’s “discovery” of an employee’s previously unknown
racial or ethnic identity may result in discriminatory treatment.333 A case
against Merrill Lynch provides an illustrative example. There, a former
broker alleged that he was on the management track at Merrill Lynch until
he came under the supervision of a new manager. An arbitration panel
found that upon learning of the broker’s ethnicity, the new manager
removed the broker from the management track and “basically sent [him]
to a corner to eventually be terminated.”334
A similar dynamic may occur in cases involving DNA ancestry test
results. Recall Sergeant Cleon Brown.335 Prior to sharing his DNA test
results, nothing suggests that Brown had ever been subject to any form of
racial hostility or ridicule by his colleagues. Yet, after he disclosed his
results, Brown’s colleagues allegedly responded in a racially hostile
manner, causing Brown to sue for discrimination.
The critical question is whether these factual scenarios give rise to an
actionable legal claim of discrimination. We consider two potential
avenues for relief that plaintiffs may have: the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)336 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.337
1. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. — Plaintiffs, like Brown,
who face discrimination on the basis of their DNA ancestry test results may
have actionable GINA claims. GINA outlaws discrimination based on
genetic information in health insurance and employment. It forbids

333. Individuals in interracial unions or who have multiracial children have also
experienced explicit overt discrimination at work after an employer discovered their
relationships. See Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our Hearts, supra note 318, at 199–207.
334. Jamie Levy Pessin, Fired Iranian Broker Wins $1.6 Million from Merrill, Wall St. J.
(July 23, 2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118522781094175435 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
335. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text.
336. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
337. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codiﬁed as amended in
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
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employers from taking adverse employment actions338 and from limiting,
segregating, or classifying employees on the basis of their genetic
information.339 GINA also prohibits employers from requesting, requiring,
or purchasing an employee’s genetic information except under certain
enumerated circumstances.340 Notably, GINA is a preemptive statute.341
Genetic information discrimination was not—and continues not to be—a
widespread social phenomenon.342
While Congress most likely passed GINA to alleviate fears around
medical genetic testing,343 the statute’s plain language leaves the door
open to apply to nonmedical tests. GINA simply covers “genetic
information,” which it deﬁnes as a person’s genetic test results, the genetic
test results of their family members, and their family medical history.344
Nothing on the statute’s face requires the genetic information that it
covers to convey health risk. Although eleven legislators objected to this
broad deﬁnition because it could apply beyond medical genetic testing,
Congress nonetheless left it intact.345 The statute’s drafters were therefore
aware of the law’s potential reach beyond medical genetic testing.

338. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (2018) (stating that employers may not “fail or refuse to
hire, or . . . discharge, any employee, or otherwise . . . discriminate against any employee
with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . .
because of genetic information with respect to the employee”).
339. Id. § 2000ff-1(a)(2) (stating that employers may not “limit, segregate, or classify . . .
employees . . . in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of the employee as an
employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee”).
340. GINA contains six exceptions. The statute permits an employer to obtain genetic
information under a variety of conditions, including: “(1) inadvertently; (2) through
voluntary wellness programs; (3) when processing medical leave; (4) via commercially
available documents, like newspapers that contain obituaries; (5) for the occupational
monitoring of toxic substances; and (6) to ensure quality control in DNA analysis by law
enforcement.” Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of
Employee Privacy, 128 Yale L.J. 710, 728 (2019); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(1)–(6).
341. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 439, 441 (2010) [hereinafter Roberts,
Preempting Discrimination]. Based on its legislative history, Congress most likely passed the
statute to encourage people to learn about their health risks and to participate in research.
Id. at 471. Securing this objective necessarily requires protection against the adverse use of
this information.
342. See Areheart & Roberts, supra note 340, at 750.
343. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2,
122 Stat. 881, 882–83 (codiﬁed as amended in scattered titles of 42 U.S.C.) (“Federal
legislation establishing a national and uniform basic standard is necessary to fully protect
the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the potential for
discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing,
technologies, research, and new therapies.”); Roberts, Preempting Discrimination, supra
note 341, at 471–74.
344. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4).
345. See Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360,
1368 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
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GINA’s accompanying Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) regulations support an expansive interpretation. The regulations
state that “[g]enetic information does not include information . . . about
the race or ethnicity of the individual or family members that is not derived
from a genetic test.”346 While we reject the notion that DNA ancestry tests
reveal race or ethnicity per se, this exception implies that GINA may in
fact cover genetic information related to an individual’s race or ethnicity
when it is derived from a genetic test. In other words, it could arguably
leave the door open for GINA to apply to DNA ancestry test results.
Moreover, at least one court has applied GINA’s protections outside
the context of medical genetic testing. In Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group Retail
Services, LLC, the federal district court applied GINA to an employer’s use
of DNA forensics.347 Atlas operated warehouses that stored products sold
in grocery stores.348 After discovering human fecal matter in a company
warehouse on multiple occasions, Atlas asked some of its employees to
provide cheek swabs to identify the guilty culprit(s).349 Atlas then sent the
cheek cell samples to a forensics lab that compared the employees’ DNA
to DNA from the offending excrement. The lab sent those results to
Atlas.350 Atlas thus conducted forensic DNA testing in connection with a
disciplinary investigation, not to obtain medical- or health-related
information.
Two targeted employees, Jack Lowe and Dennis Reynolds, sued Atlas,
alleging that GINA prohibits employers from requesting genetic
information from their employees.351 Atlas moved for summary judgment,
arguing that “‘genetic information’ [for purposes of GINA] refers only to
information related to an individual’s propensity for disease.”352 In other
words, Atlas argued that GINA only covers the results of medical genetic
testing. However, the court ruled for the plaintiffs, ﬁnding that “the
unambiguous language of GINA covers Atlas’s requests for [the plaintiffs’]
genetic information and thus compels judgment in [their] favor.”353
Importantly, the Atlas decision suggests that GINA is not limited to genetic
information that communicates a health risk.
As demonstrated by Atlas, GINA potentially covers a broad range of
genetic information. Consequently, courts could reasonably interpret
346. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(c)(2) (2019) (emphases added); see also Booker v. Gregg, No.
1:16-CV-187 JD, 2016 WL 4437989, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016) (rejecting a GINA claim
in which the plaintiff alleged discrimination, relying on the fact that his “genetics are
African American,” because “Mr. Booker’s complaint does not include any allegations
related to genetic tests”).
347. 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1361.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1363. The results showed that neither plaintiff was a guilty culprit. Id.
351. Id. at 1363–64.
352. Id. at 1364.
353. Id.
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GINA to bar employers from collecting or using genetic information to
screen for employee health, to identify a guilty defecator in a disciplinary
investigation, or—for purposes of this Essay—to discriminate on the basis
of race. Thus, plaintiffs who allege that their employer discriminated
against them based on the results of their DNA ancestry tests arguably have
standing under GINA. Put simply, GINA may cover genetic race
discrimination.
GINA, however, has certain potential shortcomings in cases of genetic
racism. Importantly, GINA prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees “because of genetic information.”354 Yet, when an
employer engages in racially discriminatory behavior based on DNA
ancestry tests, is that behavior because of the employee’s genetic
information or because of the employee’s race? Interestingly, the Cleon
Brown case, which involves allegations of racial harassment following the
voluntary disclosure of ancestry test results, was brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights statutes, but not under
GINA.355 Given the uncertainty about whether and to what extent GINA
applies to genetic race discrimination cases, analysis of Title VII seems
pertinent.
2. Title VII. — While we reject genetic race, we believe that plaintiffs
like Cleon Brown, who experience race discrimination after disclosing
their DNA ancestry test results, should have actionable Title VII claims. As
we explain in this section, this conclusion does not rely on genetic race.
Instead, we join other scholars who argue that courts have used
membership in a protected class as a misguided gatekeeping mechanism
for antidiscrimination claims.356 Thus, Brown’s lawsuit is actionable—not
because he demonstrated that he is Black as a matter of law—but rather
because he faced race-related harassment and discrimination by his
employer.
Brieﬂy, Title VII’s key statutory provisions are very similar to
GINA’s.357 The Act prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis
354.
355.
356.
(2017).
357.

42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2018).
Plaintiff’s Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 13, at 2, 5–6.
See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101, 104

The statute states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.358 Although several
analytical frameworks exist for bringing claims under Title VII,359 at least
two are pertinent to this analysis: (1) individual disparate treatment claims
arising from a tangible, adverse employment action; and (2) individual
disparate treatment claims arising from a hostile work environment.
With the former, plaintiffs must prove that their employers
intentionally relied upon an impermissible characteristic like race in
making an employment decision (e.g., termination, demotion, or a failure to hire).360 In setting forth a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show:
“(1) They belong to a group protected by Title VII; (2) They applied and
were qualiﬁed for the position in question; (3) Despite their qualiﬁcations,
they were rejected; and (4) The employer continued to look for persons
with their qualiﬁcations.”361
In harassment or hostile work environment cases, plaintiffs must
prove that the employer’s conduct was based on a protected classiﬁcation,
was unwelcome, and was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to create a
hostile or abusive work environment.362 They need not show an economic
or other tangible loss (e.g., loss of beneﬁts, failure to promote, or
termination). Nor must they establish that the behavior was
psychologically injurious.363
Although Title VII speaks only in terms of protected classiﬁcations
(e.g., race, sex, religion, national origin, or color), courts have generally
required plaintiffs in individual disparate treatment cases to establish that
they are a member of the targeted protected class (e.g., Black, a woman,
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356, 359–61
(1995) (setting forth the after-acquired evidence framework); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989) (setting forth the mixed-motive framework); Int’l Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334–37 (1977) (setting forth the pattern or
practice framework); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–31 (1971) (setting forth
disparate impact theory).
360. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 805 (1973).
361. See id. at 802. The employer may rebut this prima facie showing by offering a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. The plaintiff then has an opportunity
to show that the proffered reason is a pretext or a “cover” for discrimination. Id. at 804–05.
In cases involving multiple or “mixed-motives,” plaintiffs may prevail by establishing that a
protected classiﬁcation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decisionmaking. If a
plaintiff successfully makes this showing, then the employer may limit or avoid damages if it
proves that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the
prohibited criterion. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–102 (2003) (describing
the required showing in mixed-motive discrimination cases under Title VII).
362. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986) (rejecting petitioner’s
argument that Title VII only prohibits discrimination resulting in tangible economic loss);
see also Race/Color Discrimination, Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/race_color.cfm [https://perma.cc/GA3G-QTYM] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2019). The harassment must be severe or pervasive both objectively and
subjectively. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).
363. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.

2020]

GENETIC RACE?

1993

Muslim, etc.). In imposing the “protected class” requirement, courts rely
upon the text of Title VII, which prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee “because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”364 They have also relied upon the
Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, an early Title VII
case in which the Court ﬁrst set forth the framework for inferential or
circumstantial individual disparate treatment cases. In that race
discrimination case, the Court stated that plaintiffs may set forth a prima
facie case by showing, among other things, that “[they] belong[] to a racial
minority.”365
In the vast majority of race discrimination cases, the plaintiff’s racial
characterization is a nonissue because a plaintiff’s self-identiﬁed race (how
they identify) is the same as their observed race (how others, including the
employer, identify them).366 Moreover, these racial characterizations tend
to be stable over time (i.e., a person’s self-identiﬁed and observed race do
not tend to change). For example, in McDonnell Douglas, the employer did
not challenge the plaintiff’s characterization of his race as Black because
the plaintiff’s self-identiﬁed race and observed race were aligned.367
364. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
365. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
366. Although challenges to class membership have not often arisen in past Title VII
cases, it is a defense that employers may strategically employ with greater frequency as
arguments about multiracialism and colorblindness percolate. See Jones, Shades of Brown,
supra note 229, at 1551–52 (examining the possibility that employers may deny knowledge
of an employee’s racial identity in an attempt to negate an inference of discrimination).
Indeed, a recent case highlights this possibility. See Complaint & Demand for Trial by Jury
at 2, Evans v. Canal St. Brewing Co., No. 2:18-cv-12631 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2018), 2019 WL
1491969; Tom Perkins, Founders Brewing Manager Claims He Didn’t Know Black Employee
Is Black, Detroit Metro Times (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.metrotimes.com/table-andbar/archives/2019/10/21/founders-brewing-manager-claims-he-didnt-know-black-employeeis-black (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). In the case, the plaintiff identiﬁed as Black.
While being deposed, his former general manager denied knowledge of the plaintiff’s race.
Id. After some prodding, the manager admitted that the plaintiff’s skin tone was dark, but
argued that he did not know the plaintiff’s DNA. Id. Interestingly, the manager also denied
knowing the race of Michael Jordan or Barack Obama. Id. When interviewed, the plaintiff’s
attorney expressed the belief that “the move [was] tactical: To argue on whether Founders
[Brewing Company] discriminated against Evans as a minority, his managers must ﬁrst
acknowledge that he is one.” Teo Armus, ‘I Don’t Know His DNA’: Craft Brewery Manager
Says He Can’t Conﬁrm Black Employee’s Race in Discrimination Lawsuit, Wash. Post (Oct.
22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/22/craft-brewery-manager-cantconfirm-black-employees-race-discrimination-lawsuit (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
367. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792. For discussion of cases where the plaintiff’s
self-identiﬁed race and observed race differ, see generally Clarke, supra note 356, at 106–
07, 121–26 (arguing that courts’ rigid application of the protected class framework excludes
nontraditional classes such as LGBT plaintiffs); D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black,
White, or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 87, 88–141 (2013) (analyzing cases of misperceived identity);
Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 228, at 1325 (arguing that courts should recognize
employment discrimination claims arising when an employee is targeted based on a
mistaken racial classiﬁcation).
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Establishing membership in a particular group is not as easy in cases
involving racially ﬂuid individuals, like Cleon Brown. Indeed, in the Brown
case, the City of Hastings challenged Mr. Brown’s claimed Black racial
identity, asserting that neither the city, nor Mr. Brown, had ever
considered Mr. Brown to be Black.368 For the reasons we articulate in Part
I, we agree with the City of Hastings. While DNA test results may
increasingly be a constitutive aspect of some people’s personal identities,
DNA ancestry test results alone should not be conﬂated with sociopolitical
conceptions of race.369 In other words, DNA ancestry test results are not
race.
This conclusion raises an important question for genetic race
discrimination claims: If a plaintiff cannot show that they are a member of
a particular group (i.e., the race that is being maligned), can they proceed
with their claim? That is to say, if Cleon Brown cannot use ancestry test
results to establish that he is Black, can he still claim racial harassment?
Courts have considered these questions most directly, and with mixed
results, in what are increasingly known as misperception discrimination
cases.370 In these cases, an employer’s perception of the plaintiff’s race
368. Walter Smith-Randolph, Hastings Officer Says Co-Workers Were Racist After
Discovering He Is 18-Percent African, WWMT (May 10, 2017), https://wwmt.com/
news/local/hastings-officer-says-co-workers-were-racist-after-discovering-hes-18-percentafrican [https://perma.cc/N3U3-G2LE]. The City argued:
Obviously, individuals who discover the existence of some genetic
markers through testing are not within the group of persons the antidiscrimination laws were meant to protect. These statutes were meant to
provide redress and legal recourse to a class of individuals who have
experienced historic discrimination and harassment because of the color
of their skin—not because a Caucasian discovers that his ancestry may be
linked back centuries (or perhaps not at all) to an area of the African
Continent.
Id. The City thus maintained that Brown had no claim. While we agree that DNA ancestry
test results alone are an inadequate basis upon which to assert a racial identity, we do not
agree that individuals who experience discrimination as a result of these tests have no legal
standing to bring an antidiscrimination claim.
369. See supra note 21.
370. The issue has also arisen, albeit less directly, in third-party discrimination cases. In
these cases, plaintiffs seek redress for unlawful discrimination that other individuals have
suffered rather than discrimination the plaintiff has endured directly. Prototypical thirdparty cases are sex discrimination cases initiated by male plaintiffs on behalf of women, or
race discrimination cases initiated by white plaintiffs on behalf of nonwhite employees. See
Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1206–09 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 927 (1998) (considering allegations of disparaging remarks made to a
white male officer about female and Black officers); Jackson v. Deen, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1346,
1350–52 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (considering racially discriminatory treatment against Black
employees as witnessed by a white employee). Some federal courts have refused to recognize
these third-party claims, ﬁnding that such discrimination is unrelated to the plaintiffs’
protected status and only imparts indirect harm. Accordingly, these courts have held that a
plaintiff can only beneﬁt from Title VII protection if the proscribed discrimination is aimed
at individuals with whom the plaintiff shares the same racial or gender identity. For criticism
of this approach, see Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1497, 1498,
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does not align with the plaintiff’s self-identiﬁed race and the employer acts
based upon its perception.371 In some misperception cases, courts have
imposed what has become known as an “actuality” requirement. Before
allowing a claim to proceed, these courts require that a plaintiff establish
“actual” membership in the racial group that is targeted by the
employer.372
For example, in Butler v. Potter, the plaintiff, who identiﬁed as
Caucasian, alleged that his supervisors had discriminated against him
because they perceived him to be of Indian or Middle Eastern origin.373 In
rejecting Butler’s claim, the court concluded “Title VII protects those
persons that belong to a protected class . . . and says nothing about
protection of persons who are perceived to belong to a protected class.”374
The court further determined that if Congress wanted to “protect[]
persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected class,” then it
could do so.375
Other courts, however, have disagreed with this reasoning.376 For
example, in Kallabat v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., the plaintiff alleged that
he was subject to a hostile work environment and other adverse treatment
because his employer perceived him to be Muslim.377 In allowing the
plaintiff’s claim to proceed, the court suggested a reasonable jury could
ﬁnd that the employer was discriminating on the basis of religion even if
1501–04 (2010) (categorizing third-party race discrimination claims initiated by white
plaintiffs as “interracial solidarity” claims and arguing for legal recognition of such claims).
371. See Clarke, supra note 356, at 119; Dallan F. Flake, Religious Discrimination Based
on Employer Misperception, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 87, 111–17 (describing key cases in which
courts rejected misperception discrimination claims); Greene, supra note 366, at 87–88;
Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 228, at 1288.
372. See, e.g., Sears v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-1322, 2014 WL 1665048, at *8 (M.D.
Tenn. Apr. 25, 2014); Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, No. 12-2788-CM, 2013
WL 5819703, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2013); Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 4:10CV2755,
2012 WL 1068794, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No.
3:09CV415, 2011 WL 1769805, at *5 (W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 257 (4th
Cir. 2011); Adler v. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 07-C-4203, 2008 WL 5272455, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008); Lewis v. N. Gen. Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys., 1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291, at *6 (N.D. Ga. June
30, 2006).
373. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846–48 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
374. Id. at 850.
375. Id.
376. See, e.g., Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 WL 5358093, at *4
(E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); Arsham v. Mayor of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 846 (D. Md. 2015);
Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, No. 10-C-8196, 2013 WL 3834405, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
July 24, 2013); Zayadeen v. Abbott Molecular, Inc., No. 10-C-4621, 2013 WL 361726, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2013); Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM,
2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010); LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F.
Supp. 2d 762, 770 (D. Neb. 1999); see also Clarke, supra note 356, 112–19 (arguing that this
reasoning “misconstrue[s] Title VII’s statutory language, . . . McDonnell Douglas[,] . . . and
standing doctrine”).
377. 2015 WL 5358093, at *1–5.
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the plaintiff was not in fact Muslim. The court cited a Third Circuit case
stating, “What is relevant is that the applicant, whether Muslim or not, was
treated worse than he otherwise would have been for reasons prohibited
by the statute.”378
Importantly, the EEOC, the entity charged with principal oversight of
federal employment discrimination laws, has taken a similar view,
concluding that “[d]iscrimination against an individual based on a
perception of his or her race violates Title VII even if that perception is
wrong.”379
We agree with the EEOC and courts that allow misperception cases to
proceed. Much complexity in employment discrimination cases could be
reduced if courts focused on the basis for the employer’s adverse action
and not on whether an employee is a member of a particular group. Title
VII’s animating purpose is to eliminate discriminatory actions by
employers in order to increase employment opportunities for workers.380
Given that purpose, to have standing to bring a claim, it should be
irrelevant whether the plaintiff actually self-identiﬁes with the race that
provided the basis for the employer’s action. The crux of the matter is that
the employer acted adversely based upon race. It is this impermissible
motive that establishes the basis for liability and that the law seeks to
eliminate.
Moreover, it is misguided to say that plaintiffs in misperception cases
are not harmed. If a plaintiff loses a tangible employment opportunity, or
is harassed, then they are injured regardless of whether they ﬁt within the
targeted group. For example, if someone like Cleon Brown can show that
he was not hired, or was demoted, terminated, or otherwise subject to
abusive work conditions, then that individual has suffered harm despite
any dissonance between his self-identiﬁed and observed race.
As noted above, these conclusions further Title VII’s animating
purpose. They are also not inconsistent with the statutory text. Because the
Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to cover all racial groups,381 one
reasonably can and should read the statute to mandate only that the
plaintiff set forth the nature or character of their claim and that it fall
within one of Title VII’s prohibited classiﬁcations (i.e., race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin).382 Further, although the statute bars
discrimination based on “such individual’s race,” courts have interpreted
this language to merely require that plaintiffs demonstrate the racial
378. Id. at *4 (quoting Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 2002)).
379. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Compliance Manual: Directives
Transmittal No. 915.003, at 15-5 (Apr. 19, 2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/racecolor.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3N5-3F62].
380. See 29 C.F.R § 1608.1(b) (2020).
381. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–79, 283 (1976).
382. See Clarke, supra note 356, at 102–04 (arguing against protected class gatekeeping
because the goal of Title VII should be to prohibit all forms of group-based discrimination).
For a thorough critique of the protected class requirement, see id. at 112–19.
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character of the defendant’s action.383 Finally, although Title VII, unlike
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), does not address “regarded as”
discrimination, this omission should not be determinative. Cases of
misperceived identity simply may not have been within Congress’s
contemplation when Title VII was adopted. Indeed, in interpreting Title
VII, the Supreme Court has recognized claims that may not have been on
Congress’s radar in 1964. For example, in holding that same-sex sexual
harassment claims are cognizable, the Court acknowledged that “male-onmale sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII.”384 However,
the Court went on to observe that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”385
To conclude that Cleon Brown and other racially ﬂuid persons ought
to have standing to bring race discrimination claims, even if their selfidentiﬁed race and observed race do not align, does not mean these
plaintiffs will ultimately win their cases. Difficult questions will remain for
the factﬁnder to determine. For example, in a case like Cleon Brown’s, it
will be up to the factﬁnder to decide whether Brown subjectively found
the harassment to be hostile or abusive, or whether it was, as the City
maintained, teasing that Brown himself instigated and promoted.386 The
factﬁnder will also need to determine what the employer perceived the
plaintiff’s race to be387 and whether the employer’s actions were based
upon race at all. For example, in the Cleon Brown case, the City might
argue that Brown’s coworkers were not motivated by race per se, but rather
they were mocking the fact that Brown was engaging in racial fraud.
To sum up, at least two federal laws could provide potential recourse
against genetic racism in the employment arena. Because GINA does not
383. See id. at 113–15.
384. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
385. Id. See also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750–53 (2020) (holding
that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination forbids discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity even though Congress may not have contemplated
such protection in 1964).
386. See Smith-Randolph, supra note 368 (describing the statement issued by the City
of Hastings, which alleges that Brown instigated the jokes about his race and failed to
adequately prove that he subjectively experienced a hostile work environment).
387. If a factﬁnder were to reject genetic race and to conclude that Cleon’s race was
white and that he was perceived as such by his coworkers, then his case would not ﬁt the
misperception frame. Rather, his race discrimination claim would be akin to an
associational claim. For example, in her analysis of the case, Professor Tanya Katerí
Hernández states that “Cleon looked white, and thus his perceived race was white. The
discriminatory treatment he received was not based on his perceived race but was instead
motivated by the nonwhite results of his Anctesry.com test.” See Hernández, Multiracials
and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 13; see also Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our Hearts,
supra note 318, at 207–12 (discussing discrimination by association cases in the context of
interracial relationships). An associational claim might also exist in cases where a plaintiff,
upon receipt of DNA ancestry test results, began to associate more with people of color, or
to embrace social causes involving race.
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limit the kind of genetic test results it covers, its protections should extend
to DNA ancestry tests. While we believe that plaintiffs like Brown may also
have actionable Title VII claims, they should be entitled to relief not
because they have adequately “proved” their race using DNA ancestry tests
but because they have faced racial discrimination or harassment.
B.

Race-Conscious Initiatives and Genetic Race

Genetic race raises complex issues in other areas, including raceconscious initiatives.388 In recent decades, the Supreme Court has
restricted the use of these initiatives to two purposes: (1) remedying past
and present discrimination;389 and (2) increasing an organization’s overall
racial diversity.390 As explained below, we are skeptical of the use of genetic
race in these contexts.
Remedial race-conscious initiatives have a long history, dating back at
least to the late nineteenth century.391 Modern equivalents ﬁnd expression
in the affirmative efforts of private and governmental actors to redress
discrimination against Black Americans and other people of color. For
example, since the 1970s, colleges and universities have instituted
proactive measures to increase the number of minorities in their student
bodies.392 Governmental entities have also sought to be more racially
egalitarian by, for example, implementing programs to encourage the
hiring of minority contractors.393 These race-conscious programs have
been subject to backlash and controversy, and over time the Supreme
388. In this Essay, we use “race-conscious initiatives” synonymously with “affirmative action.”
389. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 236 (1995) (holding
that all racial classiﬁcations will be subject to strict scrutiny in order to prevent reoccurrences
of past discrimination and future discrimination).
390. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003) (holding that the educational
beneﬁts ﬂowing from a diverse student body constitute a compelling state interest and that
colleges and universities may consider race in admissions to secure these beneﬁts). For an
overview of these rationales and the emergence of the diversity rationale, see Trina Jones,
The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 171, 171–75 (2005)
[hereinafter Jones, The Diversity Rationale].
391. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev. 753, 755, 777 (1985) (pointing to the existence of
remedial race-based initiatives, like The Freedmen’s Bureau, at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption).
392. See, e.g., Fisher v. Texas, 570 U.S. 297, 306 (2013) (“[T]he University included a
student’s race as a component of the [Personal Achievement Index] score, beginning with
applicants in the fall of 2004.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316 (ruling on a law school admissions
program that considered racial diversity as a factor in admission decisions); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (involving a medical school admissions
program that reserved sixteen seats for minority applicants).
393. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 206 (concerning federal contracts that
provide incentives for employing socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as
subcontractors); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (ruling on
a city ordinance that required contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the
contract to minorities).
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Court has limited their use by disallowing reliance on quotas,394 subjecting
all such initiatives to strict scrutiny (regardless of their underlying
intent),395 and requiring that such measures be directed at speciﬁcally
identiﬁable acts of discrimination by the entity in question.396
Because of these restrictions, in the 1990s, racial justice advocates
began increasingly to rely upon another justiﬁcation for affirmative
action—diversity.397 Although diversity measures are similar to remedial
race-conscious programs in that both seek to include persons with
different life experiences, diversity measures generally do not focus on
corrective or distributive justice.398 Rather, proponents of diversity
initiatives contend “that diversity is good in itself and that contributions
from persons of diverse backgrounds will advance the mission of the entity
in question.”399 Importantly, in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted
the diversity rationale in the context of university admissions,400 ﬁnding
that student body diversity increases cross-racial understanding, augments
the learning process, promotes good citizenship, and legitimates future
leaders.401 Businesses and other entities have also embraced the rationale.
Some businesses welcome the reputational boost that a diverse workforce
produces.402 Others believe that diversity augments problem solving and
improves client relations.403
The diversity rationale, however, has been subject to extensive
criticism. Indeed, preeminent race scholars have argued that it is
insufficiently tethered to the history of race and racial justice struggles in
this country. For example, Professor Derrick Bell has asserted that “the
394. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
395. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
396. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
397. See Beydoun & Wilson, supra note 265, at 289–92 (discussing the emergence and
limitations of the diversity rationale); Jones, The Diversity Rationale, supra note 390, at 175
(same).
398. Jones, The Diversity Rationale, supra note 390, at 173–74.
399. Id. at 173.
400. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (“We agree that, in the context
of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the
Law School’s race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority
applicants.”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003) (holding that the educational
beneﬁts ﬂowing from a diverse student body constitute a compelling state interest).
401. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–32.
402. See Joe Hanel, 3 Ways a Diverse Workplace Can Positively Impact an Organization,
Charlotte Bus. J. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2017/03/
06/3-ways-a-diverse-workplace-can-positively-impact.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
403. See e.g., Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, Greater Good Mag.
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_diversity_makes_
us_smarter [https://perma.cc/9XP5-8K3V]; Scott Page, How Diversity Powers Team
Performance, Knowledge@Wharton (Jan. 4, 2018), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/great-teams-diversity [https://perma.cc/W52B-U4D7]. For an extensive examination
of corporate diversity programs, see generally Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity Contributes
to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1011 (2016).
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concept of diversity . . . is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to
achieve racial justice [in part because] diversity enables courts and
policymakers to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race and class that
adversely affect so many [Black] applicants.”404 Similarly, Professor
Charles Lawrence has noted that the diversity rationale “articulates its
purpose as ‘forward-looking’ rather than ‘backward-looking.’ [In so
doing,] it avoids any direct admission or acknowledgement of [an]
institution’s past discriminatory practices, even when that discrimination
is de jure and of relatively recent vintage . . . . [Proponents behave] as if
there is no structural discrimination to remedy.”405
Whether offered for remedial or diversity purposes, race-conscious
initiatives implicate genetic race as entities may seek to use DNA ancestry
test results to beneﬁt from these programs.406 For example, business
owners, like Ralph Taylor, may invoke DNA ancestry test results to argue
that their businesses are minority-owned.407 Or, a subcontracting ﬁrm may
seek to increase the number of people of color in its workforce in order to
qualify for certain governmental contracts.408 For example, the ﬁrm might
ask its current or future employees to undergo DNA ancestry testing and,

404. Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1622, 1622 (2003).
405. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense
of Affirmative Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928, 953–54 (2001). Other scholars have
expressed similar views. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, We Will Turn Back?: On Why Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke Makes the Case for Adopting More Radically RaceConscious Admissions Policies, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2265, 2296 (2019) (noting that class
and diversity-based initiatives “allow a remedy that should seek to cure the effects of past
and current racial discrimination to be applied without addressing the important role race
played in structuring opportunity or the lack thereof”); Richard Delgado, Affirmative
Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 Mich. L.
Rev. 1222, 1223–25 (1991) (arguing that affirmative action in general is ahistorical and
inattentive to historical wrongs). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 98 (1986) (arguing that a focus on
discrimination limits the potential of affirmative action measures).
406. See also Beydoun & Wilson, supra note 397, at 328–47 (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence has created incentives for white individuals to
“reverse pass” in order to secure access to affirmative action programs, among other things).
407. See Farzan, supra note 243. For example, in order to be considered a minorityowned business by the National Minority Supplier Development Council at least ﬁfty-one
percent of a business must be owned by a member of a minority group, or in the case of a
publicly owned business, at least ﬁfty-one percent of the stock must be owned by one or
more minority group members. See Sarah Kessler, How to Get Certiﬁed as a MinorityOwned Business, Inc., https://www.inc.com/guides/2010/05/minority-owned-businesscertiﬁcation.html [https://perma.cc/BAN4-945S] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
408. Far from being mere speculation, this kind of DNA ancestry testing for affirmative
action purposes has already taken place. One author writing about the social, legal, and
medical implications of DNA ancestry testing explained: “Some employers—even after
adoption of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008—have sought DNA
ancestry tests for employees in order to gain governmental beneﬁts for minority businesses
(personal experience).” Wagner, supra note 76, at 243.
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much like the ﬁctional mayor of Portland in Part III,409 instantly transform
the racial composition of a pool of predominantly white employees.
In addition to businesses, individuals may seek to rely upon the results
of DNA ancestry tests in order to beneﬁt from affirmative action. The
infamous case of Malone v. Civil Service Commission demonstrates this
possibility.410 The case involved twin brothers, Paul and Philip Malone,
who took a civil service exam in 1975 to secure employment with the
Boston, Massachusetts, ﬁre department.411 The Malone brothers were fair
haired and light-skinned with “Caucasian” facial features.412 In 1975, they
listed their race as “White” on their initial job applications.413 When both
brothers performed poorly on the 1975 exam, the City denied them
employment.414 In 1977, the Malone brothers took the civil service exam
again. At the time of the second exam, Boston had agreed to a courtordered affirmative action plan in order to increase the number of Black
people in its ﬁre department. Although the brothers’ 1977 test scores
would not have qualiﬁed them for employment if they were “White,” the
brothers had listed their race as “Black.” They were hired and served as
ﬁreﬁghters for ten years.415
In 1987 when the Malones applied for promotions, the Fire
Commissioner noticed that the brothers were classiﬁed as “Black.” The
City subsequently terminated the Malones for having falsiﬁed their 1977
applications.416 In the ensuing legal proceedings, the Malones sought to
prove they were Black by offering a questionable and inconclusive
photograph of a woman who was allegedly the Malones’ maternal great
grandmother.417 The Malones claimed that they were told she was Black.418
However, evidence presented at trial indicated that the Malone family had
held itself out as white for three generations.419
409. See supra notes 254–262 and accompanying text.
410. 646 N.E.2d 150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). The Malone case has been discussed
frequently by legal academics. See, e.g., Beydoun & Wilson, supra note 397, at 331–33;
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in RaceConscious Law, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1231, 1232–34 (1994); Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who’s
Black, Who’s White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States’s Deﬁnition of
Race and Racial Classiﬁcations, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 513, 515–16 (1995).
411. See Wright, supra note 410, at 515.
412. See Ford, supra note 410, at 1232–33.
413. Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 151 n.3.
414. See Wright, supra note 410, at 515.
415. Ford, supra note 410, at 1232–33.
416. See id.
417. Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 152 n.5. The court offered three ways in which the Malones
might establish that they were Black: (1) through physical appearance; (2) through official
documentation, like a birth certiﬁcate showing Black ancestry; and (3) by showing that the
brothers or their families had held themselves out to the community as Black and were
regarded by the community as Black. See Ford, supra note 410, at 1233.
418. See Ford, supra note 410, at 1233 n.12.
419. See id. at 1233.
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To be sure, the Malone case occurred before the advent of DNA
ancestry testing.420 One can nonetheless readily envision other individuals,
similar to the Malone brothers, relying upon DNA ancestry test results to
qualify for race-conscious programs.421 For example, individuals may seek
to rely on DNA tests in college admissions.422 Indeed, in a recent legal case,
a medical school applicant alleged that the school’s admissions advisor
said her chances of securing admission would increase if she took a DNA
ancestry test that revealed Native American or African American
ancestry.423 Refusing to heed this advice, the applicant applied to the
school, indicating her race as white, and was rejected. She subsequently
sued the school, alleging racial discrimination in the admissions process.424
In another instance, journalist John Crudele reports receiving the
following reader response to an article he wrote inquiring about the use
of DNA ancestry tests in college admissions. The reader stated:
“My daughter is in the process of applying for colleges. Although
both of my wife’s parents were off-the-boat Irish, family lore has
always attributed the dark complexion of some relatives to
Spain/the Armada[]” . . . . “We did DNA testing out of curiosity
and, frankly, to see if we could get a leg up on college admissions.
As it turns out, my daughter does indeed have Spanish
blood[]” . . . . “But after the test we were told by the National
Hispanic Honor Society, ‘She’s not Spanish enough,’ and she was
out. In the insanity that guides affirmative action, however, we
learned that Spanish is ‘self identifying’—if you feel Spanish, you
are! Isn’t that great?”425

420. For other cases similar to the Malones’, see Beydoun & Wilson, supra note 397, at
333–37 (discussing the case of a white professor who was “outed” for passing as Native
American).
421. See Amy Harmon, Seeking Ancestry in DNA Ties Uncovered by Tests, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 12, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/12/us/seeking-ancestry-in-dna-tiesuncovered-by-tests.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the myriad ways in
which Americans are strategically using DNA ancestry test results, including to make claims
to citizenship, scholarships, health services, and casino money, among other things).
422. See John Crudele, Proof that DNA Testing Is Going to Start Making an Impact on
College Admissions, N.Y. Post (May 7, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/05/07/proof-thatdna-testing-is-going-to-start-making-an-impact-on-college-admissions
[https://perma.cc/2PJG-CJ68]; Harmon, supra note 421. One can also foresee similar
scenarios arising in other areas. For example, individuals might try to rely upon DNA
ancestry test results when seeking membership in organizations that are designed to serve
minority communities (e.g., a Black or Latin American Law Students’ Association).
423. Scott Jaschik, DNA Testing, Race, and an Admissions Lawsuit, Inside Higher Ed
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2019/01/28/lawsuitraises-questions-about-dna-testing-race-and-admissions [https://perma.cc/5HKC-5GUZ]. The
applicant alleged that the school’s admissions officer also told her that she had “advised a past
Caucasian applicant to obtain a genetic test, that the applicant learned that he was partially
African American, and that he was accepted into Jefferson on account of his race.” Id.
424. Id.
425. Crudele, supra note 422 (quoting J.P. Barry, a reader of the New York Post).
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In addition to admissions, DNA ancestry tests may also be used to
secure ﬁnancial aid. Journalist Amy Harmon describes a situation that
involved adopted twins. The twins’ birth parents identiﬁed as white and
the twins had always thought of themselves as white.426 Yet, when it was
time to apply for college, the twins’ adopted father decided “it might be
worth investigating the origins of their slightly tan-tinted skin, with a new
DNA kit that he had heard could determine an individual’s genetic
ancestry.”427 Although the DNA ancestry test results, stating that the twins
were nine percent Native American and eleven percent northern African,
arrived too late to be used in the admissions process, the father thought
they might be useful in securing ﬁnancial aid.428 The father, a business
executive, told Harmon, “Naturally when you’re applying to college you’re
looking at how your genetic status might help you . . . . I have three kids
going now, and you can bet that any advantage we can take we will.”429
As noted earlier, we reject such uses of genetic race. Allowing
individuals access to race-conscious initiatives premised on genetic race
has the potential to undermine or thwart remedial or corrective justice.
Importantly, corrective or remedial affirmative action programs are
designed to ameliorate the effects of past and present discrimination
against groups that have experienced structural disadvantages based on
race.430 The theory is that structural racism has prevented—and continues
to prevent—certain groups from having access to housing, employment,
educational, and other opportunities and that affirmative efforts are
required to level the playing ﬁeld.431 These policies and programs serve
antisubordination goals and are responding to problems that are social—
not biological, scientiﬁc, or genetic—in nature. The problem with
applicants who base their race solely upon DNA ancestry test results is that
these applicants may not have experienced any of the disadvantages that
affirmative action programs seek to redress.432 Put differently, genetic race
426. Harmon, supra note 421.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9 (2003) (analyzing the interplay of
anticlassification and antisubordination principles within antidiscrimination jurisprudence).
431. See Randall Kennedy, For Discrimination: Race, Affirmative Action, and the Law
39–54, 78–81 (2013) (tracing the historical development of contemporary affirmative action
programs). See generally Lawrence, supra note 405 (defending affirmative action programs
at educational institutions); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, Atlantic (June 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the inter-generational effects of slavery and
segregation in the United States).
432. See Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 250–51. Roberts observes:
Applying for beneﬁts under a genetic alias distorts the purpose of
affirmative action policies designed to remedy institutionalized
racism . . . . Whites who discover for the ﬁrst time after taking a DNA test
that they have a tiny fraction of African, Asian, or Native American
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does not provide a means of identifying and addressing individuals and
groups who have been and continue to be subject to systemic race-based
barriers to opportunity.
Consider again Ralph Taylor.433 A DNA ancestry test revealed that
four percent of his DNA traced to sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, Taylor, like
many Americans, has non-European ancestry. Yet, his entire life, Taylor
viewed himself and was viewed by others as white. His phenotype, cultural
practices, and all the other indicators that people use to assign race led to
his designation as white. Although Taylor’s DNA ancestry test results may
indicate genetic links to Africa, he has not experienced structural
disadvantage due to his race nor will this likely be the case. In short, relying
on the results of DNA ancestry tests in the affirmative action context
obscures the reality that discrimination is a social phenomenon, with
material consequences, based on the social salience of race.
We are similarly skeptical of a reliance on genetic race to access
diversity initiatives. As noted earlier, these initiatives have little meaning
unless they are grounded in a particular sociopolitical and historical
context. When we drill deeply and ask for what purpose racial diversity is
being pursued, the answer is invariably because a person’s race tells us
something about that person’s lived experience in the United States and
we believe that experience may shape the person’s outlook and add value
to an organization. Again, the problem with reliance upon ancestry test
results as a proxy for race is that genetic race does not align with the
sociopolitical nature of race and therefore does not reﬂect a person’s lived
experience as a member of a particular racial group.434 Thus, to the extent
that diversity programs employ race as a proxy for perspectives that have
been shaped by a particular sociopolitical context, racial identiﬁcation
based solely on a DNA ancestry test adds very little.
Ralph Taylor’s case exempliﬁes this gap.435 His entire life, Taylor selfidentiﬁed and was viewed by others as white. If an entity implements a raceconscious diversity plan seeking greater representation among racial
minorities, it is hard to see how this goal can be furthered by crediting
Taylor’s racial classiﬁcation based on his DNA ancestry test results. Indeed,
doing so would result in a superﬁcial form of paper diversity, as Taylor
would not have an extensive lived experience as a Black person.
Even without an extensive lived experience as a racial minority in the
United States, some will contend that people who change their race, like

ancestry should not be entitled to claim any beneﬁt because they have not
experienced the racial disadvantages that affirmative action redresses.
Their race has not changed on account of a genetic test.
Id.
433. See supra notes 10–12, 277–290 and accompanying text.
434. See supra section II.B.
435. See supra notes 10–12, 277–290 and accompanying text.
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Rachel Dolezal436 and Ralph Taylor,437 ought to qualify for diversitycentered initiatives. The argument is that these individuals occupy a
unique space and may have views and experiences that differ from persons
whose racial identiﬁcation has never shifted. While we acknowledge this
argument, we caution against creating a false equivalency—that is to
conclude that the experiences of these individuals are substantively the
same as those of individuals who have been Black their entire lives. We
question whether a transitional experience of race should be accorded the
same salience as an extensive experience as a racial minority in this
country. We also express concern about the extent to which such racial
transitions might be used strategically to secure material advantages.
C.

Immigration Law

Lastly, courts, legislators, and policymakers may be tempted to rely on
genetic ancestry tests as proxies for race, national origin, and ethnicity in
the context of immigration. Incorporating genetic testing, including DNA
ancestry tests, into the U.S. immigration process is not mere conjecture.
Other countries have adopted—and later abandoned—immigration
policies that rely on genetic race. And the United States government has
recently expanded DNA collection at the border.438 Should immigration
officials in the United States decide to screen for genetic race, they could
do so without much added effort. This section brieﬂy overviews some
current uses of genetic information in U.S. immigration policy and,
drawing upon the experiences of at least two other countries, hints at
future problems that could arise here. Consistent with the major theme of
this Essay, we conclude that overreliance on DNA ancestry tests in the
context of immigration is likely to be misguided, if not discriminatory.
1. United States DNA Immigration Policies. — While the United States
has a history of excluding people based on ethnicity and nationality439 and
currently collects DNA for immigration purposes, it has not yet used DNA
ancestry tests to screen immigrants. However, existing policies lay
precedent for immigration officials to rely on genetic race, should they
want to, in the future.

436. See supra notes 269–276 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 10–12, 277–290 and accompanying text.
438. DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,397, 56,398–
99 (Oct. 22, 2019) (codiﬁed at 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b)(4) (2020)) (limiting the Secretary of
Homeland Security’s authority to exempt persons detained at the border from DNA
testing); Bobby Allen & Joel Rose, Justice Department Announces Plan to Collect DNA from
Migrants Crossing the Border, NPR (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.npr.org/
2019/10/21/772035602/justice-department-announces-plan-to-collect-dna-from-migrantscrossing-the-bord [https://perma.cc/A83C-GSZA] (discussing the Justice Department’s
proposal “to begin collecting DNA samples from hundreds of thousands of immigrants
crossing the border”).
439. See infra notes 467–468 and accompanying text.
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Immigration officials have, on occasion, relied on genetic tests to
establish or to verify family relatedness. The United States grants
citizenship to the foreign-born children of U.S. citizens440 if the citizen
parent establishes a biological link to the child.441 Parents may opt to prove
that relationship using genetic tests.442 The United States also has a family
reuniﬁcation program that allows refugees and asylees to apply for their
immediate family members to enter the country.443 Under the I-730
“follow-to-join” process, a refugee or asylee can ﬁle a petition for their
spouse or unmarried children under the age of twenty-one.444 In addition,
people from certain countries who have an “anchor relative” in the United
States can participate in the United States Refugee Admissions Program,
referred to as the “Priority Three” or “P-3” family reuniﬁcation
program.445 Pursuant to that initiative, both the anchor relatives and the
individuals seeking entry to the United States must provide genetic test
results to conﬁrm their biological relationship.446
The mandatory DNA testing requirements in the P-3 program were
adopted in response to suspected fraud. The Bush administration
authorized a study from 2007 to 2008 that took genetic information from
individuals who were seeking to join their family members in the United
States.447 The study claimed to have found widespread immigration
fraud—over eighty percent—leading the government to suspend the P-3
family reuniﬁcation program.448 In 2010, the Department of State
proposed a policy to require mandatory DNA testing as a condition of

440. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(e) (2018).
441. The actual processes of establishing citizenship vary depending on whether the
parents are married and, if the parents are not married, whether the U.S. citizen is the
child’s mother or father. Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship at Birth by a Child Born
Abroad, U.S. Dep’t of State—Bureau of Consular Affs., https://travel.state.gov/
content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/us-citizenship/Acquisition-US-CitizenshipChild-Born-Abroad.html [https://perma.cc/9DSY-RR8L] (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
442. Information on DNA Testing, U.S. Dep’t of State—Bureau of Consular Affs.,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/us-citizenship/USCitizenship-DNA-Testing.html [https://perma.cc/3H2N-6YL3] (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
443. US Family Reunification, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, https://www.unhcr.org/enus/us-family-reunification.html [https://perma.cc/LYT8-S857] (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. See Fraud in the Refugee Family Reuniﬁcation (Priority Three) Program Fact
Sheet: Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, (Feb. 3, 2009),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2009/181066.htm
[https://perma.cc/P6LF-4KLF] [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of State, P-3 Program Fact Sheet].
448. Bonnie Erbe, Immigration Fraud Riddles Suspended Family Reuniﬁcation
Program, U.S. News & World Rep.: Thomas Jefferson St. (Dec. 11, 2008),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/erbe/2008/12/11/immigration-fraud-riddlessuspended-family-reuniﬁcation-program (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“The tests
were able to conﬁrm familial relationships in only 20 percent of cases, so six weeks ago the
department suspended the program until officials ﬁgure out a better way to run it.”).
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accessing the program.449 As of October 2012, all participants in the P-3
program must submit to genetic testing.450 Notably, African refugees
comprised over ninety-ﬁve percent of the participants in this program
prior to its suspension.451
The use of genetic tests to verify family relationships for immigration
purposes may be growing in popularity. In 2018, when the United States
government separated thousands of children from their parents at the
U.S.–Mexico border, some proposed using genetic tests to reunite the
separated families.452 In 2019, ICE began a pilot program using Rapid DNA
kits to evaluate the familial relationships of individuals apprehended by
DHS.453 When it ﬁrst adopted the policy in the summer of 2019, ICE issued
a privacy impact statement with DHS promising to destroy all DNA samples
and purge all data following the testing.454 Instead of destroying this
449. 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: DS-7656; Affidavit of
Relationship (AOR); OMB Control No. 1405–XXXX, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,690, 54,690 (Sept. 8,
2010).
450. See U.S. Dep’t of State, DHS & DHHS, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal
Year 2013 Report to the Congress 12 (2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/
organization/198157.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WSN-VTG5] (explaining that the P-3
program will resume in ﬁscal year 2013 with new requirements, including that “DNA
evidence of certain claimed biological parent-child relationships will be required” as part of
the program); Edward S. Dove, Back to Blood: The Sociopolitics and Law of Compulsory
DNA Testing of Refugees, 8 U. Mass. L. Rev. 466, 480–81 (2013) (discussing the Oct. 4, 2012,
press release from the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
which stated that DNA evidence of a biologic parent–child relationship will be required
under the P-3 Program).
451. U.S. Dep’t of State, P-3 Program Fact Sheet, supra note 447 (“In recent years, more
than 95% of the applications to the P-3 program have been African—primarily Somalis,
Ethiopians and Liberians.”).
452. Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Why There’s a Deep Cultural Aversion to DNA Testing,
Even When It Can Reunite Separated Immigrant Families, Time (July 17, 2018),
https://time.com/5340278/dna-testing-immigration-family-separation [https://perma.cc/
A8H3-C8GB].
453. DHS, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Rapid DNA Operational Use 1 (2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-rapiddna-june2019_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q567-8JXY] [hereinafter DHS, Rapid DNA Operational Use]; Priscilla
Alvarez & Geneva Sands, Exclusive: DHS to Start DNA Testing to Establish
Family
Relationships
on
the
Border,
CNN
Politics
(May
1,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/homeland-security-dna-testing-immigration/
index.html?no-st=1557614020 [https://perma.cc/Y6QL-RHDC]. Under U.S. immigration law,
U.S. citizens can bring close relatives to the United States, and in certain circumstances
refugees can join their family members in the United States. See Family, USCIS,
https://www.uscis.gov/family [https://perma.cc/Y7DT-ETXB] (last updated Dec. 31,
2019) (outlining how U.S. citizens may petition for relatives to immigrate to the United
States); U.S. Refugee Admission Program Access Categories, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/u-s-refugee-admissions-program-access-categories
[https://perma.cc/U6HC-7AMV] (last visited Aug. 27, 2020) (outlining how members of
designated nationalities may be reuniﬁed with family members already in the United States).
The government stated that the pilot program was to prevent fraud and child trafficking.
DHS, Rapid DNA Operational Use, supra, at 1.
454. DHS, Rapid DNA Operational Use, supra note 453, at 5.
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information, mere months later, the DOJ decided to further expand DNA
collection at the border.455 Since January 2020, DHS, ICE, and Border
Patrol have had the power to collect the DNA of all individuals in
immigration custody and to upload their data to the federal crime-solving
database CODIS.456 While this new expansion raises serious civil liberty
and social justice concerns outside the immediate scope of this Essay,457
for the purposes of our analysis, it demonstrates that immigration officials
are more than capable of mass DNA collection and testing at the border.
While able to identify a person’s genetic family members,458 genetic
tests cannot detect meaningful social relationships. Genetic tests for family
are both overinclusive and underinclusive, including some who lack a
familial relationship, while excluding others who may in fact have such a
relationship. As Professors Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett point out,
“[L]awmakers assume that a genetic tie stands in for another kind of
relationship, for example, that a genetic father should automatically be a
legal father, or a genetic parent should automatically confer citizenship
on her foreign-born child.”459 The reliance on genetic tests in immigration
law, however, may devalue the often far more signiﬁcant social ties that
constitute family. To start, deﬁnitions of family may vary from culture to
culture.460 Individuals may therefore not perceive themselves to be
engaging in fraud by asserting a familial relationship to someone with
whom they lack a genetic tie. Furthermore, over the course of immigration
proceedings, parents may discover that—despite their lived realities—they
are not in fact their children’s genetic relatives.461 For example, one man
who hoped to reunite with his sons after he became a United States citizen
took a genetic test to verify his paternity.462 The results revealed that only
one of his four sons was his genetic relative. His deceased wife had most
455. See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,397,
56,397 (proposed Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codiﬁed at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (proposing to remove
a DNA collection exemption for detained noncitizens).
456. DHS, CBP and ICE DNA Collection 1 (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/privacy-pia-dhs080-detaineedna-january2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY8SK7TA].
457. See Daniel I. Morales, Natalie Ram & Jessica L. Roberts, DNA Collection at the
Border Threatens the Privacy of All Americans, N.Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/opinion/dna-collection-border-privacy.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
458. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
459. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 22, at 768–69.
460. See generally James Georgas, Int’l Assoc. for Cross-Cultural Psych.: Online
Readings in Psych. & Culture, Family: Variations and Changes Across Cultures 1 (2003)
(discussing the different deﬁnitions, structures, and functions of the family in different
cultures and societies).
461. Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 Va. L. Rev. 629,
632 (2014).
462. Rachel L. Swarns, DNA Tests Offer Immigrants Hope or Despair, N.Y. Times (Apr.
10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/us/10dna.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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likely had an affair. As a result, he could only bring his biological son to
the United States. His three other sons, whom he had loved and raised,
stayed in Ghana.463 Ironically, under domestic family law—which values
social parenthood over biology in many cases—that man would have
probably had to pay child support for those very same children.464
Importantly, once the government has a person’s DNA sample, it
could use that genetic material for other kinds of genetic tests. Thus, a
sample collected for family reuniﬁcation purposes could be tested for
other things, including medical risk or genetic ancestry. Indeed, it is a very
small step from testing for genetic familial relatedness to testing for
national origin, ethnicity, and race. For example, in the United States,
asylum applicants must establish a well-founded fear of persecution in
their home country on the basis of at least one of ﬁve protected grounds:
(1) race, (2) religion, (3) nationality, (4) social group, or (5) political
opinion.465 Although not currently a practice in the United States,
immigration judges and officials could view DNA ancestry tests as a
relatively cheap and efficient way to verify asylum claims based on race or
nationality.
Using DNA ancestry tests in this way presents opportunities for the
government to discriminate—on the basis of race or nationality—against
those seeking to enter the country. Although such discrimination is
theoretically unlawful with respect to immigration visas,466 the United
States has a long and regrettable history of adopting racist exclusionary
policies,467 including President Trump’s infamous 2017 Muslim travel

463. Id.
464. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 22, at 790–92.
465. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (providing that in the asylum application
process, “[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee
within the meaning of [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)]”); see also id. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(deﬁning “refugee” as a person who is “outside [their] country of . . . nationality” and
“unable or unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of[] that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”); id. § 1101(a)(42)(B)
(deﬁning “refugee,” in special circumstances, as a person who is “within [their] country
of . . . nationality” and “persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion”).
466. See id. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (“[N]o person shall receive any preference or priority or be
discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” (emphasis added)).
467. U.S. immigration policy has a long history of discriminating against individuals on
the basis of race and national origin, and biological tests have played a role in implementing
past policies. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Cindy Hwang Chiang & Shirley S. Park, The Lost
Brown v. Board of Education of Immigration Law, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1657 (2013) (discussing the
line of Supreme Court cases in which the Court upheld Congress’s Chinese exclusion laws
and administrative policies that used blood-group testing to challenge the familial
relatedness claims of Chinese migrants during the Cold War).
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ban.468 Despite troubling implications of the ban, the Supreme Court
upheld the third version of the policy in 2018,469 and in early 2020, the
Trump administration expanded the travel ban to six new countries, four
of which are in Africa.470 Critics have called the expansion unfounded and
discriminatory.471
As we have explained at length, genetic ancestry does not speak to
social statuses. Thus, a DNA ancestry test is simply incapable of predicting
an immigrant applicant’s race, nationality, or social group. Moreover, the
use of genetic ancestry tests for veriﬁcation purposes could result in the
discriminatory exclusion of people from countries dubbed socially
undesirable, resulting in an immigration system reminiscent of that which
employed eugenics-driven medical examinations at the beginning of the
twentieth century.472 Recent events in the United Kingdom and Israel,
which we examine in the next section, highlight this potential.
2. International DNA Immigration Policies. — Both the United
Kingdom (U.K.) and Israel have used genetic testing to verify a person’s
race or ethnicity for immigration purposes. Like the United States, the
U.K. has an asylum program that provides refuge to individuals who face
persecution in their home countries. In 2009, the U.K. Border Agency
began an initiative called the “Human Provenance Pilot Project.”473
Responding to perceptions that asylum seekers were falsifying their
nationality,474 the British government instituted a pilot program to test the
validity of asylum claims using genetic ancestry. Under the program,
individuals who failed the language portion of the asylum screening could
voluntarily provide cheek swabs, hair samples, and nail clippings for use in
DNA ancestry tests and other forensic analyses.475
468. Proclamation No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
469. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–23 (2018).
470. The ban now extends to Nigeria, Eritrea, Tanzania, Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Myanmar (Burma). Geneva Sands, Trump Administration Expands Travel Ban to Include
Six New Countries, CNN Politics, https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/31/politics/trumpadministration-travel-ban-six-new-countries/index.html [https://perma.cc/4R2Q-CUHA]
(last updated Feb. 22, 2020).
471. Id.
472. See L.E. Cofer, Assistant Surgeon Gen., U.S. Pub. Health Serv., Eugenics and
Immigration: Large Amount of Bad Breeding Prevented by Medical Examination of Aliens
at Ports of Entry—Detection of Defectives More Thorough Now than Ever Before, Because
of Decrease in Numbers Arriving, Address Before the Young Men’s Christian Assoc. of
Wash., D.C. (Feb. 18, 1915), in 6 J. Heredity 170, 170–74 (1915) (describing the medical
examination criteria used to exclude immigrants from the United States at ports of entry).
473. Christopher Delatorre, Can DNA Prove Your Nationality?, Singularity Hub (June
14, 2010), http://singularityhub.com/2010/06/14/can-dna-prove-your-nationality/#more16827 [https://perma.cc/98CV-Z5S7].
474. Id. (“The UKBA—responsible for securing the border and controlling migration
in the UK—claims that falsifying nationality has been a particular problem for East
Africans.”).
475. See id. (“The Human Provenance Pilot Project was designed to test forensic
samples voluntarily given by asylum seekers who failed language analysis testing.”); see also
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This experimental policy drew criticism from both scientists and
human rights groups. Scientists described the project as “ﬂawed,”
explaining that nationality is a sociopolitical—not a genetic—category,476
and that genetic technologies could not track socially constructed
categories.477 Moreover, they explained that results can sometimes be
surprising and unexpected, such as when individuals who have parents
from two different geographic regions receive results classifying them in a
third region, from which neither parent came.478 One geneticist described
some of the tests being used for the project as “little better than genetic
astrology.”479
Human rights advocates likewise disapproved of the policy, believing
it could lead to serious injustice by invalidating legitimate asylum claims.480
They were also concerned that asylum seekers—who often ﬁnd themselves
without legal representation—might feel compelled or be manipulated
into sharing their genetic information. The British government defended
the highly criticized initiative with a written statement that “[a]ncestral
DNA testing will not be used alone but will combine with language analysis,
investigative interviewing techniques and other recognized forensic
disciplines.”481 It maintained that a combination of these techniques “may
indicate a person’s potential origin.”482
These critiques eventually led the U.K. Border Agency to terminate
the ill-advised initiative. Immigration officials temporarily halted the
program in October 2009, only to revive it in modiﬁed form in late

John Travis, Scientists Decry Isotope, DNA Testing of ‘Nationality’, 326 Science 30, 31
(2009) (“The Border Agency says only asylum-seekers who have already failed linguistic tests
. . . will be asked to provide mouth swabs, hair and nail samples.”).
476. See Travis, supra note 475, at 30 (“[G]enes don’t respect national borders, as many
legitimate citizens are migrants or direct descendants of migrants, and many national
borders split ethnic groups.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting David Balding)).
477. See Genetics Without Borders, 461 Nature 697, 697 (2009) (explaining that
genetic testing, such as Y-chromosome analysis, SNP-based identiﬁcations, and isotopic
analysis, cannot prove nationality or geographic origin).
478. Id.
479. Travis, supra note 475, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mark
Thomas).
480. See Jamie Doward, DNA Tests for Asylum Seekers ‘Deeply Flawed’, Guardian (Sept.
19, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/20/asylum-seeker-dna-tests
[https://perma.cc/R7Y7-S27C] (“Many of those who seek asylum are two or even three
generations removed from the country of origin of their parents and grandparents . . . . A
Zimbabwean farmer ﬂeeing persecution may possess the DNA of British relatives; would
they be denied asylum on that basis?” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sandy
Buchan of Refugee Action)).
481. Travis, supra note 475, at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.K.
Border Agency).
482. Id.
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November 2009.483 The program ended in March 2010.484 In June 2011,
the British government formally abandoned the effort entirely.485 Perhaps
not coincidentally, in 2012, the U.K. adopted the Protection of Freedoms
Act486 in response to the 2008 decision from the European Court of
Human Rights, which held that keeping innocent people’s DNA in a
criminal database violated the European Convention on Human Rights.487
Pursuant to the Protection of Freedoms Act, only individuals who have
been convicted of a crime will have their DNA proﬁles and ﬁngerprints
indeﬁnitely retained.
We agree with the critiques of the Human Provenance Project. As we
have argued throughout this Essay, DNA ancestry tests are ﬂawed.
Moreover, even if the these tests could perfectly predict where a person
was born, reliance on their results is still problematic. Like race, nationality
is a ﬂuid category, subject to variation and change. Locking in the place
where someone was born as their “true” national identity raises many of
the same concerns posed by conﬂating genetic ancestry with race. Just as
a 100% accurate genetic ancestry test—which does not and may never
exist—will never be a test for race, a 100% accurate genetic ancestry test
will not be a test for nationality.
More recently, the Israeli government conﬁrmed that it has used
genetic tests to verify claims of Jewishness related to immigration.488
Israel’s 1950 Law of Return provides that “[e]very Jew has the right to
come to this country as an oleh [immigrant].”489 Although the law did not
originally deﬁne who qualiﬁed as Jewish, a 1970 amendment clariﬁed that
“‘Jew’ means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become
converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.”490
483. U.K. Home Off., UKBA’s Human Provenance Pilot Project, GOV.UK (Oct. 14,
2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukba-s-human-provenance-pilot-project
[https://perma.cc/D55N-NPXQ] (responding to a freedom of information request).
484. Id.
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When Jewish people from the Soviet Union began to migrate in signiﬁcant
numbers to Israel in the 1990s,491 Israeli government officials greeted them
with skepticism.492 Indeed, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
instituted a policy that, to receive an immigration visa, a Russian-speaking
person who was born outside of a marriage must take a DNA test to prove
Jewish ancestry.493 However, the PMO was careful to explain that it was not
asking for a genetic test for Jewishness but rather a “test to determine a
family bond that entitles [the child to the right of return].”494 Thus, the
genetic tests in question were arguably not being used to test for ethnicity
but rather family relatedness, although that line could potentially blur.
One set of scholars described the policy as “an attempt to develop an
objective, scientiﬁc means of deﬁning the boundaries of the Jewish
population.”495
Like the U.K.’s Human Provenance Pilot Project, Israel’s use of
genetic tests for immigration purposes has been met with criticism. One
father whose daughter was denied a Birthright trip absent a genetic test
“called the policy ‘blatant racism toward Russian Jews.’”496 As noted, the
policy was recently the subject of a legal challenge before the High Court
of Justice.497 Several individuals ﬁled a petition against the Chief Rabbinate
and the rabbinical courts attacking the use of genetic tests to verify claims
of Jewishness.498 Among the major duties of rabbinical courts is rendering
decisions regarding whether a person is Jewish.499 The petitioners alleged
that relying on genetic tests in those cases constituted discrimination.
While the High Court disagreed, the majority opinion did instruct the
rabbinate to issue formal written rules relating to genetic testing within a
year.500 It is worth noting that statistics presented by the Israeli government
indicate that the courts conﬁrm most applications to corroborate
Jewishness, making genetic testing relevant in only a handful of cases.501
Interestingly, most objections to the policy seem to come from the alleged
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targeting of Russians and Eastern Europeans and from reducing Jewish
identity to a DNA test.
Thankfully, the United States has not yet adopted immigration
policies that explicitly rely on genetic race. However, the current hostility
toward immigrants from certain areas of the world and the widespread
DNA collection at the border certainly make such policies a very real
possibility. The infrastructure is already largely in place and precedent
(albeit highly controversial) from other countries exists. We therefore
strongly urge lawmakers and immigration officials to view these examples
as cautionary tales and to avoid using DNA ancestry tests as a misguided
proxy for racial, ethnic, or national identity. As with employment
discrimination and race-conscious initiatives, DNA ancestry tests function
as a poor proxy in the context of immigration.
*

*

*

As Part II describes, courts in the United States have historically used
biological race to create and reinforce racist social hierarchies. While
World War II led to the widespread rejection of scientiﬁcally veriﬁable
racial categories, DNA ancestry tests may smuggle in biological
determinations of race if adopted by courts as proxies for racial or ethnic
identity. Although the kinds of harms that may result from genetic race
that Part III describes are subtler than the blatant racism of the past, an
overreliance on DNA ancestry tests is nonetheless deeply problematic. We
therefore conclude in Part IV that courts and other decisionmakers should
reject genetic ancestry as a proxy for race.
CONCLUSION
The DNA ancestry testing industry shows that Americans are curious
about their genealogies and geographic origins. DNA ancestry tests have
the potential to assuage this curiosity and to augment our understanding
of the ways in which humans are interrelated. They certainly have
meaningful potential beneﬁts, such as connecting people with their
genetic family members and helping genealogists ﬁll in the missing
branches of their family trees. Yet, as this Essay shows, a cautionary warning
is in order. These tests reveal genetic ancestry, not race. As Part I explains,
the results of DNA ancestry tests vary depending upon the size of a
company’s database and knowledge of human population genetics at the
time. Because people of predominantly European descent make up most
of the reference databases, people with non-European ancestry get less
reliable results. It is therefore important not to take these results too
seriously.
Beyond their technological and methodological limitations, DNA
ancestry tests present considerable public policy challenges. Indeed, even
if the tests were 100% accurate, they alone should not serve as a proxy for
race. Because the tests are grounded in science, they reify biological

2020]

GENETIC RACE?

2015

conceptions of race (i.e., the belief that race is created by nature and is
genetically identiﬁable, static, and hereditary). Unsurprisingly, as Part II
explains, biological conceptions of race have been used to create and
justify racial hierarchies and racial subordination in the United States and
elsewhere.
Biological race, however, conﬂicts with the predominant modern view
of race as a social construction—as a concept that is structural, relational,
contextual, temporal, and experiential. Under the social constructionist
view of race, which this Essay adopts, Ralph Taylor and Cleon Brown are
not Black based on their genetic ancestry alone. Indeed, as Part III
explains, individuals who ground their racial identiﬁcation and racial
performances on DNA ancestry test results may be subject to accusations
of racial fraud and cultural appropriation.
Racial identity claims based on DNA ancestry tests may also reinforce
white privilege and instantiate existing racial hierarchies. Importantly, due
to the the principle of hypodescent, this choice appears to be largely
available only to whites. Whites ground their claims to Blackness on test
results that indicate a small percentage of sub-Saharan ancestry. Yet, if
Black people were to make a similar assertion (i.e., to claim whiteness
based upon test results indicating a small percentage of western European
ancestry), we posit that such clams would be greeted with skepticism. Thus,
as has historically been the case, one can more readily move down rather
than up in the U.S. racial hierarchy; access to whiteness remains elusive,
and white identity continues to be more difficult to assume than nonwhite
racial identities.
To conclude that DNA ancestry test results alone are inadequate
proxies for race does not mean that individuals subject to discrimination
based on these tests are without legal recourse. As we maintain in Part IV,
Title VII and GINA ought to provide relief, as these statutory interventions
are designed to prevent the foregoing discriminatory activity. To vindicate
this objective, we maintain that courts should interpret the term “genetic
information” in GINA broadly to encompass non-health-related tests. In
Title VII disparate treatment claims, we contend that courts should cease
requiring protected class membership as a prerequisite to bringing suit.
Rather, they should focus on the essential factual question of whether an
employer’s actions were motivated by race.
Some will argue that the analysis herein ignores the revolutionary
potential of DNA ancestry tests to show that most Americans (and indeed
most humans) are racially mixed and to thereby disrupt any notion of
biologically distinct races. Yet, as we point out in section III.C,
monoracialism has never been the reality in the United States. Moreover,
the contention that multiracialism will end racism is belied by historical
and contemporary evidence in countries where multiracialism has been
publicly encouraged and widely recognized. In addition, recent scholarly
research indicates that an embrace of multiracialism will neither obliterate
racial distinctions nor end anti-Black bias and discrimination. It may
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simply reconﬁgure existing hierarchies without eliminating structural
barriers.
Looking to the future, we can readily imagine a number of contexts
in which DNA ancestry tests will play an increasingly important role. Raceconscious initiatives and immigration law, which we consider in sections
IV.B and IV.C, respectively, are only two such areas. School admissions and
criminal investigations are others. As we venture forth, we hope that the
analysis herein will guide and inform future discussions and will help to
produce a world in which technological innovation and science will
advance, rather than hinder, social justice.

